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Abstract  
The concepts of ‘progress’ and ‘evolution’ share a long and entangled history stretching 
back into antiquity. Pre-Darwin all evolution was thought to be progressive, now from our 
modern perspective no evolution is progressive; our commitment to naturalism appears to 
place the concept of progress out of biological reach. In this dissertation we show that this 
modern perspective is mistaken. Progress as a natural, biological concept is both attainable 
and is in fact widely used throughout evolutionary biology, albeit somewhat implicitly. 
Defenders of the ‘fact/value gap’ may be forgiven for some initial scepticism on this point, 
as could those concerned that the aim of applying ‘progress’ to biological phenomena is 
invariably motived by anthropocentric wishful thinking; we make clear that evolutionary 
progress provides no grounds for human exceptionalism, and do so in a way which should 
not disturb David Hume or G.E.Moore.  
Organisms do things: they eat, excrete, fly and photosynthesise - they have functions. These 
are quite unlike any properties belonging to non-living entities and phenomena outside of 
the biological word, and their singular nature warrants a singular explanatory approach. We 
rely heavily on the ‘Selected Effects’ conception of function to provide warrant for the 
special handling of biological function, but are far from doctrinaire; the means through 
which the SE conception warrants normative interpretation, is quite different than its 
supporters have supposed. 
Evolution is thought to have produced many patterns in the natural world. Some are 
phantoms, the products of observers like ourselves hard-wired to seek regularity in disorder 
and intention and design in inanimate processes. Functions are not phantoms, they belong to 
the natural world, as does the progressive nature of the evolution produced by their 
incremental improvement.                    
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Chapter 1 
Progressive evolution: introduction and overview       
1.1 Three objections  
Evaluative terms like ‘progress’ and ‘improvement’ were at one time as closely-associated 
with biological evolution as much as ‘natural selection’ and ‘adaptation’ are today. 
Naturalists preceding Darwin adhered closely to the origins of the term in considering 
‘evolutionary’ changes as an ‘unfolding’ or ‘development’, when species evolved they 
improved. As with so much else in biology this changed after Darwin, although the 
diminishment of evolution’s progressive aspects was more gradual than might be supposed. 
The Malthusian picture of species competing in the struggle for survival with ‘natural 
selection’ in the role of arbiter seemed, if anything, to support rather than question 
evolution’s progressive credentials, driving organisms and species to ever greater strength 
and sophistication. Indeed Darwin himself at times struggled with it. Post-Darwin opinion 
initially remained divided on the issue, although from the advent of the twentieth century 
onwards the tide turned inexorably against an explicitly progressive interpretation. The 
growing confidence that Darwin was right, and that the theory of natural selection required 
no other supplementary forces to account for evolutionary phenomena was strengthened 
further by the identification of the mechanisms responsible for inheritance and the advances 
of the evolutionary synthesis made possible by this discovery. (Richards 1992, Ruse 1996, 
Shanahan 2004).  
From the perspective of modern biology now able to manipulate DNA, map the human 
genome, and develop artificial genetic material, the concept of progress in relation to 
evolution would seem to belong to a different era, a perspective largely shared by 
contemporary philosophy. We may broadly categorise the reasons for this antipathy as 
belonging to three camps.  
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The first of these is scientific: knowing as we do the empirical facts of natural selection, and 
informed by our ever growing knowledge of genetics and ontogeny there is no place for the 
concept of progress - other than human scientific progress - concerning evolutionary 
biology. And further, no theoretical reason why we should think that the generation of 
random variation coupled with differential selection should produce, let alone amount to, 
advance or improvement. Evolution by natural selection can explain changes in the 
composition of populations, and changes in population-members’ characteristics as a 
consequence, but this does not provide grounds to think that these changes embody progress 
in any way. Mature evolutionary theory it seems simply has no need for the concept. 
The second of these camps could be construed as political: the abuse of evolutionary theory 
in attempting to justify the horrors of eugenics and racial ‘purity’ do not need to be spelt out 
here; we need only note that the distance between terms such ‘progress’ and ‘improvement’ 
and those more politically charged such as ‘inferiority’ and ‘degeneracy’ can at times appear 
distressingly small. Given this history - and indeed partial resurgence (Fuller 2018) - an 
aversion to using concepts which rank - rather than sort - the products of evolution is 
understandable. More recently, the welcome dismantling of the ‘biological class system’ has 
been more expansive. A rejection of biological superiority seems implicit in recent attempts 
to direct the concerns we have for ourselves towards the natural world and its non-human 
inhabitants more generally. The suggestion that some species could be superior per se to 
others- or treated as though they are-  is increasingly recognised as untenable, 
environmentally damaging, and - in common with the notion of racial superiority - 
potentially giving a veneer of scientific respectability for abuses carried out by members of 
the putatively ‘superior’ category.   
The third of these camps is philosophical: the recognition of biology as an empirical science 
naturalistically emancipated from supernatural characterisation was a battle hard fought and 
is a hill upon which many contemporary philosophers are happy to perish. Although it may 
look very like there is purpose, direction, intention and design in evolution, we must be 
explicit that the use of these terms is metaphorical - albeit perhaps unavoidable - when 
describing the causes of evolution and the phenomena that evolution can produce. Evolution 
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by natural selection is a natural mechanism, and the reintroduction of ‘improvement’ and 
‘progress’ into the evolutionary lexicon is a regressive step in the wrong, anti-naturalist 
direction. The naturalist/anti-naturalist dialectic is one philosophical front, the naturalist/
normative dialectic is another. The application of terms such as ‘progress’ and 
‘improvement’ would seem to presuppose the existence of ‘standards’ or ‘values’ in order 
for any comparison of evolutionary phenomena to be carried out. But ‘standards’ as 
normally construed belong to people and to practices: rules of etiquette, safely limits in 
engineering and so on; appealing to the ‘standards’ of nature itself appears to be quite odd 
and unwarranted. How are these ‘standards’ set? How do we go about finding them out? 
And perhaps most importantly- ‘how is our understanding of nature improved by thinking 
of it in this way?’ If evolutionary biology is to be considered a respectable naturalistic, 
empirical enterprise its currency must be in facts; it should not be in evaluative concepts 
more at home in ethical or aesthetic discourse. 
Yet despite these camps’ concerns the problem of progress in evolution refuses to go away. 
Not only is lay use of the term ‘evolution’ almost synonymous with ‘gradual improvement’, 
moreover the idea of evolution as a progressive, improving, process has been held firmly 
and explicitly by a number of leading evolutionary scientists: J.Huxley (1942), 
T.Dobzhansky (1956), B.Rensch (1959), F.Ayala (1974), G.G.Simpson (1974), E.Mayr 
(1988), D.Raup (in Nitecki (eds.) 1988), W.Wimsatt and J.C.Schank (in Nitecki (eds.) 
1988), J.T.Bonner (1988), E.O.Wilson (1991), R.Dawkins (1996a), M.T.Ghiselin (1999), 
S.Conway-Morris (2003), and B.Rosslenbroich (2014) for example. It is difficult to 
conclude that we should put these scientists’ collective opinion down to the lingering 
influence of 19th century metaphysics and move on.  
Our aim in the work ahead will be to show that a wholesale rejection of progress in 
evolution is a mistake. Despite us enjoying respected - if select - biological company this 
positioning sets us firmly against the tide of philosophical orthodoxy. Crossing the well-
recognised chasm between natural description and normative evaluation is normally fraught 
with philosophical peril. We hope to show that this tension can be diffused somewhat 
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concerning certain evolutionary phenomena, while simultaneously respecting the concerns 
from both the scientific and political camps.  
If the scientific objection is correct and there is little reason to think that a mechanism based 
upon the biased retention and propagation of random variation should generate 
‘improvement’ or ‘progress’ in anyway, there is equally no prima facie reason to think that 
the mechanism of natural selection should rule out the production of such phenomena. We 
do not usually demand that the empirical consequences of theories should be immediately 
derivable from their basic formulations. A line of argument based upon our inability to 
expect progress or improvement from natural selection could be just as easily applied to 
other common evolutionary phenomena such as speciation, sexual reproduction and so on; 
there is nothing in the basic tenets of natural selection that would lead us to expect these 
widespread phenomena either yet we hold natural selection to be the mechanism 
responsible. Even if natural selection does not predict ‘improvement’ or ‘progress’, as with 
these other evolutionary phenomena, this is a long way from saying that natural selection 
cannot account for them. Moreover the contention that we can expect change through the 
action of natural selection but not ‘improvement’ may not be as secure as is traditionally 
thought. As we will see, once we delve deeper into the reasons why certain variants provide 
the selection advantages they do the language of ‘progress’ and ‘improvement’ is both 
justified and empirically appropriate.    
Concerning the political unease which treating evolution evaluatively in this way might 
arouse, our strategy in this dissertation will be to avoid this as much as possible by taking 
human evolution out of the equation as much as possible. We will establish our case for the 
restricted application of terms such as ‘better’, ‘improvement’, and ‘progress’ and so on in 
regards to non-human evolutionary phenomena first before specifically human evolution is 
introduced. Even then this will fall far short of a defence of human superiority. This should 
not be seen as ducking the issue; clearly Homo Sapiens are as much as product of natural 
selection as are any other species, but all too often philosophical approaches to evolutionary 
progress are compromised by anthropocentrism, either by deliberate inclusion of the author 
(Spencer 1891, Huxley 1942), or by providing a too-easy target for their critics (Simpson 
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1949, Gould 1988). By largely omitting human evolution from what follows our intention is 
to show that a progressive interpretation of evolution does not require any commitment to 
the former, while insulating our position from the dangers of the later. 
The philosophical problems of justifying the application of non-naturalist or normative 
terms to natural phenomena are not as easily circumvented however - these will be dealt 
with directly. A recognition of progress in evolution neither requires a return to an 
intentional, teleological perspective rightly discarded by contemporary Darwinism, nor need 
it involve an unwarranted application of ethical or aesthetic terms better used to appraise the  
behaviour of moral agents. Although the progressive nature of evolution can be understood 
quite naturalistically without recourse to non-natural forces, the normative aspects of 
evolutionary ‘progress’ and ‘improvement’ are more subtle and accordingly require more 
careful philosophical treatment. As with naturalism itself, normativism comes in different 
varieties, and the normativism involved in recognising established standards within 
evolutionary phenomena is very different from that required in the recognition of ethical or 
aesthetic evaluation. There has been much confusion in this area, both from those who 
maintain an absolute moratorium on the use of evaluative terms in empirical science on the 
one hand, and from those who contend that by virtue of selection biological entities have 
functions that they are ‘supposed’ to perform on the other. Neither of these positions are 
correct. Analysis reveals a third way. There is no philosophical prohibition against the use of 
performative terms when describing certain biological phenomena, but this does not provide 
further warrant to think species, organisms or traits have ‘obligations’ in any non-
metaphorical sense. Our reasons for thinking this will be made explicit. 
1.2 Progress: intuitions and prohibitions 
There are as many conceptions of evolutionary progress as there are authors on the subject, 
and this dissertation proves to be no exception. While it is difficult to find common ground 
concerning evolutionary progress in the work of authors as distinct as are G.G.Simpson and 
E.O.Wilson, or as philosophically diverse as are Herbert Spencer and David Raup, there are 
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general guidelines - central properties - that those sympathetic to progressive evolution 
implicitly respect. 
The first of these is directionality. All evolution involves change, but only a subset of 
evolutionary change is directional in the sense that a series of evolutionary events could be 
reliably arranged into the correct temporal sequence absent knowledge of the actual order in 
which they occurred (Ayala, in Nitecki, (eds.) 1988). Directionality per se however does not 
amount to progress. As was repeatedly emphasised by Gould (1988b, 1990, 1996, 1997a) 
and affirmed with considerable rigour by Brandon and McShea (McShea 1998, McShea & 
Brandon 2010) the nature of evolutionary processes are such that directionality can be 
expected of them in ways very different from those which even a liberal interpretation could 
describe as ‘progressive’ . Directionality is evidently necessary if progress is to be made but 1
it is far from sufficient. 
The second theme weaving through the progressive literature concerns the causes of 
evolution rather than its effects. Whatever various writers think evolutionary progress is, it 
cannot be accidental: there must be a force, influence or mechanism responsible for the 
directional evolution produced. So in addition to being directional, progress in evolution 
must also be driven. Early naturalists considered the causes of progressive evolution to be 
either supernatural in the form of divine intent, or due to as-yet-undiscovered forces or 
substances, although for modern conceptions of evolutionary progress natural selection is 
the near-exclusive causal mechanism . For Julian Huxley (1942) progress consists in the 2
greater control of- and independence from- an organism’s environment; for J.Bonner (1988) 
progress can be witnessed through the positive correlation between size and anatomical 
 The increases in both anatomical complexity and diversity between species more generally is probably the 1
clearest example of a directional evolutionary trend produced incidentally. Reproduction is an inexact 
process and as a result differences should compound generation upon generation unless these effects are 
countered by opposing influences. Kimura’s ‘Neutral Theory of Evolution’ (Kimura 1968) use as a basis for 
calculating evolutionary time based on the regularity of random and selectively neutral variation is another.  
 Why does natural selection not enjoy total exclusivity? Championed by Rosslenbroich (2009, 2014) the 2
apparent evolutionary trend towards greater ‘autonomy’ in the sense of increased self-reliance and resilience 
to external, environmental influences is a plausible one - which Rosslenbroich suggests may be driven by 
factors other than natural selection. Rosslenbroich however leaves this as an open question, and as such we 
will not pursue this line of enquiry further here.  
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complexity, for Richard Dawkins progress consists in the “ ...accumulating number of 
features contributing towards whatever adaptation the lineage in question 
exemplifies.” (Dawkins 1996a, p1017). These are very different perspectives on what 
evolutionary progress consists in, but there is no disagreement here as to the identity of the 
driving force behind these diverse effects. For Huxley, greater control of- and independence 
from the environment is selectively beneficial, as are Bonner’s increases in size and 
anatomical complexity, whereas Dawkins’ increase in number of contributory features is 
explicitly adaptive.  
The third theme is an effect: improvement. For an evolutionary series to be progressive the 
sequence must not only be directional and driven, it must also leave whatever is evolving in 
a ‘better’ or improved condition. Given the vagueness of this qualification, various authors 
have widely different perspectives on what improvement consists in. G.G.Simpson suggests 
increases in ‘awareness and reactibility’ to be one facet of evolutionary progress, and 
‘internal fertilisation’ and ‘postnatal care’ to be others (Simpson 1949); for Wimsatt & 
Schank (in Nitecki, (eds.) 1988) increases in the amount of genetic information promote 
‘ ...the possibilities for, and capability of producing and maintaining a larger variety of more 
complex adaptions through evolutionary time’ (ibid p233); for Bernhard Rensch, it is 
increases in anatomical complexity, rationality, and the refinement of the nervous system 
which provide progressively evolving organisms with their advantage (Rensch 1959).  
From a naturalistic standpoint directionality is unproblematic, many natural processes are 
directional in the sense that earlier and later stages of the process could be placed in correct 
temporal order; direction simpliciter in evolution is commonplace. The existence of ‘drive’ 
in evolution is also comparatively uncontentious, as long as the nature of the force 
responsible remains naturalistic. As natural selection is held near-universally responsible for 
evolutionary progress by modern supporters this too remains unproblematic. It is with the 
third theme: improvement, that proponents of evolutionary progress appear to depart from 
scientific explanation. Most naturalists - and naturalistically inclined philosophers - would 
be happy to acknowledge the existence of directional trends in evolution and be more than 
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happy to consider natural selection as responsible, but recognising such trends as progress 
or improvement is often thought a step too far.   
Our perspective on evolutionary progress follows closely in the spirit of those preceding by 
respecting each of these central properties. The type of evolution which we recognise as 
progressive is directional: in that given stages belonging to a sequence of progressive 
evolution we would with some confidence be able to place each stage in the correct order in 
which they occurred; and our type of progressive evolution is also driven: in that in 
common with nearly all other post-synthesis conceptions the mechanism responsible for its 
generation is natural selection. However the progress defended in this dissertation also 
explicitly charts improvements brought about by evolution - we do not shy away from the 
term. As we will see there is nothing in our use of ‘improvement’ to which evolutionary 
science might object; indeed in many cases it is difficult to see how empirical analysis might 
describe the phenomena without the use of performative terms.      
Our guiding aim in the work ahead is to show that progress in evolution is real. It does not 
rely on subjective or questionable evaluations of natural phenomena, nor does it rely on 
empirical facts or philosophical concepts not already in general circulation. Moreover the 
type of progress which we defend in this dissertation conforms with both informed and 
intuitive use. Organisms possess traits which are real, and traits possess functions which are 
real, and the level at which traits perform their functions is not something imposed on them 
by external appraisal but is a quality of the traits themselves. Put simply some traits perform 
their functions better than do other traits. When a directional sequence of evolution features 
improvement in a given function and is driven by the selection advantages that each 
functionally-improved stage provides, the sequence will be progressive.  
By recognising evolutionary progress in this way, we hope to avoid some common pitfalls 
to which previous attempts have been vulnerable.  
Firstly, by recognising evolutionary progress as functional improvement, progress does not 
become too permissive. We do not claim that progress is a near-necessary consequence of 
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evolution as per Herbert Spencer’s conception of progress, characterised as the inexorable 
creep of increasing complexity and differentiation (Spencer 1891), nor does the 
qualification of ‘progress’ become vacuous by overuse. Only a subset of evolutionary 
phenomena are produced by natural selection, and only a subset of the phenomena produced 
by natural selection are progressive.  
However secondly, by recognising progress as functional improvement we do not 
characterise progress as too rarified or unusual. We might recognise this as a failing of 
Huxley’s conception (Huxley 1941), if progress consists in ‘greater independence from and 
control of the environment’ it is difficult to see how this might apply to the evolution of 
organisms outside of the narrow category of metazoans. The possession of traits, and the 
possession of functions however can be appreciated quite broadly. Progress could be 
witnessed in the functional improvement of the traits of bacteria: such as the locomotive 
abilities granted by a mobile flagellum; the traits of archaea: such as ability of cannulae to 
exchange nutrients with proximate conspecifics; and the traits of metazoans: such as the 
visual acuity bestowed by the possession of functioning eyes.   
Lastly, the conception of evolutionary progress as brought about through functional 
improvement is not impressionistic, nor is it based upon a vague or ill-defined notion of 
what progress might consist in. E.O.Wilson (1991) for example provides us with certain 
examples of ‘progressive’ events: the origin of eukaryotic organisms, the Cambrian 
explosion, to name but two, events which permitted increases in biodiversity, but Wilson 
provides no further rationale for thinking biodiversity itself should be progressive. It may 
seem that way but - as our work in chapter 4 will reveal - impressions are not enough. By 
contrast, should we know what the function of a trait is, we have good grounds for knowing 
what improvement in that trait’s functioning would be, and a realistic expectation that we 
would be able to recognise and empirically measure ‘better-functioning’ if we saw it.  
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1.3 Underlying themes.  
Weaving through this dissertation are a number of thematic strands. Some of these will be 
focused on quite directly, while others will be more peripheral. Perhaps the most evident is 
the explanatory scope of natural selection. Familiarity has perhaps made this fact less 
striking than it actually is: that such diversity and intricacy of ‘design’ as is found in the 
natural world formerly requiring the powers of a divine creator to be made intelligible might 
be accounted for using such a profoundly simple theory. We take a population of 
reproducing entities with different characteristics, ensure that these characteristics are 
heritable, ensure that differences in character causally influence reproduction, add an open-
ended source of random variation, allow considerable time, and what began as a relatively 
simple population of abiotic entities incrementally evolves into the complexity and diversity 
of the living world that we witness today. Phenomena which formerly required intention and 
design are accounted for through the operation of a mindless and aimless naturalistic 
process. We will notice however that accounting for progress in evolution places additional 
and surprising demands on natural selection’s explanatory scope. 
Our second subsidiary theme concerns the relationship between normative terms and natural 
phenomena. Given that natural selection is considered sufficient to account for such 
intricacy and ‘design’ it is perhaps surprising that the established position on what natural 
selection can and cannot explain should extend to: i) the existence of the traits and 
behaviours of organisms and species but stop short of: ii) warranting an evaluative 
understanding of the evolutionary processes which created them. Running though the work 
ahead is the thought that some aspects of nature are ‘normative’ independently of human 
interpretation, this warrants using normative terms to describe them.  
Our third theme concerns the interplay between the representation and the reality of 
evolutionary phenomena. All representation to some extent misrepresents and this in turn 
may bias our understating of the phenomena represented. Representation may omit 
properties of the phenomena which it does possess or equally lend the phenomena qualities 
which it does not. Awareness of this can mitigate misunderstanding to some degree, but the 
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means of representing evolutionary phenomena: the metaphors, the intentional and 
teleological nature of explantation, the ‘historical’ methods used interpret evolution, are 
pervasive and lie deep in evolutionary science. We remain vigilant to this throughout.  
Our final underlying theme concerns the methodology used in understanding evolutionary 
phenomena. The usual approach for supporters of progress can be characterised as a ‘top-
down’, pattern-centred approach. Previous attempts to characterise progress in evolution 
commence with the identification of ‘progressive’ phenomena: the biodiversity of the living 
world, the complexity or living organisms, the adaptive fit of species to their environments 
and so on - an impressionistic exercise. The work ahead makes full use of this approach, but 
not exclusively. A ‘bottom-up’, process-centred approach is also required. A pervasive 
thought in what follows is that the means of generation for such phenomena - its mechanism 
- should also be at the core of the concept of progress in evolution. This is usually thought 
of as expendable in progressive accounts but our thinking in the work ahead indicates this to 
have been a mistake.   
We will later reappraise these themes in the light of the work to follow.  
1.4 Précis of the chapters ahead       
We start in chapter 2 by defending the causal and creative powers allocated to natural 
selection in the face of recent philosophical attempts at reappraisal. Despite this being 
something of a rear-guard action in that we defend the powers of natural selection that 
orthodoxy already acknowledges it to posses, the analysis required proves to be instructive. 
There are two arguments here: one defending natural selection as a casual process, and 
another defending natural selection as a creative process, and both must prove successful if 
natural selection is to act as a basis for evolutionary progress that subsequent chapters 
require. 
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Questions concerning natural selection’s causal potency are typically directed towards the 
extent of phenomena that natural selection can explain, or the nature of entities through 
which natural selection can be said to exert its causal influence. Opinion in both of these 
areas is divided. In terms of extent, discussion might be directed towards identifying the 
scale of natural selection’s contribution for certain phenomena in contrast to the contribution 
of other evolutionary influences: drift, mutation/developmental factors, and migration. The 
long running debate concerning adaptationism is probably the clearest example of this type 
of inquiry: do we consider natural selection’s role in evolutionary change to be such that 
these other factors can be safely marginalised in explaining the evolution of traits and 
characteristics? How big a part do chance events or contingent factors influence evolution in 
comparison to natural selection? Questions such as these presuppose natural selection’s 
causal efficacy. 
However, running alongside these debates concerning the extent of natural selection’s causal 
powers, there is another which fundamentally questions whether natural selection has any 
causal efficacy at all. The position which we characterise as the ‘non-causal view’ considers 
the traditional picture of natural selection as a causal mechanism changing the composition 
of populations to be misconceived. The genuine site of causal interaction is between 
individuals and their environment, it is this and this alone which dictates the fate of 
individuals and their characteristics. Individuals interact, change in population composition 
is the effect; the traditional view of natural selection as a casual mechanism is 
misconceived, natural selection is the accumulated consequence of these individual 
interactions, not their cause. In response to this striking claim, we examine Roberta 
Millstein’s suggestion that exclusive focus on the causal interactions of individuals is a 
mistake in evolutionary explanations. Populations of individuals have properties which 
individuals do not and some of these are causally efficacious in a way which cannot be 
explained using the non-causalist individual-centric perspective. We find Millstein’s 
argument to be convincing, we notice however that the ground being fought on between the 
non-causalists and Millstein is somewhat different than their arguments might suggest. The 
causal efficacy of individuals verses the causal efficacy of populations arises due the 
conception of individuals and populations as distinct entities. This is incorrect. Individuals 
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are parts of populations, and populations are composed from individuals; the debate is not 
one of causality but of mereology.              
As the name indicates, natural selection is a selection process, a point very much capitalised 
on by defenders of what we then characterise as the ‘non-creative view’. For nature to 
favour the propagation of certain types over others, these types must be different in some 
respect; natural selection requires differences first in order that they then be selected from. 
This again leads to quite a striking conclusion. If natural selection’s causal efficacy stretches 
only as far as favouring or disfavouring pre-existing variation, evolutionary science would 
appear to be mistaken by holding it responsible for the creation of complex and adaptive 
traits. The genuine site of biological creativity is to be found in the genomes of individual 
organisms and their development; mutation and genetic recombination create, natural 
selection promotes or eliminates. In contrast to the arguments of Millstein and the non-
causalists, the ground on which the non-creative argument is fought does concern the nature 
of causality. We recognise that natural selection’s efficacy is limited to the favouring or 
disfavouring of pre-existing variation, but note that through this ability the background 
conditions necessary for the creation of complex, adaptive traits are produced. 
With natural selection’s causality and creativity secured, our attention in chapter 3 turns to 
the questions of how natural selection favours or disfavours certain types of variation, and 
how these empirical ‘facts on the ground’ should be understood philosophically. This 
chapter answers both the worries of the scientific and philosophical camps concerning 
progress in evolution. We begin by noticing that the reconciliation of natural facts and 
normative values typically attempts to explain the capacity for normative judgment, or the 
reasons for the judgments themselves, naturalistically. In contrast, when we describe 
evolution as ‘progressive’ and its effects as ‘improvements’ we are instead attempting to 
‘normativise’ natural phenomena. We see that despite natural selection’s efficacy extending 
to the differential propagation of random variation only, the reasons for some variants 
having the selection advantages that they do is due to these variants performing their 
biological functions to an improved standard. This claim is supported using the ‘selected 
effects’ conception of biological function, and through doing so we recognise that 
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improvement in biological functioning is not a quirk or marginal characteristic of natural 
selection but instead is a fundamental property. We note that in opposition to the 
scientifically-oriented concerns that natural selection can explain change, but that it cannot 
explain improvement, a considerable amount of natural selection cannot be understood 
without recourse to such progressive terminology. Contra the philosophical worries that 
progress in evolution imports normative terms into scientific discourse without warrant, we 
suggest that what normativity is imported by use of evaluative concepts such as 
‘improvement’ and ‘progress’ is fully justified by the nature of the phenomena described.                               
                              
In chapter 4 we widen our perspective from chapter 2’s defence of first principles, and 
chapter 3’s defence of normative interpretation, to appraise the patterns suggested to have 
been created by evolution at the largest of spatial and temporal scales. Here we recognise 
that even the most striking of patterns in the natural world can be produced incidentally. 
‘Quasi patterns’ such as these can provide us with no further insight into nature’s operation. 
Those patterns for which a mechanism can be found however - ‘authentic patterns’ - can 
often prove informative and revelatory. Once we have secured the conceptual means 
through which quasi and authentic patterns may be discriminated, we return to the 
established literature regarding evolutionary progress, and apply our analysis to two high 
profile ‘progressive’ evolutionary patterns.  
The first of these patterns, suggested by Richard Dawkins, is proved to be authentic. The 
gradual co-adaptation which Dawkins characterises as ‘arms-races’ between predator and 
prey coheres neatly with our preceding analysis-  and is in fact a special case of the progress 
we describe in chapter 3. The pattern of escalation described by Dawkins is not accidental - 
in that there is a clear, reliable and well understood mechanism available to account for the 
observed pattern. We find that the co-adaptation characteristic of arms-races respects 
additional desiderata in that the mechanism responsible for the pattern is able to ‘screen-off’ 
lower level events underlying a pattern’s surface phenomena; is able to regulate which 
phenomena belong to the pattern and which do not; and finally the mechanism which 
generated the pattern not only accounts for the pattern’s ‘elements’- those phenomena that 
together comprise the pattern - but also accounts for the arrangement of the elements in the 
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specific configuration provided. Wilson’s pattern comprised from various ‘landmark’ events 
in the history of life on Earth fares less well in the light of this analysis. Lacking an obvious 
underlying mechanism to explain both its elements and their arrangement we note Wilson’s 
pattern appears arbitrary and unreliable; certain stages are largely accidental, and 
consistency seems to necessitate the inclusion of other missing elements into the pattern. 
Additionally, certain stages force us to tackle the minutiae of their specific occurrences - the 
pattern presented by Wilson does not ‘screen-off’ lower level events in the manner required. 
We close chapter 4 by considering what properties large scale progressive patterns such as 
that suggested by Wilson would need to posses for us to consider them as authentic, and 
note that the only plausible casual mechanism currently available for their generation is 
natural selection.  
In chapter 5 the ‘political’ issue of anthropocentrism held at bay until now is confronted. 
The blows dealt by Stephen J.Gould to the possibility of a coherent and naturalist approach 
to progress in evolution continue to reverberate, but here we find that his dismissal of 
evolutionary progress as anthropocentric ‘wishful thinking’ to be unconvincing. We 
additionally find Gould’s aversion to conceiving of evolution as a ‘linear’ process, 
transforming one species into another to be unwarranted. Evolutionary lineages are real and 
denying this can - and indeed has - led to persistent confusion. We do not however dismiss 
all of Gould’s concerns. While lineages are real, they are also easy to misrepresent. We 
make explicit two procedures which are commonly used in the identification of lineages, 
and the methods used to represent their evolution, with emphasis on evolution which has 
occurred within certain lineages over large amounts of time. The first of these procedures is 
delineation: the process of picking out from the many splits and diversifications of the ‘tree 
of life’ the narrow sequence that connects a descendant population with its evolutionary 
predecessors. Approaches to evolutionary progress which perform this procedure usually 
consider the lineage identified as somehow more central or important in evolutionary 
history. We support Gould in recognising this as a mistake, but note that it is only the 
reification of a lineage which is unwarranted, not the coherence of the lineage itself.  
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The second of these procedures is demarcation: the nature of evolutionary lineages is such 
that they may be composed from a vast amount of individual organisms and can chart quite 
radical changes in morphology. A preparatory step in understanding these changes is to 
divide a chosen lineage into ‘stages’ in order to appropriately index the evolution which the 
lineage has undergone. Despite this procedure’s common implementation, we note that 
demarcating a lineage using impartial means may miss out much of what we expect an 
evolutionary explanation to provide on the one hand, while demarcating according to 
qualitative aspects of the evolutionary changes themselves can severely mislead on the 
other. Unlike the procedure of delineation which picks out a real and objective part of the 
natural world, we suggest that the procedure of demarcation will always be project specific; 
any one delineated evolutionary sequence may be demarcated in any number of different 
ways.  
We look at three examples of demarcation: the first is one of our own, the evolutionary 
lineage linking the modern whale with its prehistoric land-based ancestor, Pakicetus; the 
two remaining examples are from evolutionary literature: the evolution of the novel 
phenotype ‘Cit+’ in the Long Term Evolutionary Experiment (LTEE); and evolution of the 
vertebrate eye in work of Nilsson & Pelger. We note that the way in which these lineages are 
demarcated greatly influences our attitude to the nature of their evolution. 
Finally in chapter 6, our valedictory tasks are to recap, reappraise and conclude. With the 
benefit of our undertaken analysis we focus on the objections spelt out at the start of this 
chapter from empirical science, naturalist philosophy and those concerned that a defence of 
progress in evolution may open the door for ‘political’ abuse. We confirm that none of these 
camps should have grounds for suspicion. We then revisit this dissertation’s central themes: 
the explanatory scope of natural selection, the relationship between normative terms and 
natural phenomena, the relationship between representation and reality, and the 
methodology used in understanding evolutionary phenomena, appraise their influence, and 
realise that we have rarely stayed from at least one of them. Finally we turn our attentions to 
the properties traditionally thought to central to modern accounts of evolutionary progress: 
direction, drive and improvement. We recognise our perspective to be very much in keeping 
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with these former approaches, but additionally suggest that our analysis provides something 
which previous attempts do not- an empirical account for the appearance of design in the 
natural world as generated by progressive evolutionary processes.  
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Chapter 2 
Natural selection: causality & creativity   
2.1 Introduction  
Perhaps the greatest success of natural selection is explaining the remarkable fit of 
organisms to the environments that they inhabit. The phenomena are familiar and 
ubiquitous: fish have gills and sleek fusiform bodies well-suited to their aquatic habitat, 
while cacti posses fleshy stems and sharp spines which aid water retention and deter thirsty 
herbivores in their arid surroundings; organisms are well-suited to their environments as a 
matter of course. A brief summary of how naturalists accounted for this phenomena might 
go as follows: stretching back into antiquity it was almost universally believed that 
organisms were expressly designed so as to suit their environments, until at the beginning of 
the 19th century it was gradually realised that organisms that changed could also account for 
their environmental suitability if they did so by adjusting their characteristics in response to 
the environment in appropriate ways. The mysterious mechanism responsible for achieving 
this was originally thought to be located within the organisms themselves, with progress 
accrued over an individual lifetime of environmental adjustment retained and passed on by 
inheritance; a suggestion which became increasingly untenable empirically. The means of 
environmental accommodation or ‘adaptation’ were then externalised to processes occurring 
outside of the individual organism; a development which signals to many the turning point 
at which evolution was naturalised (Ruse 1996, Bowler 2009). It was not necessary for 
individual organisms to change their own characteristics to suit the environment, given 
readily available conditions the environment would ‘naturally-select’ between existing 
character-variants and promote the propagation of those with a greater environmental 
suitability over those with less by virtue of their differential reproduction. Given other fairly 
uncontentious conditions ‘Paley’s question’ of apparent design (Neander 1995, Razeto-
Barry 2013) could be answered satisfactorily by known biological properties and dynamics; 
no designer or mysterious forces required.        
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In the terms of accounting for the fit of organisms to their environments this final picture 
has remained essentially unchanged although debate has ranged on a number of subsidiary 
issues: the relative importance of natural selection in comparison to other causal influences 
in producing the design-like characteristics of organisms (Gould & Lewontin 1979, Dennett 
1995, Dawkins 1997, Godfrey-Smith 2001, Sterelny 2003); the conditions required for 
natural selection to create adaptive traits when it does in fact do so (Lewontin 1970, Endler 
1986, Brandon 1999, Godfrey-Smith 2007); and whether natural selection exclusively 
produces adaptations for organisms alone or whether populations, species or higher taxa 
could themselves posses adaptations by virtue of similar dynamics operating at these 
‘higher’ compositional levels (Grafen 1984, Wilson 1992, Sterelny 1996, Gardner & Grafen 
2009). What natural selection can and cannot do is clearly fertile ground for debate. 
Recently however, shared assumptions underlying these debates have themselves become 
candidates for philosophical reappraisal.  
Attacks have come from two fronts. Firstly, for natural selection to do anything at all it must 
be casually efficacious and this, it has been suggested, fundamentally misconstrues what 
natural selection actually is. We may be able to explain the fit of organisms to their 
environment through natural selection to a satisfactory degree, but employing the term in 
this way is in fact an instrumental convenience rather than an accurate representation of 
empirical reality. Natural selection is not the cause of adaptive phenomena- it is not a cause 
at all, according to a committed group of philosophers- but a consequence of lower-level 
events. It serves as a kind of explanatory shorthand through which we conceptually group 
the actual but disparate causes of adaptive phenomena in a regulated and tractable way 
(Rosenberg 1994, Walsh 2000, Walsh, Lewens & Ariew 2002, Lewens 2004, Matthen & 
Ariew 2009).            
The second front attacks natural selection’s creativity. The traditional view which regards 
natural selection as a process that creates the remarkable adaptive fit of organisms to their 
environments through the slow accumulation of favoured traits over others is, according to 
the non-creative view, mistaken. Biological novelty is ultimately sourced from mutation, not 
selection. Once variation has arisen then natural selection retains, ignores, or - as is almost 
19
always the case- eliminates that variation. As nature can only select from options that are 
already available, regarding natural selection as the creative source of variation and by 
extension adaptation is mistakenly awarding credit in the wrong place. The traditional view 
of natural selection creating solutions to answer environmental demands is, it is claimed, 
based on a fundamental but pervasive mischaracterisation (Sober 1995, Stegmann 2010, see 
Razeto-Barry & Frick 2011 for comprehensive overview of the ‘non-creative’ approach).  
Clearly if true either of these arguments would have profound consequences. If natural 
selection does not perform the creative work of the mysterious 19th Century forces 
wholesale in successively shaping organisms’ environmental suitability then what does? At 
best, the widely-held conception of natural selection as a producer and refiner of adaptive fit 
would have to be heavily revised at worst conceivably thrown out all together. Remarkably 
perhaps, recent work in this area appears to support an attitude that falls between revision 
and what even sober assessment would call revolution (Walsh 2000, Matten & Ariew 2009, 
Brunnander 2013). Rather than direct our efforts towards a detailed rebuttal of these various 
approaches, our aim in this chapter will be to focus on shared general shortcomings of both 
the ‘non-causal’ and ‘non-creative’ positions. As our task in the work ahead is to defend the 
conception of natural selection as cause of progressive evolution establishing its causal and 
creative efficacy is an important preliminary step.     
Notice that despite their apparent similarity  in perspective the argument for ‘non-causality’ 3
and the argument for ‘non-creativity’ are incompatible, at least prima facie. Should we hold 
the argument for non-causality then natural selection has no causal efficacy, so the 
contention of the non-creative argument that natural selection’s influence is entirely 
destructive is moot- it has no causal influence in need of accurate characterisation. 
Conversely, if we are convinced by the argument for non-creativity and believe natural 
selection’s influence to be limited to eliminating disadvantageous variation, then it must 
have some casual efficacy even if its powers are only destructive. With our eye turned 
towards the wider task of interpreting the effects of natural selection, it appears we may 
 And indeed, in some cases shared supporters (Walsh 1998, 2000)  3
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potentially spare ourselves some heavy lifting by countering the argument for non-creativity 
only. Showing, contra the non-creative argument, that natural selection creates, ipso facto 
shows that natural selection causes, so there should be no further requirement to directly 
engage with the arguments for non-causality. Although tempting, this short-cut will be 
avoided.  
Firstly, the apparently a priori prohibition on what natural selection can or cannot ‘do’ if 
shown to be non-causal may well more flexible than it first appears. We might, for example, 
agree that although natural selection is not actually casual, it retains an explanatory power 
which stems from viewing its influence as creative not as destructive. Holding such a view 
of natural selection as a kind of ‘quasi-creative mechanism’ is a position which, as I see it, 
should not be automatically dismissed out of hand. Our second and more important 
motivation for avoiding the short-cut is that the reason for both the non-causal and non-
creative arguments’ ultimate failure is additionally instructive. Addressing both arguments 
not only provides us with a broader conception of what sorts of phenomena natural selection 
can be called upon to justify (the creative argument), and illuminates the means through 
which natural selection goes about producing them (the causal argument), but also 
illustrates that both negative arguments against these positions are themselves based on 
shared assumptions. Non-causalists and non-creativists alike approach causation as an 
exclusive province of interactions at the ‘smallest’ and ‘closest’ possible level of analysis 
(Jackson & Pettit 1992). For non-causalists these interactions will be the life-history events 
of individual organisms, the idiosyncrasies of their births, endurance, propagation and 
deaths; for non-creativists it is the developmental effects caused by novel mutations in 
regards to their phenotypic consequences. Non-causalists believe that any causality 
discerned above the level of individual organism/environment interactions are a statistical 
abstraction, making natural selection explanatorily convenient but causally redundant; in a 
similar fashion supporters of the non-creative view believe that the creative work of 
producing phenotypic novelty is only ever carried-out ontogenetically, again no further 
contribution from natural selection is necessary. Through addressing both the non-causal 
and non-creative approaches we will see their shared methodological attempt to isolate the 
site of evolutionary causality is misconceived and erroneously mischaracterises how natural 
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selection causes and how it creates. The traditional view explains not because it is 
convenient or because is makes disparate events amenable statistically, it explains because it 
accurately describes the causal and creative powers of natural selection.  
                    
We will proceed as follows. In 2.2 we layout the non-causal position, characterising natural 
selection as an effect rather than a cause as more traditionally construed; in light of 
arguments put forward by Millstein, in 2.3 we find the proposals of the non-causal view to 
be unconvincing: exclusive focus on the undoubtably causal interactions of individuals 
proves to be an unsuccessful strategy in light of the fact that individuals are parts of 
populations, not the causes of populations. In 2.4 we examine the non-creative position and 
also find its arguments to be unconvincing for similar reasons. Novel traits arise because of 
the interactions between genetic inheritance and ontogenetic development- the properties of 
individual organisms as the non-creative argument claims, but the reasons for an 
individual’s genetic inheritance necessarily involve the selective dynamics of the 
populations of its ancestors; again we notice the wider perspective is wrongly overlooked in 
preference of events occurring ‘at’ the level of the individual. In 2.5 we will synthesise our 
observations from this chapter’s previous sections and notice that although the cumulative 
selection, retention, and propagation of unlikely genetic combinations is a necessary step to 
explain complex adaptive features it is not sufficient to account for the ‘fit’ of organisms to 
the environments that they inhabit. For that we need to more closely examine the reasons for 
the fitness benefits of successive genetic combinations. Section 2.6 summarises the 
chapter’s findings and establishes this dissertation’s work ahead.     
2.2 The non-causal argument 
What we will collectively label the ‘the non-causal view’ can be seen developing through a 
series of papers which increasingly questioned the causal efficacy of natural selection in 
progressively bolder terms (Rosenberg 1994, Walsh 2000, Walsh, Lewens & Ariew 2002, 
Lewens 2004, Matthen & Ariew 2009). At their core, the idea that while it may be 
explanatorily productive to employ natural selection as though it were a causal influence, 
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the only genuinely causal factors responsible for the survival and reproductive 
performances of organisms are the proximate interactions that take place between the 
organisms themselves and their environments. When organisms and their traits interact with 
their environments systematically to promote their own proliferation we say that they are 
‘naturally selected’ but this, these authors contend, is misconceived. ‘Natural selection’ is a 
high-level product created by the similarity of individual-to-environment interactions and 
not a casual process in itself.  
This striking view is perhaps best illustrated in the following analogy from one of its 
leading proponents (Walsh 2000). We should consider the effects that natural selection 
appears to cause in populations featuring variation, heredity and differential reproduction as 
we would the shadow of an aeroplane crossing the ground as the aeroplane flies overhead. 
Like natural selection, the shadow has measurable properties (in the shadow’s case:  size, 
speed, shape, location etc) and each successive state of the shadow appears, to the naive 
observer, to result from causal influences on the shadow’s former state, propelling the 
shadow forward in the direction of travel, perhaps also increasing/decreasing in size, 
brightness and so on. But we of course know better. Appearances are deceptive and the path 
of the shadow is not caused by the effects of influences working on former ‘shadow-states’, 
all of the shadow’s properties and its direction of travel are generated at a more fundamental 
level by the properties of the aeroplane and the its position relative to the sun, ground, cloud 
cover etc. By analogy the genuine causal explanation of how the genetic composition of a 
population moves from one state to another is not through any direct actions of natural 
selection, but through the combined and disparate causes behind each survival, death and 
reproduction of the population’s individual members, each migration and each mutation. 
When enough of the causes of survival, death and differential reproduction are of a similar 
kind and have a consistent effect over enough individual instances we combine them 
together into one- like the various properties of the aeroplane, sun etc combine to produce 
the shadow- and say that the cause of population change is natural selection. In actuality 
both the evolutionary change and the phenomena of natural selection are effects, jointly 
caused by the accumulation of events at the genuinely causal level of individual to 
environment interaction. 
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Sterelny and Kitcher in a passage near-ubiquitously cited in the non-causal literature 
suggest: 
“In principle we could relate the biography of each organism in the population, explaining 
in full detail how it developed, reproduced and survived, just as we could track the motion 
of each molecule of a sample of gas. But evolutionary theory, like statistical mechanics, has 
no use for such a fine grain of description: the aim is to make clear the central tendencies in 
the history of evolving populations.” (Sterelny & Kitcher, 1988, p345) 
Extending this perspective, leading non-causalists Walsh, Lewens & Ariew contend: 
“If evolutionary theory is a theory of forces it isn’t a theory about the statistical structure of 
populations (and vice versa)..... The only genuine forces going on in evolution are those 
taking place at the level of individuals (or lower) and none of these (and no aggregate of 
these) can be identified with either selection or drift.” (Walsh, Lewens & Ariew, 2002, p453)       
But reassure us that: 
“... it should not be alarming that there is a theory that explains by appeal to population-
level statistical properties as opposed to individual causal properties. The kinetic theory of 
gases is an obvious example of such a theory. The properties described by the 
phenomenological gas laws - temperature, pressure, volume - are, like trait frequencies, 
population-level properties. The nature and relation of these ensemble-level properties is 
explained in terms of a statistical property...... it is the statistical property...... that explains 
the changes in the ensemble-level properties if the gas” (Walsh, Lewens & Ariew, 2002, 
p463- italics in original) 
The ontological line in the sand being drawn here by the non-causalists is between 
genuinely causal individual-level properties on the one hand, and non-causal, statistical, 
population-level properties on the other: 
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“...change in the structure of the population is explained and predicted by appeal to some 
statistical property, an average of individual propensities” (Walsh, Lewens & Ariew, 2002, 
p463- italics in original) 
The salient term in this statement is ‘explained’: as in merely explained. The genuine causes 
of changes in population structure by contrast are not to be found in an average of individual 
trait-propensities, but in the responses of actual individual traits in their actual 
environments.  
Employing statistically-abstracted properties such as averages: life expectancy, average 
wage etc. are of course indispensable when attempting to get a broader understanding of the 
collective behaviour of groups of individuals. We understand the dispersion of gas as caused 
by the properties of its individual component molecules but report on the gas’s behaviour in 
terms of the properties of the gas as a whole- it’s pressure and temperature; we acknowledge 
that rises in inflation are caused by the collective decisions of countless of individual 
economic agents, but explain them through abstracted collective-properties like ‘demand’ 
outstripping ‘supply’. This procedure itself is uncontroversial. The non-causalists’ point is 
well taken here: despite its undoubted utility, explaining the behaviour of collections of 
individuals using statistical properties is a quite different enterprise from identifying the 
underlying causes responsible for the behaviour of the collective’s individual members. This 
can be easily recognised by appreciating that the insights provided by statistical analysis are 
possible because of its ability to balance-out the idiosyncrasies of individual causes in order 
to survey the broader behaviour of collectives. 
For non-casualists, individual organisms in populations- like molecules of gas in a container 
or consumers in an economy- are the fundamental units of casual interaction. Organisms, 
molecules and consumers interact and cause; populations, pressure and inflation are the 
consequences. Although convention regards ‘natural selection’ as a causal influence 
effecting the genetic composition of populations, this- like a lay observer interpreting  
entropy as a causal agency effecting the gas’s behaviour - is an explanatory convenience and 
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misconstrues causal reality. Populations, like economies, are abstractions. The causes of 
evolutionary change, like the causes of booms and recessions are not because ‘higher-level’ 
population-properties like trait-frequency or consumer confidence causally interact with 
other ‘higher-level’ population-level properties like ‘risk of predation’ or consumer dept; 
evolutionary change occurs when individual organisms within a population causally interact 
with their environments resulting in the individuals possessing certain traits reproducing 
more successfully than individuals which do not possess those traits.  
When this occurs the representation of the trait in the population increases. The traditional 
causal interpretation of this is to say that in the environmental circumstances in which the 
interactions of the individuals had taken place, that the traits in question had been ‘naturally 
selected’; as though ‘natural selection’ were an additional causal influence acting at the level 
of the population in parallel with the lower-level proximate causes behind the survival and 
reproduction of the population’s individuals. According to the non-causal view, the ‘natural 
selection’ of traits in specific environments - the increase in their populational 
representation due to the systematic effects of their traits - is an effect caused solely by the 
interactions of the individual members possessing those traits. So when we say that trait t or 
trait u is naturally selected, any causality that this statement appears to award to natural 
selection ‘acting on’ t or u is merely metaphorical. ‘Natural selection’ is a statistical 
abstraction that we read into the causes of individuals’ survival and reproduction; albeit an 
instrumentality productive one. The only genuine causes of organisms’ survival and 
reproduction are the events of their life histories that actually caused those individuals to 
survive and reproduce.         
Clearly, adopting this perspective could have alarming consequences; not least of which 
would be a fundamental reappraisal of large swathes of philosophical and perhaps even 
biological orthodoxy based upon natural selection’s status as a causal mechanism . As such 4
it might be tempting to dismiss the claims of the non-causalists out of hand by applying a 
kind of argument from incredulity. But suppose that we feel that these claims have some 
 The levels of selection problem is explicitly addressed in this revisionary way by Walsh (Walsh 2000). If natural 4
selection is not a cause, then we do not need to be troubled about what hierarchical level: gene, organism, super-
organism etc selection is actually acting on. According to Walsh natural selection is not acting at all.
26
merit, but also suspect their call to revolution is somewhat premature. We seem to be 
presented with two options: i) contend that the causes of adaptive evolution are not 
exhausted by the interactions of individual organisms and conceive of natural selection as a 
casual influence distinct from these interactions, as the language of selective explanation 
appears to indicate- an approach which may strike us as equally avant garde as the claims of 
the non-causalists themselves; or ii) contend that the causes of adaptive evolution are 
exhausted by the interactions of individual organisms as per the non-causalists’ claims, but 
that the causal influence of natural selection is included as part of these interactions; a 
project that can be characterised as one of compatibility. This will be our approach in 2.3.  
2.3 Population-level causes and explanations  
Our aim in this section is to demonstrate that in many situations, properties belonging 
exclusively to populations of individuals have an equal claim to casual efficacy as do the 
properties of the individuals involved. The main contention of the non-causalist position is 
that as causation happens exclusively to and through the interactions of individual 
organisms, any apparent causes not ‘at’ the level of individuals must therefore be merely 
statistical abstractions. This claim is central for the non-causalists, so their position would 
be fatally weakened if it were proved to be inaccurate. We do not deny individual-level 
causation by suggesting this - clearly individuals live, die and reproduce - a commitment to 
casual singularity does not also mean a commitment to the exclusivity of population-level 
causality, but neither does it mean a commitment to the exclusivity of individual-level 
causality as non-causalists contend. Evolutionary events can pertain of a plurality of 
explanatory perspectives, and we may reap the benefits of these without committing to a 
plurality of causal processes on the occasions that we do so.    
    
Our case will be made primarily through an examination of proposals put forward by 
Millstein (2006) concerting population-level causal properties, but first we will consider the 
below simplified population (fig 2.1) to appreciate more clearly what the non-causalists are 
claiming.     
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fig 2.1:  
 
             
We start with an individual A, which successfully produces three offspring: B, C & D; 
subsequently the D individual further reproduces three offspring: E, F & G, individuals B & 
C do not reproduce. For the non-causalists the causes for D’s successful survival and 
reproduction are to be found exclusively in D’s birth, encounters with predators, 
consumption of food and water and so on: events quite idiosyncratic to D alone. As we have 
a full account of the reasons for D’s survival and reproduction provided with this 
information, the non-causalists contend, we have no need to introduce ‘natural selection’ as 
a causal mechanism additional to the facts provided; we already know the full casual story. 
So what is natural selection? The non-causalists’ answer is this: if there were other members 
of the wider population (not shown in fig 2.1) who shared D’s characteristics and who 
successfully passed on these characteristics in similar environmental circumstances to those 
in which those characteristics benefited D then we would say that those characteristics were 
naturally selected. In circumstances like this where similarity in inheritable characteristics 
has similar effects on survival and reproduction, it looks as though ‘natural selection’ is 
‘favouring’ certain traits and ‘disfavouring’ others, but natural selection is not causal here. 
The individual’s environmental interactions are causal; ‘being selected’ is a statistical 
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artefact, an effect brought about through repeated similarity in characteristic-to-environment 
reproductive success. We could, if we wished, exhaustively explain both the life histories of 
individuals, and the the development of populations made up from such individuals by not 
referring to natural selection at all.  
Our first point of departure from this individual-centric perspective is to observe that given 
realistic ecological circumstances, even the very simplified and limited population structure 
featured in  fig 2.1 could have casual relevance for the depicted outcome. The compromised 
survival and reproduction of B and C may not have occurred in isolation to the life of D and 
may have had a profound causal influence on D’s survival and reproduction; so when 
considering D’s reproductive successes they cannot automatically be marginalised. The non-
causalists are correct that D’s life history provides us with the reasons for D’s survival and 
reproduction, but this is somewhat myopic. A comprehensive explanation for the 
circumstances of D’s life history would have to encompass ecological information on D’s 
habitat, and that may depend significantly on the number and activities of the other 
members of D’s population. For example: suppose the habitat of the above population is 
desperately short of resources making the carrying capacity of the population severely 
limited. It might well be the case that in order for D to successfully reproduce B and C did 
not reproduce. If B or C had survived to reproduce the resources for D would have been 
even more severely restricted, perhaps to the extent that it would have prevented D 
surviving long enough to successfully reproduce as it did. These are not contrived or 
artificial circumstances, the life histories of individuals within a population intersect as 
matter of routine.  
We may be confident that the non-causalists’ response to this criticism would be to agree 
that B, C and D’s individual life histories may have significant overlap, but the correct way 
to interpret this is as individual life histories with individual-level causes intersecting and 
resulting in the involved individuals’ survival and reproduction. But can notice here that this 
version of events is not quite right. D’s reproductive success is not conditional specifically 
on the absence of the individuals B and C, it is conditional on there being no or very few 
other population-members in the second generation using up environmental resources at D’s 
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expense. It just so happens that in the above population the required resources were 
available because B and C specifically did not survive to reproduce, but had there been 
other members of the population D’s reproductive success could have been very different. 
D’s comparative success was due to the population being small - a population-level 
property.  
As population-size is clearly a property of a population, we might start to suspect here that 
at least some of the disagreement between the individual-level-causes of the non-causalists, 
and the population-level-causes of Millstein might hinge on differences in explanatory 
approach rather than differences in casual reality. For the non-causalists B and C’s influence 
on D’s reproductive output is conceived as the life histories of two individuals intersecting 
the life history of a third individual; in contrast for those holding a population-level casual 
view it is the fact that population-size is very low that explains D’s reproductive success. It 
seems clear that these differences concern the mode of explanation, and do not concern 
differences in casual circumstances: B and C’s deaths means that the population was much 
reduced, the population was much reduced because both B and C died. So even at this 
preliminary stage, we might suspect that evolutionary causality per se is perhaps not as 
central to the debate as the non-causalists contend. We will notice this theme repeated as we 
turn to the arguments of Millstein.   
Populations of individuals of course have many properties that their members taken  
individually  do not: distribution, diversity and ecological niche being obvious examples. 5
Millstein’s approach is very much in contrast to that of the non-causalists when she 
contends that some of these population-level properties are causally responsible for 
evolutionary effects that cannot be accounted for from an individual-level perspective. The 
first of these population-level causal properties is variation. Variation in population 
 As Millstein correctly points out, we must be careful not to conflate the proposals of the non-causal view with the 5
‘levels of selection’ problem as more commonly construed (Dawkins 1975, Sober & Wilson 1994, Sterelny & Kitcher 
1998, Okasha 2006). It is not the primacy of the gene or of the organism etc for natural selection that is our concern 
here as that question presupposes the causal efficacy of natural selection; the very thing we are setting out to investigate. 
‘Individuals’ for our purposes could mean individual genes or individual organisms, and ‘populations’ could mean 
populations of genes, or populations of organisms. Although the default non-causal position does in fact see the 
individual organism as the exclusive site of evolutionary causality (Walsh 2000, Lewens 2004), this is not- I think- an 
absolute requirement of the non-causal position. 
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members is a property of populations- not individuals- and has significant consequences for 
the differential reproduction of population members: itself a population-level effect. 
That populations are comprised from individuals with various traits, that these traits have a 
direct baring on the individuals’ survival and reproduction is undeniable. The non-causalists 
are again correct on this point: if we were to take Sterelny & Kitcher’s advice and trace the 
life-history of each individual in a population we could know in principle exactly how the 
traits of each individual contributed to their survival and reproduction. But there is much 
that looking at an individual’s life history and reproductive output in isolation like this will 
not tell us. We would not know if that individual’s interactions with its environment were 
systematic of individuals with their characteristics, and whether the number of offspring 
produced by that individual was typical of similar individuals or entirely idiosyncratic; to 
know that we need to know the responses of multiple individuals. Additionally, we would 
also not know how to interpret the number of offspring produced by an individual from a 
‘selection perspective’ as this can only be understood by knowing population-level 
information concerning the reproductive outputs of other individuals.    
At first pass this suggestion might strike us as quite odd. For surely it is individuals 
themselves that reproduce at various rates and ‘number of offspring’ is a property of 
individuals, not a property of populations; increase in population size being a product of its 
individual members’ reproductive output. But consider again fig 2.1: this time we will 
stipulate that it depicts a very small section of a much wider population composed from 
substantially more individuals. Notice that we can do this without making any changes to 
the individual life-histories of the population-members shown. The fates of A, B, C, D and 
so on all may all play out exactly as originally specified, only this time there are other 
population-members present but remote enough not to have made any survival or 
reproductive differences to the individuals explicitly represented. Individual A successfully 
reproduces three times as does D just as before, whereas B and C do not reproduce at all, 
just as before. But the number of offspring alone (an individual-level property) cannot tell 
us if these individuals are selectively favoured. To know that we need to know the 
comparative reproductive outputs of the other population members. If the entire population 
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was as depicted in fig 2.1 as originally specified, by virtue of having three offspring, A and 
D would be selectively favoured, whereas both B and C would not. But this is only because 
A and D’s contributions to their subsequent generations are disproportional to the 
population average. If the average reproductive output of individuals in an extended 
population were to be above three offspring then this would mean A and D were not 
selectively-favoured as their proportional contribution to the next generation would be 
much-reduced. In clear breach of the non-causal view’s marginalisation of the population-
level, we can only appreciate the evolutionary significance of A and D’s survival and 
reproduction by comparative information not necessarily provided by an analysis of the 
minutiae of individual life histories, no matter how forensically this is carried out.      
We might again preempt the non-causalist response to this. Being ‘selectively favoured’ or 
‘not-favoured’ are the statistically-abstracted consequences of the actual survival and 
reproduction of individuals with certain characteristics. They are not the causes of 
differential reproduction, but an optional characterisation of the results of genuinely casual, 
individual-level interactions. The very fact that the population dynamic in fig 2.1 can be 
variously interpreted as demonstrating both positive and negative selection depending on 
the dynamics of the wider population- despite other population members having no casual 
relevance in either scenario- demonstrates that natural selection itself cannot be casual, but 
is instead a matter of context and interpretation. As such, it would seem that this example 
supports the non-causal position rather than argues against it. Millstein’s contention that 
intra-populational variation causes differences in reproductive success might seem to be in 
trouble at this point. Non-causalists can remain intrenched in their original position: it is the 
characteristics of D and the environment inhabited by D that caused D to survive and 
reproduce as it did, and it is the characteristics of B and of C and their interactions that 
similarity decided their reproductive fates. Although differences in characteristics directly 
effect differences in reproductive output, it is not the variation itself that is directly causal, 
but the specific characteristics and interactions of the individuals themselves.  
Millstein’s second, and more convincing, population-level causal property is genotype-
frequency. Populations have genotype-frequencies whereas individuals have genotypes. The 
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population-level property of genotype frequencies causes the population-level effect of 
changes in genotype frequency. Although individuals may develop quite dramatically over 
their life-cycles (we may think of metamorphoses as a striking example of this) their 
genotypes do not. When a population features n copies of a certain genotype at time t1, and 
m copies of that genotype at t2, (and n ≠ m) this is not due to any changes in the 
composition of the individuals themselves. Individuals die, reproduce and migrate, and the 
frequencies of genotypes in a population change when individuals with different genotypes 
undergo these processes at differential rates. We may characterise Millstein’s second claim 
then as follows: under certain circumstances, the frequency of genotypes in a population (a 
population-level property) causes changes in genotype frequency over subsequent 
generations (a population-level evolutionary effect).  
Consider the familiar hawk/dove population dynamic. A population ‘T’ features two 
genotypes ‘d’ & ‘h’. Genotype d produces ‘dove’ behaviour: faced with aggression from 
other population members d-types always back down to avoid potential injury. In contrast h-
type ‘hawk’ individuals will always follow-through on any threat despite coming out worse 
from such encounters some of the time. We can explain the wax and wane of population T’s 
d and h genotype frequencies over subsequent generations as follows: as the frequency of d-
types in the population rises, the lower the probability that any d-type will confront an 
aggressive h-type, so the lower the probability that behaviour characteristic of the d-type 
will be necessary to avoid potential harm. At some point d-type behaviour is no longer 
beneficial compared to h-type behaviour; there is a much-reduced possibility that any h-type 
will be met with a h-type response so their characteristic aggressive behaviour begins to 
pay-off as h-types also profit from the lack of h-types in the population, causing an increase 
in h-type representation at the expense of the representation of d-types. At some further 
point however, h-type behaviour ceases to be beneficial; the increasing risk of damage to h-
types from other h-types as they become more frequent means that d-types regain the 
advantage and grow in populational representation.     
If this should be considered an inaccurate explanation for the ongoing development of this 
population’s genotypic frequencies, then the non-causal view is more revolutionary than our 
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earlier concerns might suggest. Models of frequency-dependence are entirely routine in 
evolutionary biology (Sterns 2000, Nowak & Sigmund 2004, Ridley 2004, Otto et al. 2008), 
so Millstein cannot be accused of capitalising on a rare phenomenon to make an 
unwarranted general claim about the casual efficacy of population-level properties. But as 
the preceding case study indicted, denying natural selection’s explanatory relevance is not 
the non-causal view’s contention: 
“....natural selection theory explains changes in the structure of a population, but not by 
appeal to the individual-level causes of births, deaths, and reproductions. As natural 
selection theory does not deal in the causes of these individual-level phenomena, it cannot 
yield causal explanations for them” (Walsh, Lewens & Ariew, 2000, p469- italics added). 
Their point is that explanatory adequacy and genuine causality can come apart, and that 
explanatory accounts which award natural selection casual efficacy achieve this in lieu of 
finer-grained explanations exhaustively detailing the life histories of individual population 
members. It is generally accepted that we may enjoy explanatory plurality while adhering to 
causal singularity (Jackson & Pettit 1992, Sterelny 1996); different explanations may 
provide different perspectives of certain events and answer to different types of enquiries, so 
this claim of the non-causalists is not in itself that contentious. But their suggestion implies 
something further. That out of the different available explanations some in particular will be 
more legitimate than others because they detail events occurring at the finely-grained level 
where causality is taking place: the interactions of individuals. In contrast however, as 
Millstein argues, it seems natural here for us to consider the relative frequencies of d-types 
and h-types - population-level properties - as causally responsible for the changes in 
genotype-representation over subsequent generations and not just as an explanatory 
substitute in lieu of finely-detailed information. It seems hard to avoid the conviction that 
any explanation for the fluctuation of genotype frequencies over generational time - and we 
may allow there could be a plurality of explanations - would have to include the frequencies 
of the genotypes themselves, and that the reason for their inclusion is not one of descriptive 
preference or perspective, but because they are directly causal to the evolutionary outcome 
that we are trying to explain.  
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Notice again here that in common with our population in fig 2.1 there is no disagreement 
about the nature of cause: we know this is due to d-types’ and h-types’ interactions; the crux 
of the matter appears to stem from the non-causalists’ commitment that causation occurs 
exclusively to a single individual. This is a different and much stronger claim, and one that 
we - and we may suspect, holders of the traditional view more generally - have good 
reasons to reject. When individuals within a population causally interact, then ipso facto the 
population also casually interacts, and when a population interacts it does so through the 
activities of its individuals. The cause is not in contention here. As we saw above, we may 
explain these interactions through the causal interactions of individuals (the deaths of B and 
C) or the causal interactions the population (very low population size); but considering ‘the 
individual’ and ‘the population’ as two casually-distinct entities and stipulating that we 
prioritise one as ‘the’ level of causality and dismissing phenomena not occurring ‘at’ that 
level as derivative is misconceived. This can be appreciated quite clearly by recognising that 
the actual relationship that holds between the interactions of individual organisms and 
populations of individuals is in fact quite different to the casual one that Walsh’s analogy of 
a plane casting its shadow over the landscape suggests. The correct relationship of 
individual-to-population is not one of causality but of mereology. Aeroplanes cast shadows 
that are ontologically distinct from their physical causes and are at a spatial and temporal 
remove from them; individuals do not cause, and are not temporally or spatially separate 
from, populations and population-level events, individuals are parts of populations, 
affecting one means affecting the other. 
The ontological ‘line in the sand’ drawn by the non-causalists between genuine causal 
properties on the one hand and statistical ‘abstract’ properties is an important one for the 
non-causalists, but it is somewhat artificial. Certain properties are able to be both statistical 
in the sense that they are derivable from the central tendencies of ‘lower level’ individuals 
and genuinely casual in that they describe the sufficient conditions required for the 
collective behaviour of the ‘lower level’ individuals to produce a given effect. 
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Consider again the analogy of pressurised gas heated within a container. As the gas heats, it 
expands and exerts increasing pressure against the walls of the container as it does so. At 
some point, the pressure of the gas surpasses the structural integrity of the container causing 
the container to crack, releasing gas and decreasing the pressure within. How should we 
understand this? Clearly we explain the effect here - the expansion of the gas - in terms of 
the properties of the gas: pressure, heat, and volume are not properties possessed any 
individual molecule. The irreducibility of these properties, coupled with their explanatory 
and predictive abilities would be, we might suggest, sufficient for them to be considered as 
directly causal. In contrast, the non-causalists would seem committed to the view that the 
‘population-level’ properties of the gas, its heat and pressure, are not to be considered 
directly casual but statistical and derivative- as would the effect of the gas’s expansion. For 
the non-causal view the container’s cracking would be caused when one particular molecule 
struck with sufficient force. 
Although the approaches here diverge on explanatory approach, it is clear that they pertain 
to the same underlying causal process and as such it is also increasingly clear that 
disagreement here is not over the nature of the causes themselves. The non-causal strategy is 
to dial the ‘grain’ of their explanation to that of the individual taking the actions of 
surrounding individuals as background conditions for the ‘main events’ of individuals’ 
survival and reproduction. In contrast, Millstein’s strategy is to set the ‘grain’ of her 
explanation higher to the level of the population, because only from this perspective can we 
discern that properties of populations like the frequencies of d- and h-types produce effects 
such as changes in their frequencies over subsequent generations; she considers the grain set 
by the non-causalists as too narrow to appreciate this. As we can see from the gas example, 
the non-casual view in claiming that their grain is the only one ‘at’ which casualty takes 
place is somewhat myopic. The effect of the behaviour of a single individual with other 
individuals seen as background conditions simply is the joint effect of all of those 
individuals when taken as a collective. There is no contradiction here for the non-causalists 
to capitalise on; it is just the explanatory emphasis which each side places on the relevance 
of the background conditions which seems to be in dispute.  
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Non-causalists maintain that the events surrounding the actions of an individual (here the 
relative frequencies of each genotype) should be considered as background, whereas 
Millstein considers the activities of all the collected individuals to be of equivalent causal 
importance. With this in mind, we might consider Millstein’s claim against the non-
causalists that causality is to be found exclusively ‘at’ the level of populations to somewhat 
less than a decisive win, but notice that although these individual-level and population-level 
explanatory approaches are compatible - indeed once it has been established that they 
describe different aspects of the same casual process, it is difficult to understand how they 
might not be compatible - the appropriate approach will be guided by the nature of the 
phenomena that we are hoping to better understand. We understand the reasons non-
causalists believe a population-level phenomenon like natural selection to be derivative is 
that it cannot be discerned at the level of the individual; individuals cause individual-level 
effects which are then aggregated- in the non-causalist view- misleadingly. Similarly, 
Millstein considers population-level properties like the frequencies of d- and h- types to be 
directly, not derivatively casual; but the subsequent effects that she explains by using these 
population-level properties are population-level effects. If we wish to explain individual-
level effects; births, deaths etc then, as-per the non-causal view, it seems we must construe 
causes as acting on or through individuals, but the converse of this also seems to hold: if we 
wish to explain population-level effects then it seems we must construe their causes as 
acting on or through populations. The suitability of explanatory approach, at least in these 
cases, appears to be orientated according to the level of the explanandum.  
The principle in play here would seem to be quite a general one and not particular to 
specifically biological populations and individuals. We cannot explain why any particular 
molecule of gas in the pressurised container behaved in the way that it did using ‘higher 
grain’ properties such as pressure and temperature; for that we would require considerably 
more ‘lower grain’ information about that particle’s specific location, speed etc and the 
specific conditions of the other particles . Similarly with the actions of an individual 6
 Notice the non-causalists’ point is not entirely otiose: if we had access to this information we might omit the 6
‘population-level’ properties of pressure and temperature as a casual influence for the movements of any particular 
particle. This however is quite different from claiming that pressure and temperature are not causal. Cracks in 
containers can be caused by increases in pressure and burns can be caused by the temperature of pan handles, as much 
as differences in a population’s genetic composition can be caused by natural selection.  
37
economic agent: if we want to know why they acted in the specific way that they did: their 
choice of purchases, investments and so on, citing ‘inflation’ as a cause for their distinctive 
behaviour will be insufficient, we need to know the the ‘facts on the ground’ and options 
open to that particular agent, their financial acumen, ethical concerns and so on. This 
observation may not be of primary importance for Millstein whose objective is to show the 
causal efficacy of natural selection per se and which her use of frequency-dependence 
sufficiently demonstrates, but we require natural selection not just to be casually effectatious 
but to be responsible for specific phenomena: the uncanny fit of organisms for the 
environments which they inhabit, and there are reasons to doubt that changes in genotype 
frequency over subsequent generations alone are sufficient to achieve this. 
The difficulty arises when we ask at which ‘grain’ our explanandum: the fit of organisms to 
the specifics of their environments, is to be interpreted. Should we stipulate that it is the fit 
of individual organisms to their environments, then as this appears to be an individual-level 
effect it would seem to require an individual-level cause. As Millstein’s example 
demonstrates only that natural selection causes population-level effects, we must either 
reformulate our original question so that the properties of individuals are construed as 
population-level properties, or ‘shift grains’ and explain the properties of individual 
organisms employing individual-level principles. Either of these approaches might strike us 
as unsatisfying. In the light of the our findings in this section, our key question would seem 
to hinge on whether we consider: the fact that populations contain individuals which fit 
their environments more suitably than other individuals, and: the fact that individuals have 
certain features which fit their environments to be equivalent explananda. And this would 
seem to depend on the nature of the features that we are interested in. Natural selection may 
explain why the representation of one genotype’s populational representation varies in 
comparison to the representation of another but it does not explain how these processes 
conspire to create the adaptive phenomena which prompted our original investigation. 
Recognising natural selection as a mechanism for generating evolutionary effects like 
changes in genotype frequency falls very short of our intended expectation for it as the 
mechanism responsible for the creation and promotion of complex adaptive traits. We will 
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return to this problem in greater length in 2.5, but first we need to establish  natural 
selection’s creativity.  
2.4 The non-creative argument  
Soon after natural selection’s debut it was realised that without a source of phenotypic 
novelty the process of selection would eventually run out of things to select from (Huxley 
1942, Vorzimmer 1963, Dobzhansky 1970, Mayr 1982); a puzzle that found its resolution 
decades later with the discovery that heredity was transferred by means of discrete units and 
that the copying processes of these units could, on occasion, be inexact. Genes could 
change, or mutate (Bowler 1978, Futuyma 2015), these ‘mistakes’ and their phenotypic 
consequences were able to account for the ‘open-ended’ source of novelty that the theory 
required.  
As with the non-causal position, there is no single proponent of the ‘non-creative’ position 
(Endler 1986, Muller & Wagner 1991, Sober 1993 &1995, Walsh 1998, Brunnander 2013) 
although again the core of the argument can be distilled quite straightforwardly. As per the 
original worries, natural selection cannot claim to be a source of evolutionary novelty or 
variation in its own right, but works exclusively by selecting pre-existing variation. The 
ultimate source of this variation in evolution is mutation, with phenotypic novelty 
producible through the recombination of existing genes. Without mutation, evolution by 
natural selection would eventually eliminate all fitness differences and grind to a halt, 
leaving a static and selectively-homologous population. But when naturalists assert that 
natural selection explains how and why complex adaptions like gills, leaves, lungs and 
tracheae originated their statements are not intended to be taken elliptically but as a 
description of empirical reality:  
“Natural selection... is much more than a negative process... Natural selection may be 
compared rather to a painter which creates a picture by mixing and distributing pigments in 
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various ways over the canvas. The canvas and the pigments are not created by the artist but 
the painting is.” (Ayala 1970, p5) 
“For most professional biologists and many thinking people in the 20th Century (both 
theists and atheists), the theory of evolution provides an adequate basis for understanding 
both life’s diversity and the adaptedness of living things. We believe evolution through 
natural selection to be the main creative force that adapts organisms to their environments, 
without comprehension or design.” (Doolittle 1994, p47) 
Are these and other similarly-minded authors wrong to think this- should they be 
exclusively thanking the mechanisms of mutation and inheritance instead? In common with 
the prima facie claims of the non-causal approach we might be tempted here to think the 
position too outlandish to warrant serious attention. The claims of the non-creative position 
however are more subtle. Consider: for natural selection to occur in a population it must 
necessarily feature heredity, differential reproduction and variation, so as variation is an 
integral part of natural selection, and mutation is the ultimate source of variation, variation 
is therefore an integral part of natural selection also. The creative- and non-creative 
positions are in complete agreement in this. Additionally no one (or at least, no one who 
recognises natural selection as a causal mechanism) disputes that natural selection provides 
a causal explanation for the distribution of a trait through a population once that trait already 
exists. The difference in the positions becomes evident when we turn to the issue of whether 
the process of natural selection has creative potency in addition to the genetic variation that 
it requires. For holders of the non-creative position, mutation is the ultimate source of 
evolutionary novelty- with the proviso that genetic recombination may act as a secondary 
developmental mechanism: 
“The processes of mutation, recombination, heredity and ontogeny determine which traits 
an individual has. A distinct kind of causal explanation- developmental explanation- appeals 
to these processes to explain of individuals, severally, why they have the traits they 
have.” (Walsh 1998, p252) 
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Natural selection on the other hand refers exclusively to: 
“... the differential survival and reproduction of individuals. Natural selection sorts the 
variants, preserving those traits and combinations of traits which confer on an individual the 
capacity to survive and prosper in its environment. But it does not produce the variants, 
combine them, or ‘transmit’ them from parents to offspring. Selection merely causes 
changes in trait frequencies within a population. If that’s what it does, then that’s what it 
explains”. (Walsh 1998, p252).   
Notice that in common with the non-causal argument, the non-creative argument overlooks 
events occurring ‘above’ the level of individual organisms- but in a different way. For non-
causalists the fates of other population members were conceived of as background 
conditions for the site of genuine causality- located ‘at’ the level of the individual: its birth, 
death, reproduction etc. Here the mechanisms for genuine creation are likewise identified as 
those which occur to individuals: the specifics of how their genetic inheritance coupled with 
developmental factors are able to produce phenotypic novelty. In contrast to the non-causal 
position, natural selection is conceived as having some influence through the ‘sorting’ of 
traits, this is however quite distinct from its traditional characterisation as a mechanism 
responsible for the ‘production’ of variants promoting environmental/phenotype suitability.            
Notice also that the structure of the non-creative argument is considerably more 
straightforward and less contrived than that of the non-causal argument. According to the 
non-creative view natural selection can never be creative in principle. Natural selection 
‘sorts’ and selects, it does not ‘produce’ or create and so cannot be held responsible for 
creating adaptive traits. The non-creative argument stands or falls according to the accuracy 
of this condition, and as such provides a defence of the traditional view with a clear 
objective. If it can be demonstrated that the mechanism of natural selection can in certain 
circumstances show additionally creativity with no further mutational influence the non-
creative argument fails.  
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The non-creative argument may be summarised as follows:  
  
i) Natural selection is (at minimum) a two-stage process. Stage 1 (S1) : the creation of 
variation, followed by Stage 2 (S2) : the interaction of that variation with the 
environment. 
ii) S1, the ‘creative stage’ of the process is uniquely sourced by genetic variation: these are 
mutation with recombination as a secondary mechanism.  
iii) S2, the ‘interactive stage’ of the process is natural selection’s exclusive province. Here, 
some of the variants created at S1 interact with their environment so as to promote or 
impede their own reproduction.  
iv) Some variants have no effects in a given environment, but variants that do interact with 




v) Natural selection as characterised as interaction in iii) either works to maintain, 
promote, reduce or eliminate the representation of a novel variant. Natural selection 
does not create new variants, so natural selection does not create adaptive traits which 
are comprised from many such variants.  
Our approach will be to demonstrate that this argument is unsound due to premise ii) being 
untrue. Genetic variation is not the only source of evolutionary novelty, under easily-
achieved circumstances S2 (the interactive stage) may itself produce evolutionary novelty 
and on the occasions that it does so the mechanism of natural selection is responsible. This 
defence will provide more than simple support for one side of an established dialectic; 
additionally, it will show that the traits that we are particularly interested in- complex 
adaptations, such as wings and leaves and so on which grant organisms their environmental 
suitability- are the ones that require the mechanism of natural selection to explain their 
existence the most. Mutation, recombination and other developmental factors are able to 
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generate phenotypic novelty and variation, but are insufficient in themselves to generate the 
specific type of accumulated and complex variation required to produce the traits that we 
find particularly compelling. In order for mutation and other developmental factors to 
account for these they require suitable conditioning and natural selection is currently the 
only mechanism that is capable of providing this.  
We may consider the below phylogenetic diagram (fig 2.2: based on those found in Sober 
1995 and Walsh 1998) as representative of the non-creative view’s attitude towards the roles 
of genetic variation and natural selection. 
Fig 2.2 
  
Fig 2.2 shows the evolution of a population (P1) over three generations: G1, G2 & G3; 
comprising five organisms: A, B, C, D & E; and two alleles: x & X. G1 is composed from A 
only; G2 composed from its offspring B and C; and G3 is composed from C’s offspring D 
and E. The broken line between A(x) and B(X) shows a mutation event; here the mutation  
of the x allele into the X allele. x is selectively superior to trait X. The construal of natural 
selection as an exclusively destructive agent in accordance with the non-creative view can 
be shown in the following table:  
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We start with a single variant only in G1 (x). Then due to the effects of mutation we have 
two variants in G2, doubling the amount of variation. But in G3, due to the effects of 
selection the number of variants is reduced back to one only. In terms of creativity and 
destructiveness it seems fairly clear what roles genetic variation and selection are playing 
here. Had there been no genetic variation between G1 and G2 the number of variants would 
have remained at one, if there been no selection against variant X in G2 the number of 
variants would have remained at two. Mutation adds, selection removes. But this simplified 
perspective begins to breakdown when the population dynamics become more complicated; 
and, we may add, more realistic.     
This time our population initially features two genes: x and y, each of which has one allele: 
x mutates into X, y mutates into Y. This time traits are produced by genetic combinations, 
rather than a single gene as in P1. We therefore have four possible traits: xy, Xy, xY, XY. 
Also distinct from the traits featured in P1 their fitnesses in this example will be malleable 
as our aim will be to asses the alternate projections for a population when its evolution is 
shaped by the relative fitnesses of the traits which comprise it, keeping all other variables 
fixed. These alternative dynamics will play out in two populations: Population 2- with 
selection,‘P2S’; and Population 2- with selection much reduced: ‘P2N’. Our argument here 
is quite straightforward: if the only difference between P2S and P2N is the strength of 
selection, then we are justified in holding natural selection responsible for any variances in 
evolutionary outcome that come about. Moreover, if one of the differences in these 
populations is the creation of a novel trait that the other lacks, then we are also justified- 
table 2.1
P1 Variable: Mutation Variable: Selection Result: 
No. of Variants in 
population. 
G1 - - 1 (x)
G1 - G2 yes (x to X) no 2 (x, X)
G2 - G3 no yes ( x > X) 1 (x)
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contra the non-creative position- in considering natural selection to be a creative agent 
under these circumstances and those appropriately similar.   
We will establish the fitness scheme featuring selection in P2S as ‘FSS’:  
FSS: XY > xY = Xy > xy.  
In FSS, the XY composite trait provides a greater selection advantage than both the xY and 
Xy composites whose fitnesses are equivalent, but superior to composite xy.  
P2S is initially composed from xy organisms exclusively. So for the novel composite trait 
XY to be created, the following steps need to be accomplished first: {x mutates into X, y 
mutates into Y}, then {both X and Y must exist in the same organism}. This second step 
could occur through genetic recombination in a sexual population or by a lineage inheriting 
either X or Y and proceeding to mutate the second required variant. As the population is 
initially composed from xy, any appearance of composite traits xY (when y mutates into Y) 
or Xy (when x mutates into X) can be straightforwardly explained by referring to actions of 
mutation alone. But because Xy & xY are selectively superior to xy according to FSS, we 
may expect natural selection to increase their representation in P2S once they have arrived 
provided that genetic recombination does not prevent inheritance by splitting their 
component letters up. Notice that introducing traits based on genetic combinations has 
already made the dynamic in P2S quite different from the dynamic in P1: there natural 
selection was responsible for removing the newly-mutated variant; here selection potentially 
maintains and propagates the genetic variant, and developmental factors- should the 
components of Xy or xY have been joined by genetic recombination- have a high probably 
of removing the novel variation.            
In contrast, for our alternative population: P2N, we keep all variables and initial conditions 
the same as those in P2S aside from the relative fitness of each composite trait. We will 
establish the fitness scheme with much-reduced selection in P2N as ‘FSN’:  
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FSN: XY > xY = Xy = xy.  
In FSN, as in FSS, the XY composite trait provides a greater selection advantage than the 
xY, Xy and xy composites, however in P2N the fitnesses for these composites are 
equivalent. 
For the XY composite to arrive in P2N the same two mutational steps: {x mutates into X, y 
mutates into Y} then {both X and Y must exist in the same organism}, must occur just as 
they did in P2S, but here in P2N because xY and Yx provide no fitness benefit relative to xy 
in FSN, their initial spread through the population is far from assured. Relative to 
population size it becomes increasingly likely that both Y and X would be lost rather than 
drift to fixation absent the fitness dynamic provided in FSS. This clearly has severe 
consequences for the likelihood of P2N developing the novel XY trait .      7
Our case for the creativity of natural selection can be set out as follows. When the trait in 
question is a composite trait (here XY), and there is positive selection for each step of the 
process between initial state and the final composite (here {x mutates into X, y mutates into 
Y} then {both X and Y exist in the same organism}) natural selection greatly increases the 
probability of the composite-trait’s creation due to its ability to ‘hold’ each step in the 
population until the next step comes along. So, we while agree with the non-creative view 
that: 
P(x⏐S) = P(x⏐¬S)   
The probability of a single copy of any given trait based on a single gene (here x) existing 
given selection (S) is equal to the probability of that trait existing without selection. Natural 
selection does not influence the probability of any one trait-creating mutation occurring. 
However, in opposition to the non-creative view:  
 The probability of a novel selectively-neutral mutation reaching fixation equals 1/(2N). In a population of 10 this 7
works out to .05; in a population of 100 this works out to .005.
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P(XY⏐S) >> P(XY⏐¬S)  
The probability of a given composite-trait (here XY) existing with selection is much higher 
than the probability of that composite-trait existing without a selective process- given a 
fitness scheme like that described in FSS. The creativity of the selection process is that it 
makes biological features arising from combinations of traits vastly more probable, while 
having no influence on the mutations that create the original traits themselves.  
The thinking behind this argument is itself far from novel. R.A. Fisher suggested that: 
“.... it was Darwin's chief contribution, not only to Biology but to the whole of natural 
science, to have brought to light a process by which contingencies a priori improbable, are 
given, in the process of time, an increasing probability, until it is their non-occurrence rather 
than their occurrence which becomes highly improbable” (R.A.Fisher 1954, p314).  
And similar approaches characterising natural selection as a probabilistic cause of unlikely 
genetic combinations are hard to avoid: Kimura (1961), Neander (1988), Forber (2005) & 
Razeto-Barry & Frick (2011); as well as being implicit in the portrait of natural selection’s 
creativity that Ayala (1970) paints in the metaphor as quoted above. 
A table again helps makes the contrast between otherwise identical populations featuring 
different selection dynamics more explicit:  
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The layout of table 2.2 differs from table 2.1 in that we measure changes through ‘stages’ 
rather than generations (which would be unworkably large); the first ‘result’ column shows 
the composite-traits present in the population at any given stage, while the second shows the 
total number of composite traits created.  
Notice that the mutation order is fixed in both P2N & P2S: x to X between stage 1 to 2, y to 
Y between stage 2 to 3, no mutation stages 3 to 4. The single difference is the fitness 
differences as detailed in FSN & FSS. We clearly see in P2S that the effect of selection 
produces results very different from those shown in both P1 and P2N and that this influence 
is clearly creative. In P1 selection acted to remove the novel trait and return the population 
to its original state, in P2N it is the absence of selection that returns the population to its 
original state, while in P2S selection’s effect is to retain the novel intermediate enabling the 
later creation of XY. In P2N the total number of composite traits created without selection is 
x3, in P2S the total number of traits created with selection is x4: all those from P2N plus the 










Total number of composite 
traits created 
P2N 
FSN: XY > xY = Xy = xy
Stage 1 x1 (xy) x1 (xy)
Stage 1 to 2 yes (x to X) no x2 (xy, Xy) x2 (xy, Xy)
Stage 2 to 3 yes (y to Y) no (Xy lost to drift) x2 (xy, xY) x3 (xy, Xy, xY)
Stage 3 to 4 no no (xY lost to drift) x1 (xy) x3 (xy, Xy, xY)
P2S  
FSS: XY > xY = Xy > xy
Stage 1 x1 (xy) x1 (xy)
Stage 1 to 2 yes (x to X) no x2 (xy, Xy) x2 (xy, Xy)
Stage 2 to 3 yes (y to Y) yes (Xy > xy) x2 (Xy, XY) x3(xy, Xy, xY)
Stage 3 to 4 no yes (XY > Xy) x1 (XY) x4 (xy, Xy, xY, XY)
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This is the creative argument. Does it do what is required of it? Our aim was to demonstrate 
that premise ii) of the non-creative argument was false; to do that we had to show that 
genetic variation was not the only source of evolutionary novelty, and this, plausibly, could 
still be a matter of debate. Isn’t natural selection just shuffling around what is already 
present? Mutation, not selection, is the reason x changes into X;  mutation, not selection is 
the reason y changes into Y; and genetic recombination, not selection is the reason both of 
these develop jointly in an individual organism. Isn’t natural selection’s role in the creation 
of XY restricted to making it more likely that X and Y will conjoin rather than providing the 
causal means for their combination? In essence, the strength of our argument reduces to how 
liberal a conception of causality is considered appropriate for evolutionary phenomena. This 
was not an issue for the causal-argument, where the metaphysical nature of causation itself 
was left unexamined without consequence . Typically though, as it is widely accepted that 8
the type of causality which natural selection trades in is of the probabilistic variety (Kimura 
1955, Beatty 1984, Yoshimura & Shields 1987, Mayr 1988, Glymour 2001, Orr 2005, 
Skipper & Millstein 2005) we may rightly feel the explanatory burden lies with the non-
creativists in demonstrating why a different causal principle should apply here when 
evolutionary science itself is satisfied with a probabilistic explanation.    
If we feel that the presence of natural selection, like mutation, should be an absolute 
necessity for the creation of a novel trait such as XY then an account based on probabilistic 
causality will naturally fail. XY could be created in the examples above without the 
assistance of natural selection; although it is vanishingly unlikely that this would happen 
due to high probability that by lacking superior fitness either of its components would be 
lost to drift soon after their arrival. Alternatively, if we feel that making events more 
probable is the appropriate causal standpoint for evolutionary phenomena then the creative 
position succeeds: natural selection is not necessary for the creation of XY (as this could 
happen incidentally), and natural selection is not sufficient for the arrival of XY (as superior 
fitness in both Xy and xY traits does not guarantee their proliferation), but natural selection 
does undoubtably make the creation of XY considerably more likely and this, we may 
 Although Millstein is at pains to point out that her argument for the casual potency of population-level properties is 8
compatible with various different casual accounts (Millstein 2006, p8).  
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suggest, is sufficient to explain that trait’s creation; and thus demonstrates natural 
selection’s creativity.   
We will close this section with a an observation. Notice that the lower the value of 
P(XY⏐¬S) the stronger the case that occurrences of XY require natural selection to create 
the appropriate circumstances for its creation. If the probability of any one selectively 
neutral variant reaching fixation is P = 1/(2N), then the probability of any two neutral 
variants reaching fixation is P = (1/(2/N))2, three variants: P = (1/(2/N))3, and so on. Clearly 
the higher the number of variants required to make a trait, the lower the probability that 
mutation alone could produce it; and the larger the effective population size, the lower the 
probability that once a neutral variant had been created that it would proliferate rather than 
disappear.  
At the start of this chapter our aim was to provide a defence of the traditional- casual and 
creative-  view of natural selection as a mechanism responsible for the remarkable 
suitability of organisms for their environments. We have seen how natural selection has no 
effect (other than possibly eliminative) for the creation of single-gene traits which are due to 
genetic variation alone, but can have a significant effect on bringing separate variants 
together in a population when each is selectively beneficial, and the greater the number of 
variants that are required to produce any given composite-trait, the greater the likelihood 
that natural selection is required to produce it. So when we consider the highly intricate 
characteristics that make organisms so well-suited to their environments, we may ask how 
many mutational events were required to create such phenomena. Because, ceteris paribus, 
the greater the number of mutational events that any given complex trait requires, the 
greater the probability that the mechanism of natural selection was responsible for creating 
it.  
2.5 Lessons from the non-causal and non-creative positions  
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Let us pause briefly here and recap. In 2.2 and 2.3 we examined the non-causal position: 
that as causality is exclusively mediated through the individual’s proximate interactions 
with its environment that natural selection’s casual powers are illusory. In defence of the 
traditional view of natural selection as a causal mechanism, we suggested that the apparent 
problem of introducing natural selection into an already-complete causal account does not 
arise, and this was not due to any error over the nature of causality, but due to error over 
mereology. The actions and fates of individuals matter to populations because populations 
are composed from individuals, the corollary to this being that individuals are parts of 
populations. We observed that the ‘life history’ events of individuals given casual 
exclusivity by the non-causalist position do not cause the population to change in the way 
that one separate event causes another; the causal histories of the individual ‘parts’ of a 
population and the causal history of the population are the same history. The non-causalist 
preference for ‘individual-level’ events is guided by explanatory framing rather than causal 
reality. We further observed, that the error of the non-causal position was in reifying the 
individual, conceiving of the wider population-level picture as background only, and in 
considering population-level properties to be merely statistical abstractions lacking in casual 
efficacy. In contrast the casual view treats the members of a population’s life history events 
even-handily without giving explanatory priority to any particular individual. Millstein’s 
argument effectively demonstrated the explanatory insufficiency of the individual-level 
perspective as the population-level effect of trait frequency fluctuation could not be 
explained though the actions of individuals, but through the causal effectiveness of 
population-level properties.  
Then in 2.4 we examined the non-creative view. Here it was alleged that any causal powers 
that natural selection does possess are limited to eradicating pre-existing, selectively 
disadvantageous variation. As with the non-causal argument, we noted that the non-creative 
argument gives clear priority to events at the level of the individual; although here the 
relevant properties are the composition and fidelity of an individual’s genetic inheritance 
coupled with the specifics of its ontogenetic development. On the rare occasions that novel 
characteristics do arise within a population, these will be due to mutation or genetic 
recombination taking place within, and having effects on, individuals: genetic variation 
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creates, natural selection differentially propagates. In response, we argued that although 
natural selection is limited to the distribution of traits and thus to changing the composition 
of populations, it is through the composition of the populations that the various genetic 
components of complex traits are brought together and their novel characteristics 
subsequently produced. As natural selection is a stochastic rather than a deterministic 
mechanism, its effectiveness in doing this could not be shown with certainty. Our approach 
was to establish that natural selection substantially raises the probability of the unlikely 
genetic combinations required for complex adaptations existing in the same population at 
the same time. Conditional on a probabilistic view of causation, we considered this 
sufficient to demonstrate natural selection’s creativity.                             
What additional insights can we draw from our combined defences of the traditional, causal 
and creative view?  
Firstly, and most evidently, there is both negative positions’ overt focus on the actions and 
events of the individual at the expense of a wider perspective which recognises the causal 
relevance of other individuals. The non-causal position denigrates the other members of the 
extant population that together with the target individual jointly produce population-level 
effects, similarly, the non-creative position denigrates the target individual’s direct ancestors 
and those individuals that comprised the target individual’s ancestral populations. This is 
more than just a quirk of explanatory framing. If the ‘denigrated’ individuals in either of 
these cases had behaved differently, the evolutionary consequences would also be very 
different. For the causal argument, the relationship is synchronic, the causally-relevant 
individuals that matter are at a spatial not temporal remove and share with the target 
individual the property of belonging to a common population. This provides another reason 
for why the collective behaviour of individual population members cannot be said to ‘cause’ 
the behaviour of the population; causes are temporally prior to their effects whereas the 
behaviour of individuals within the population and the behaviour of the population itself 
occurs simultaneously. If ‘non-target’ population members behave differently, then the 
population behaves differently, so denigrating non-target individuals as explanatory 
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background rather than recognising them as part of a wider causal mechanism unavoidably, 
and mistakenly, relegates population-level properties as non-causal and derivative. 
For the creative argument, the relationship between the ‘target’ individual - here, 
specifically, an organism - which genetically inherits and develops, and the other non-target 
individuals which the non-creative position omits from the allegedly-exclusive site of 
creativity, are not only the target-individual’s immediate parent/s and direct ancestors, but 
the other members of the ancestral population, where the variants required to create the 
target individual’s genetic inheritance were selectively favoured and propagated. Here the 
relationship is diachronic; the causally-relevant individuals that matter are at a temporal 
remove, but notice that it is again a ‘population-level’ property that is causally responsible 
and which the negative-position overlooks. Natural selection does not operate by ‘selecting’ 
or ‘not selecting’, it operates by selectively favouring or disfavouring and this requires a 
population for the traits to be differentially-propagated through. To casually account for the 
creation of complex adaptations- which require the historical propagation of many such 
traits- we cannot ignore the effects of the members of the ancestral population who are not 
direct ancestors themselves, as their traits are responsible for the population-level properties 
which enabled those members which are direct ancestors to successfully develop and 
reproduce. In contrast to the position of the causal argument, here the relationship between 
the target individual and the wider, ancestral, population is causal, not mereological. 
Descendant individuals are not part of their ancestral populations, but the selective 
dynamics of ancestral populations are causally necessary for descendant individuals to 
possess the genetic repertoire that their complex traits require. This is why the nature of 
causation itself had to be addressed albeit briefly; the relationship between the inheritance 
and development of complex traits to the properties of ancestral populations is one of cause 
and effect.  
Our second lesson is more of a confirmation. Although both natural selection’s causal and 
creative abilities have been defended in the current chapter, only the dynamics highlighted 
by the creative argument may lead to adaptation in the sense that over enough rounds of 
reproduction the members of later populations could be expected - ceteris paribus - to have 
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accumulated more environmentally appropriate characteristics than the members of their 
antecedent populations. Millstein’s causal argument demonstrated natural selection’s causal 
efficacy, but showed only that population-level properties can be causally responsible for 
population-level effects. As the selective advantage of each genotype was negatively 
correlated to its representation in population T, the higher the representation of each 
particular trait, the lower that trait’s selective advantage when compared to its alternative. In 
the absence of changes to the population’s environment or the introduction of new 
genotypes disturbing the system, the ‘evolution’ of population T could well be limited to 
recycling the same d- and h-genotype frequencies. This is evolution, and natural selection is 
the cause, but in a quite a limited sense; producing more of a ‘holding-pattern’ of genetic 
representation in the population, than a process that moves the population from one former 
state into another. The difference between the effects of natural selection as characterised by 
Millstein’s approach and the phenomena that we are looking to natural selection to explain 
can be brought into sharper focus by considering the following: 
If the population with the greater selection differential: P2S, were examined at time t1 at the 
start of the demonstration and then re-examined at a later time of t2, the data analysed from 
these ‘snapshots’ might allow us to place P2S at t1 and P2S at t2 in the correct temporal 
order with some confidence. This would be possible as the representation of the selectively-
beneficial X and Y alleles would be expected to increase over subsequent generations at the 
expense of the comparatively detrimental x and y alleles; later stages of P2S are likely to 
have more. If a similar operation were attempted on population T featured in Millstein’s 
causal argument however our confidence in placing the data from the different periods in the 
correct temporal order would be much-reduced. Although selection changes the relative 
frequencies of the d and h genotypes in that population, the representation of these 
genotypes is cyclical, not directional as in P2S. We would not be able to tell - at least using 
the frequencies of the h-types and d-types alone - if one snapshot of the population 
developed from or gave rise to the other. 
As is well known frequency dependence does not always operate in this way, traits may also 
exhibit positive frequency dependance when their selection advantage increases the higher 
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their representation in the population- this would promote the directional selection 
witnessed in P2S. But the negative frequency dependence described in population T 
highlights an established scepticism concerning not what phenomena natural selection can 
explain, but what phenomena we can expect natural selection to produce (Parker & 
Maynard-Smith 1990, Sober 1984, Endler 1986, Gould 1998). Natural selection is clearly in 
evidence in population T - so much in fact that the example was chosen by Millstein with 
the explicit aim of demonstrating natural selection’s causal potency. But equally clearly, as 
the changes in genotype frequency described in population T lead only to cyclical evolution, 
this particular type of natural selection cannot lead to adaptation, and therefore cannot lead 
to adaptive traits. We rightly expect that organisms undergoing adaptive evolution to be 
markedly different from their predecessors, and in cases of cyclical frequency-dependance 
simpliciter this will not be the case.  
If we wish to accurately capture natural selection’s ability to equip organisms with complex 
adaptive traits as per our stated aims in this chapter then it is clear that the arguments given 
so far will need considerable supplementation. To be sure, our creative argument 
demonstrated that the unlikely genetic combinations needed to produce complex adaptive 
traits require natural selection to promote their retention and propagation through the wider 
population. Natural selection is clearly necessary for this to happen, but even the non-
cyclical causal influence of natural selection as demonstrated in our creative argument is not 
sufficient for this and falls short in providing an adequate explanation for the evolution of 
complex adaptive traits.  
Recall our query towards the end of 2.3. Do we consider an explanation for: i) the fact that 
populations contain individuals which fit their environments more suitably than other 
individuals, to be the same explanation for: ii) the fact that individuals have certain features 
which fit their environments? Our creative argument speaks to the first of these explananda: 
population P2S features four types of individuals {xy, Xy, xY, XY}, the origin of the X and 
Y alleles is mutational and therefore accidental, but the proliferation of these alleles though 
their Xy, xY and XY phenotypes is explained by the selective benefits these traits provided 
in their given environment. This is why the P2S population features individuals more suited 
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to their environment {Xy, xY, XY} than are other P2S population members {xy}. But this is 
a long way from explaining why individual organisms such as cacti, scorpions and birds 
have the incredibly complex and intricate adaptations that they do.   
Although we have shown that natural selection can promote the representation of certain 
traits within a population, and can understand that the retention of these traits coupled with 
further mutation and (in sexual species) genetic recombination can lead to more complex 
traits that without natural selection would be vanishingly unlikely, we have provided no 
additional qualitative connection between the earlier trait {xy} and and its ‘descendant-
traits’ {Xy, xY, XY} other than the fact that these descendant traits are selectively 
beneficial. This is not enough. For the creation of complex adaptive traits such as spines and 
wings, later stages must not only provide a selective advantage per se to the stages 
preceding them, the selective advantages of the later traits must, we suggest, be due to them 
interacting with their environments in quite a specific way.   
Let us unpack the claim. We know that in population P2S, according to fitness scheme FSS, 
the relative fitness of each trait is: XY > Xy = xY > xy. But to know if this dynamic may 
contribute to the evolution of complex adaptive traits we also need to know the empirical 
reasons for each of these traits having the relative fitnesses that they do. Knowing the 
comparative selection benefits for each of these traits is not enough. Suppose for example 
that the population P2S is a population of bacteria, and that the xy genotype provides a level 
of environmental resilience, perhaps partial immunity to a harmful bacteriophage pathogen. 
Suppose further that the introduction into the population of the X and Y alleles provides Xy 
and xY organisms with a heightened immunity to this pathogen, so explaining the fitness 
advantages of the new alleles through their improved resilience, and additionally that the 
superior fitness of the XY genotype is granted by virtue of XY bacteria enjoying an even 
higher immunity to the environmental pathogen. Here we can understand how some of the 
individuals in the population have features which fit their environment as the selective 
advantages of each genotype maps onto their empirical consequences in a direct and 
appreciable way: xy is selectively inferior to Xy and to xY because it provides inferior 
immunity - xy is more vulnerable and therefore more prone to infection than are both Xy 
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and xY; XY is even more resilient than both Xy and xY, and is therefore even less 
vulnerable to infection by the pathogen than are Xy and xY. We explain the selective 
benefits of genotypes by their average effects; but what makes the selective benefits here 
conducive to the adaption of complex traits is that they coincide with performative increases 
in a narrowly-construed function: here immunity to a specific pathogen.  
Clearly, the alignment of selective benefit with ‘improvement’ in any given effect like this is 
far from guaranteed. The empirical circumstances for the fitness benefits of each genotype 
may be very different. Given different empirical circumstances: an alternative population 
P2S* for example, the xy genotype might have provided organisms with a degree of 
immunity as xy did in P2S, while Xy in contrast might not effect immunity at all in P2S*, 
but provide instead an increase in fecundity; xY likewise may not produce any differences 
in immunity in P2S*, but instead increase metabolic efficiency; and XY could have 
provided no differences in any of the these abilities in P2S* but produced substances 
harmful to non-XY individuals’ survival and reproduction.  
Notice that if this were the case, although the accumulation of genetic variation might 
follow the same evolutionary pattern as illustrated in P2S({xy},then {x mutates into X, y 
mutates into Y}, then {both X and Y existing in the same organism}) and retain the same 
fitness scheme (FSS: XY > xY = Xy >xy), the results would be very different adaptively. 
The haphazard empirical nature of the fitness benefits of each combination in P2S* - 
immunity, fecundity, metabolic efficiency, production of non-XY harmful toxin - impedes 
the evolution of complex adaptive traits that we set out at the beginning of this chapter to 
explain. For that to happen, natural selection must not merely promote cumulative 
adaptation, but promote cumulative adaptation of a specific sort. 
For the spines of cacti and the stings of scorpions to evolve, the selection pressures need to 
be such that new variants of the such traits functionally outperform their predecessors in 
quite a specific way. We can see the beginnings of this in PS2 when the genotypes map onto 
immunity, where the xy- Xy/xY - XY individuals strengthen their immunity through through 
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intermediate steps, but not in PS2* where the fitnesses advantages of the various genotypes 
are haphazard and unrelated. 
2.6 Chapter recap and conclusion 
In 2.1 we set out this chapter’s main task: defending the traditional view of natural selection 
as the causal mechanism for the complex adaptive features of organisms and recognised this 
as a preparatory task in terms of this dissertation’s larger project. In 2.2 we discussed the 
non-causal position but in 2.3 found its arguments unconvincing; focusing on the 
undoubtably causal interactions of individuals proved to be an unsuccessful strategy in light 
of the fact that individuals are parts of populations, not the causes of populations. Casual 
interactions at the level of individuals are causal interactions at the level of populations. In 
2.4 we examined the non-creative position but also found it implausible, and for similar 
reasons. Novel traits arise because of the interactions between genetic inheritance and 
ontogenetic development- properties of individual organisms - as the non-creative view 
contends - but the reasons for an individual’s genetic inheritance involve the selective 
dynamics of the populations of its ancestors; again the wider perspective was overlooked in 
preference of events occurring at the level of the individual. In 2.5 we synthesised our 
observations from the previous sections and noticed that although the the cumulative 
retention and propagation of unlikely genetic combinations is a necessary step for the 
creation of complex adaptive traits - and one that natural selection is responsible for - 
natural selection per se is not sufficient to account for the ‘fit’ of organisms to the 
environments that they inhabit. For that we need to more closely examine the empirical 
reasons for some combinations enjoying a fitness advantage over others.  
With natural selection’s causal and creative potency secured, our focus in chapter 3 will 
move to the type of natural selection required to produce the complex traits which motivated 
our defence of the traditional view at the start of this chapter. This will involve engagement 
with a well established area in the philosophy of biology: the concept of biological function, 
58
and perhaps surprisingly, also involve engagement with a very well established area in 
philosophy more generally: how to relate normative values with natural facts.   
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Chapter 3 
Normativity, Function & Progress.  
3.1 Introduction  
The use of metaphorical language is endemic to evolutionary biology. Behaviours have 
‘strategies’, organisms have ‘goals’, phenotypes have ‘designs’ and traits have ‘purposes’; 
as is well recognised (Francis 2005, Godfrey-Smith 2009, Okasha 2018b) the application of 
these terms to describe biological phenomena can be far from philosophically innocuous. 
But the use of intentional concepts like these are not the only type of metaphor that 
evolutionary biology invites. Adaptations of some species are described as ‘superior’ to 
those of others; some species and taxa are thought to be more ‘successful’ than their rivals; 
and despite general acknowledgement that thinking of some species as ‘higher’ than others 
has little empirical warrant, its use still echos in the contemporary evolutionary literature. 
The evaluation of nature occurs as a matter of course. Some of these evaluative terms are 
more easily construed naturalistically than others: we might understand the ‘success’ of 
certain taxa - perhaps mammals and insects for example - as referring to intra-taxon 
diversity or geographical distribution, or perhaps the taxon’s endurance over evolutionary 
time. Any normativity in these statements would seem to be of a harmless, cosmetic variety 
as the empirical basis underpinning them could be restated in purely descriptive terms 
without loss of understanding. Other types of evaluation are more problematic. Darwin was 
well-aware of the fallacy in thinking that nature could be ranked according to ‘highness’ for 
example (Darwin 1872) : when we think of certain species or organisms as ‘superior’ or 9
‘higher’ the evaluation appears to be of a different and more questionable stripe.          
The difficulties of reconciling normative ‘values’ and natural ‘facts’ have an equally 
distinguished philosophical heritage. New arrivals to this rich seam of analytic philosophy 
are typically directed towards Hume’s ‘Fact/Value Gap’ (Hume 1739) and Moore’s ‘Open 
Question Argument’ (Moore 1903), while the more contemporary-orientated reader will 
 We return to this problem in Chapter 5. 9
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almost certainly be concerned with attempts at providing ethical attitudes and propositions 
with a naturalistic explanation (Mackie 1977, Railton 1986, Nichols 2004, Vavova 2015). 
On the one hand we have matters of empirical fact, such as the roundness of the Earth, the 
atomic weight of hydrogen, and evolution by natural selection- descriptions pertaining to 
how the world is, while on the other hand there is a quite distinct form of proposition: 
‘murder is wrong’, ‘cats are better than dogs’, and ‘help should always be preferentially 
given to family members’- which concern value judgements directly or directives based 
upon the desirability of outcomes and how the world ought to be. The philosophical 
difficulty lies in the negotiation of how naturalistic statements concerning facts which - as 
the majority view has it - should be value-free, relate to normative statements concerning 
attitudes or directives which are value-laden. Compatibilists have limited choices: either 
construe normative properties to be natural facts about organisms like ourselves; perhaps a 
set of rules as to how they must act if they are to promote social cooperation (Sterelny & 
Fraser 2017), or consider normative properties to be fully ‘real’ but independent of the 
agents capable of holding them (Boyd 1988).   
Our aim in this chapter will involve a reconciliation of sorts between certain natural and 
normative phenomena, although the ‘direction of travel’ will be the reverse of that usually 
taken. Typically, analysis commences with normative phenomena: with moral, ethical, 
perhaps aesthetic attitudes, and attempts to explain these as adaptive in someway so as to 
provide them with a natural evolutionary origin. Our aim here is different. Instead of trying 
to ‘naturalise normativity’ in this way, we will show how some natural facts allow - and 
indeed invite - normative interpretation. Moreover, it will be increasingly clear that this 
approach is not idiosyncratic and does not run counter to common usage. When we want to 
understand how certain traits provide a selection advantage over others, the empirical facts 
require us to interpret their performances evaluatively. In contrast to the ‘naturalising of 
normativity’ are per the more usual compatibilist approach, we will instead be attempting to 
‘normativise nature’. This will not quite be the post-Humean revolution compatibilists have 
been waiting for, but an elucidation of the reasoning implicit in a great deal of evolutionary 
explanations. We will further show however that this normativity is not merely an 
explanatory convenience or introduced artificially; the inherent naturalism and normativism 
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of certain evolutionary phenomena can be shown quite straightforwardly: the functional 
performances of biological traits can be objectively better or objectively worse than the 
performances of other traits. We are not projecting our values onto nature or transgressing 
philosophical orthodoxy in recognising this, but describing a real and causally efficacious 
aspect of the evolutionary process.       
Our findings will lean on two very different philosophical frameworks: Christensen’s 
division of normativity into distinct Evaluative and non-Evaluative conceptual areas 
(Christensen 2012), and the selected effects (SE) conception of biological function (Wright 
1973; Millikan 1984, 1989, 1989b; Neander 1991a, 1991b, 1995a, 1995b; Godfrey-Smith 
1993, Kitcher 1993, Allen & Bekoff 1995). Despite keeping to the letter of the SE approach 
we noticeably deviate from its application in two ways; we will dispute one of its oft-
suggested consequences on the one hand, and highlight an often overlooked consequence on 
the other. The SE conception tells what traits did, but it does not tell us what traits ‘ought’ to 
do; there is no normativity of the ‘Evaluative’ kind - according to Christensen’s rubric - to 
be found in evolutionary phenomena although some SE adherents claim otherwise. We 
identify that the term ‘selected’ in selected effects refers to a process, rather than an event; 
the selection dynamic in the SE conception is not one of the effects of traits being selected 
or being not-selected, but one of traits being favoured or disfavoured due to functional 
differences in their performances. Holding the SE conception of function requires an 
implicit commitment to a type of progressive evolution brought about through 
improvements in the performances of traits’ selected effects.       
We begin in 3.2 by identifying different types of normativity and noticing that some of these 
types can be, and very often are, applied to phenomena quite outside the actions of moral 
agents. Some performances are objectively better than others in a way quite unlike that of 
ethical or ‘Evaluative’ judgment. Then in 3.3 we divert our attention specifically to the 
performances of biological functions. The ‘selected effects’ (SE) conception of functions is 
considered to have introduced normative terms into evolutionary discourse but we see here 
that this attempt is less successful than is usually thought. In 3.4 however, we show that 
although the more established route to ‘normativising nature’ through the SE conception 
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fails, the SE conception does permit the use of normative language in a milder ‘Non-
Evaluative’ form. 3.5 integrates these findings with this dissertation’s overarching subject 
matter: progress in evolution, and addresses preemptively a possible criticism: how we 
should consider cases where ‘improvements’ in biological function compromise fitness. In 
3.6 our attention turns to scope: we explain that the type of progressive evolution described 
is far from a minor part of evolution- but is a widespread characteristic, traits by and large 
provide benefit through improvements in their selected effects. 3.7 revisits this chapter’s 
findings and places them into our larger project.         
    
 3.2 Naturalising normativity & normativising nature  
Attempts to make clear the relationship between normative attitudes and natural facts 
remain one of philosophy’s staple preoccupations. Approaches to the problem tend to begin 
with values: an action, attitude or outcome that is considered desirable or undesirable, and 
attempt to find a natural, non-normative justification for the holding of these beliefs. But the 
relationship between facts and values can often be equally opaque when considered from 
the opposite perspective, as certain natural phenomena and evolutionary phenomena 
particularity seem to invite normative appraisal. This chapter will be orientated with this 
lesser-addressed mystery in mind; instead of ‘naturalising normativity’ as per the more 
established route, we will instead be addressing the ‘normativisation of nature’. Identifying 
certain natural, biological facts and showing that our normative interpretations of them are 
not mere projections as might be commonly construed, but properties belonging to the 
phenomena themselves which we accurately describe by performative evaluation.  
In preparation for this task we will briefly identity the various species of normativity in 
order to make clear the nature of our ‘normativisation’ using the broad strokes of 
Christensen (2012) as a heuristic. According to Christensen we have Evaluative Normativity 
on the one hand and Non-Evaluative normativity on the other. Evaluative Normativity - 
concerning values as more commonly construed - covers two sub-categories: evaluative 
terms such as ‘good’,‘bad’, ‘moral, ‘evil,  etc and prescriptions such as ‘do not kill’, ‘do not 
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steal’ and so on. This is where philosophical efforts to reconcile natural and normative 
concepts are typically directed: ‘what natural facts conspire make actions good or bad?’ or 
dictate that ‘killing is forbidden?” - projects which attempt to ground the explananda of 
ethical attitudes and directives within a naturalistic picture of the world, often using social 
or evolutionary principles as explanans. In contrast Non-Evaluative normativity also covers 
two sub-categories: what Christensen terms ‘performance norms’ such as those which make 
a participant’s skills and abilities in a given activity poor or proficient, and ‘constructive 
norms’ which specify the necessary rules that must be observed for a given practice or 
activity to be counted as an instance of a broader type. Clearly Christensen’s demarcation of 
the normative landscape into these limited categories is somewhat crude but as we will see, 
it can be put to productive work.           
Fig 3.1  10
In contrast to Evaluative normativity, Non-evaluative normativity has been given far less 
philosophical attention for understandable reasons. There seems little controversy that when 
we stipulate that moving the king one square at a time is a necessary condition for an 
activity to count as a game of chess, or that the goal-keeper alone may use their hands to 
 fig 3.1. A representation of Christensen’s ‘taxonomy’ of normativity. Subsumed under the broad umbrella of 10
‘Normativity’ itself  are ‘Evaluative’ and ‘Non-Evaluative’ strains; under Evaluative normativity lie ‘evaluations’ 
themselves and ‘prescriptions’; under Non-evaluative normativity lie ‘performance-norms’ and ‘constructive-norms’. 
(Graphic by Tim Ashton: original to this dissertation)
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touch the ball if the game is to be a qualify as game of football - both norms of construction 
- we are referring to rules that are minus any ethical baggage, more straightforwardly 
analysed, and of a quite a different stripe to those which prescribe that we should not kill or 
lie. Performance norms are similarly considered uncontroversial - or at least uncontroversial 
when applied to inanimate processes or artefacts. When a colour television does not produce 
the colour red, or when there is heavy snow in April, the apparent ‘wrongness’ of these 
situations can be readily explained by a failure to achieve a pre-assigned task in the case of 
the television or by a departure from expectation or regularity in the case of the unseasonal 
snowfall. So although something of a blunt instrument in the manner wielded here, 
Christensen’s categorisation brings into sharp relief an important distinction which the 
remainder of this chapter will capitalise on: when televisions malfunction and bad weather 
strikes any norms transgressed are clearly on the Non-Evaluative, performative side of the 
divide rather than Evaluative. Broken televisions and bad weather can be annoying and 
unexpected but they are not immoral or unethical.  
Matters rapidly become problematic however when we consider deviations from biological 
performance norms: low blood pressure, albinism, hyperplasia for example. The apparent 
‘wrongness’ of these conditions cannot be explained by departure from expectation or 
regularity so easily. Biological conditions such as these seem to be unlike that of the faulty 
television as there is no conscious agent in the role of ‘assigner’ to establish what the 
biological performative norms are, and so no obvious way that these conditions can be 
described as not achieving them, but these conditions are also unlike unseasonal weather in 
that there seems to be something quite distinctive of the compromised performances of 
biological entities over and above their statistical deviation from what items of a similar 
type regularly do. Decades of snow in April for example would likely establish this as the 
‘norm’, whereas we would not consider albinism to be any less of a failure to produce 
pigment if - ceteris paribus - cases of it significantly increased in the much same way that 
we currently disvalue gum disease despite its endemic presence in many species including 
our own. Regularity or expectation in such cases does not seem to impose biological 
normality on them. Biological performance norms seem to be different.  
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Although statistical approaches which do recognise disease as a deviation from species-
typical performance retain popularity (Boorse 1975 & 2011, Kingma 2010, Griffiths & 
Mathewson 2018) our objective here is somewhat tangential to the debate: the compromised 
performances of both the faulty television - an artefact, and the hypotensive heart- a natural 
organ, present themselves as examples of the same kind of deviation whereas the unseasonal 
snowfall and the hypotensive heart- both natural events, do not. If we consider the similarity 
in deviation in both the heart and television to be similar despite the very different natures 
of entities responsible it would seem that in terms of performance-norms drawing a line 
between artificial performance-norms and natural performance-norms is drawing the line in 
the wrong place. When a television cannot show the colour red it fails to meet its 
performance norm because televisions are supposed to display red not because on average 
televisions do actually show red, when a heart cannot provide adequate pressure for 
circulation it too fails because it would seem hearts equally are ‘supposed’ to provide 
adequate pressure for circulation, not because hearts on average actually do provide 
adequate pressure. It may not be supposed to snow in April either of course, but the use of 
the term is recognisably distinct here in that the supposition is underwritten by regularity to 
some degree. If it frequently snowed in April, it would be unclear what point someone who 
claimed that it was not supposed to happen was trying to make.  
Although the deviation of the television and the deviation of the heart may strike us 
impressionistically as the same kind of deviation, our basis for the appraisal of one is quite 
clearly different from our basis for the appraisal of the other. We know the standard of 
performance assigned to televisions and other artefacts as we do the assigning; if the screen 
fails to project an expected colour it is failing to perform to the standard for which it was 
explicitly designed. The performance norms for biological traits are not accessible to us in 
this way as we had no hand in their production. This problem may strike us as one quite 
familiar to the philosophy of biology. In much the same way that anatomy requires us to 
reappraise the concept of ‘design’ minus a designer (Dawkins 1986, Ayala 2004), and 
adaptive behaviour requires us to re-conceive of ‘reasons’ minus a reasoner (Dennett 1990), 
the phenomena of biological performance norms would seem to require an ‘assignment’ of 
appropriate performance minus any assigner. The issue of apparent intention and reasoning 
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in evolution is typically approached by drawing an analogy between the processes conscious 
agents undertake when genuinely designing and reasoning, and the processes through which 
natural selection produces biological phenomena as though it could design and reason 
(Godfrey-Smith 2009, Okasha 2018b).  
Nature does not of course design organisms as we do artefacts by the use of models or by 
stress-testing materials ahead of construction, nor does nature identify a problem such as 
maximising foraging returns with minimal time and energy expenditure and from this 
desiderata calculate the optimum strategy. But the lack of actual intention in the 
evolutionary equivalents of these ‘design’ and ‘reasoning’ processes is often considered 
relatively unimportant compared to the phenomena produced (Dennett 1995, Dawkins 
2005). Although the characterisation of evolution as a problem-meets-solution type of 
process can be contentious (Gould & Lewontin 1979, Levins & Lewontin 1985) it is clear 
that questioning the design specifications of the mammalian eye, or asking for the reasons 
why some birds fake injury in the presence of predators are perfectly warranted empirical 
enquires despite their metaphorical presentation. When we suggest that the ciliary muscle of 
the eye is designed so as to lengthen or shorten the lens allowing for differential focus, or 
that the reason birds pretend to be injured is to distract predators away from their vulnerable 
young, these are suggestions that can be investigated and we may hope definitively 
answered; despite ciliary muscles not having actually been designed, and birds not actually 
reasoning about the effectiveness of their distraction techniques. If someone were to claim 
that asking design questions about the ciliary muscle or reasoning questions about birds’ 
behaviour were somehow misconceived and unwarranted, they would not be only be 
denying the legitimacy of the analogies but handicapping biological investigation.  
Given the reality of design minus a designer, and of reasons minus a reasoner, how may we 
go about interpreting the ‘norm’ of performance of any biological trait or behaviour minus 
an explicit assignation? This may be very obvious in some cases: an eye that is severely 
injured or diseased and cannot focus at all will surely not be performing to its ‘assigned’ 
standard, nor would the distraction technique of a bird positioned where an approaching 
predator could not see it. But often things will not be so straightforward. The subtlety of 
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many traits means that their effectiveness can be measured to a much finer degree than a 
simple and binary on or off. A bird faking an injury for example may be quite convincing in 
its behaviour so as to be indistinguishable from one genuinely injured, whereas another may 
not be quite as talented but still fake injury to a lesser but still appreciable extent. 
Anatomical traits may perform to different degrees as much as behavioural ones. Even 
slight differences in phenotype and appearance may translate into large differences in 
effectiveness. This can be understood particularity clearly where mimicry and camouflage 
are concerned for example; one mimic may look considerably more similar to its given 
model than does another, just as one organism may blend into their environment more 
invisibly than others do. Even to those skeptical that normativity can be anything other than 
a projection of values onto natural phenomena, there is an unavoidable sense in which a 
mimic which resembles its model to the point of indiscernibility, or the organism 
camouflaged so as to be undetectable are performing these tasks better than those less-
disguised, and that these differences in ability belong to the organisms themselves rather 
than to an unwarranted normative interpretation.  
Notice that the skill of a bird’s distraction technique or the effectiveness of a mimic seem to 
be open to the performatively good or bad interpretation in much the same way as the 
performances of athletes or gymnasts are, but with a major difference. When we consider 
the superiority in performance of one athlete over another, or of one gymnast over another, 
we can be reasonably confident that we are making a factual rather than an impressionistic 
or subjective judgment because we know what the rules of these practices are - in 
Christensen’s parlance, we know their constitutive norms - and so are able to adjudicate 
their performances within the context of these accordingly. Comparing the performances of 
the traits of organisms in this way is more problematic for obvious reasons. It is not 
immediately clear how we can contextualise the performances of the traits of organisms in 
the same way as we do the performances of sports players as it is unclear what the 
analogous ‘rules of the game’ are for the activities of traits and behaviours which we did not 
invent. The constitutive norms which stipulate that the performances of different players are 
performances in the same activity it seems are not provided to us by the natural world in the 
same readily-accessible way.         
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For example: at the time of writing the current holder for the fastest 100m is Usain Bolt 
(clocking in at 9.58 seconds, Berlin 2009). Clearly the whole notion of a professional 
sporting event is somewhat artificial: the distance to be run, the medications competitors are 
permitted to use, position of the competitors’ feet on the starting blocks and so on; there 
seems to be little ‘natural’ about such events. But once these constitutive norms have been 
decided on and enforced, the performances of the competitors are not evaluated but 
measured. We know that Bolt was the best sprinter in that particular race, because we know 
that the rules of the game were enforced, so each competitor’s performance in the event was 
a performance in the same activity, and because there was only one way to be the best 
sprinter in that race which was to run faster than everyone else. ‘Better’ in this example 
equates straightforwardly with ‘faster’; as time and distance are empirically measurable 
quantities, so are the relative performances of the competitors. Notice that although there is 
non-evaluative normativity at work here, the norms are not being employed to judge the 
relative performances of the competitors - empirical measurement is doing that - the norms 
evoked here are constitutive norms employed to ensure that the performances of the 
competitors are performances at the same identically-constituted activity.   
This objectivity in measurement can be carried over to many different types of 
performances once the constitutive-norms of the activity have been established and 
enforced. Consider the following: we stipulate that we wish to maximise the storage 
capacity of a specified area using the minimum amount of materials so as to accommodate a 
maximum specified load. Various engineers suggest to us various solutions. It seems a 
misnomer here to describe the process by which we arrive at the best solution as an 
evaluative ‘judgement’; much like the performances of the athletes in the 100m were timed, 
given the establishment of the competition’s constitutive-norms the best solution in these 
circumstances is one that we can more accurately be said to calculate. The design 
specifications here are of course decided by the preferences of the specifier, but once these 
norms have been established the superiority or inferiority of differing solutions according to 
these specifications are no longer a matter of subjective preference.  
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If we find the use of comparatives in the above engineering and sprinting examples to be 
problematic it will not be due to any obvious normative difficulties. We may have doubts 
about how similar design competitions and sporting events are to adaptations like mimicry 
and camouflage given their artificiality, but there is little in our use of comparative terms 
such as ‘better’ or ‘best’ here that would disturb Hume or Moore. Following Christensen’s 
Evaluative vs Non-Evaluative distinction it is clear that any normativity concerning the 
engineering competition and the sporting event falls squarely on the non-evaluative side of 
the divide. Fulfilling design criteria or setting world records are not in themselves 
evaluatively ‘good’ or ‘bad’ things to do , nor are these prescriptive courses of action that 
engineers or sprinters are ethically obliged to follow; the norms here concern construction 
and performance. 
Competitions must be played fairly, in that competitors must be competing at the same 
thing, but to ensure this they must also be organised fairly too. Events such as the one won 
by Bolt are run on the understanding that stopwatches are accurate, that the track is of 
suitable material and length and so on. These conditions may not immediately strike us as 
‘constructive-norms’ in a metaphysical sense, but notice that the organisers of such events 
need to ensure these and other conditions for the race to qualify as ‘the 100m’; results from 
other ‘100m’ races could not be compared if their track were longer or shorter or of different 
material, or if their measuring equipment were not suitably comparable. The coherency of 
there being a ‘100m world record’ depends on this similarity. The engineering commission 
is similarly constituted. It will be applied for on the tacit assumption that it contain all the 
relevant information required for its successful completion- if the request for the best use of 
storage space omitted details such as the area in question being on a submarine, or that the 
construct had to be made from reclaimed materials this would be a constitute a different 
commission from the one written down. An engineer who lacked this information and as a 
result lost the commission to a rival applicant possessing it could not be blamed for offering 
an interior solution; her solution would be designed to solve a different, less-specific 
project.       
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In terms of performance the engineering commission and the sporting event are very likely 
to produce their ‘best’ entrants as they are both contrived to discover these very things. 
Performance in these cases is underwritten by the very limited number of ways that their 
results are appropriately measured. These restrictions mean that comparative success is 
objective and definitive: Bolt (9.58 secs) being faster than Gay (9.71 secs) or Powell (9.84 
secs) is like Bolt (1.95 metres) being taller than Gay (1.8 meters) or Powell (1.9 metres). 
Given the specifiable norms of construction to guarantee ‘fair play’ there can be no genuine 
disagreement about who is fastest or tallest because coming first in these cases equates to 
satisfying a small collection of empirically verifiable facts.  11
As can appreciated from their brief implementation, Christensen’s two Non-Evaluative 
forms of normativity are fundamentally connected. Constructive-norms are the conditions 
required for something to be what it is: the rules of the 100m ensure that everyone is 
running the ‘same race’, the rules of chess ensure that opponents are playing the same game; 
performance-norms on the other hand concern how well or poorly a game or activity is 
being played or performed. Notice that we are only able to appraise the playing of a game or 
the performing of an activity if the constructive-norms for that game or activity have been 
established; a comparison of performance is only possible when applied to performances of 
the same thing. Knowing the performance-norms for ‘artificial’ practices such sprinting or 
chess-playing is relatively straightforward as the construction-norms for activities were 
explicitly designed with competition in mind. Accessing the performance-norms for 
biological traits and behaviours on the other hand would seem to be considerably more 
problematic as their constructive-norms are not given to us in the same readily accessible 
way. If we wish to ‘normativise nature’ non-evaluatively by referring to differences in 
 This not the case per se in competitive sport and the reasons for this are informative. Being fastest in a sprint, highest 11
in a jump or furthest in a throw are of course very difficult things to achieve, but they are not difficult things to judge- 
as long as ‘judging’ here means recognising the best performance rather than ensuring that the rules have been followed. 
Anyone competent can judge certain events and arrive at the same results because of the objective nature of the 
performances. In events where the performances of competitors are not objectively measurable: gymnastics, diving, 
figure skating etc. then judgment is required, which is why these competitions have multiple judges in order to 
ameliorate subjective bias. The difference here can be appreciated by considering the immediate crowd response in 
track events; unqualified ‘lay’ spectators are able to straightforwardly perceive the win. This is not to denigrate non-
track events to any degree, in many respects these sports will be harder as there is a greater range of abilities that 
participants must master; the point here is that judging these events is much harder too, because translating the diverse 
abilities it takes to be, say, a winning gymnast into a smaller number of comparative scores is a skilled task in itself. 
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biological performance, we will first have to ground these activities naturally, to find their 
construction norms, so as to ensure their comparison in warranted.  
Our positive response to this challenge will be the focus of 3.4. But first we will consider 
whether the grounding of biological performances and activities supports the suggestion that 
biological traits could be said to have ‘obligations’- or perhaps less contentiously, whether 
naturalising biological function warrants the claim that the functions of biological traits are 
performances or activities that traits are ‘supposed’ to have or are ‘meant’ to do. As we can 
appreciate through Christensen’s taxonomy: if there are activities that biological traits ought 
to do, the normativity in play here would seem to be of the strong Evaluative variety similar 
to ethical directives such as you ought not to kill or steal etc, if true, this would clearly be a 
significant victory for the project of normativising nature. As we will see however, this 
stronger claim cannot be supported.             
3.3 Normativising nature #1: The ‘obligations’ of biological traits.     
On the rare occasions when attempts to ‘normativise’ evolutionary phenomena have been 
explicitly undertaken (Millikan 1984, Papineau 1984) the approach has been to interpret the 
functions of physiological or anatomical traits as quasi ‘obligations’. Hearts have the 
function of pumping blood, eyes have the function of seeing, and the spines of cacti have 
the function of protecting the plants from thirsty herbivores. If we accept that these are 
accurate statements, then depending on how we understand the term ‘function’ there appears 
to be only the slightest of terminological shifts between saying that ‘hearts are for pumping 
blood’ and ‘eyes are for seeing’ to ‘hearts are meant to pump blood’ and ‘eyes are meant to 
see’. We start with an innocuous statement about what adaptive traits do and very quickly 
arrive at what looks very much like an explicitly normative directive. As we will see, this is 
not quite right. Functions can be used to demonstrate the inherent normativity involved in 
some evolutionary phenomena but this is not due to traits somehow ‘dishonouring’ their 
functional obligations.      
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How we should understand the phrase ‘the function of the eye is to see’ has largely 
coalesced around two distinct approaches : the Causal Role or ‘CR’ conception and the 12
Selected Effect or ‘SE’ conception (Wright 1973; Cummins 1975; Millikan 1984, 1989, 
1989b; Neander 1991a, 1991b, 1995a, 1995b; Godfrey-Smith 1993, Kitcher 1993, Allen & 
Bekoff 1995). According to the CR conception of function, the function of a trait, part, or 
item is the contribution that trait, part or item provides to the functioning of the higher 
system of which it is a part. Defenders of the CR conception often point to its generality as 
this definition can apply to either biological or artificial functions: the function of the pixels 
in your television are to broadcast in a full spectrum of colour as this activity contributes to 
the functioning of the television as a whole; the function of the eye in those organisms 
which possess them is its contribution to the organism’s visual system, and ultimately to the 
fitness of the organism. According to the SE conception by contrast, the function of a 
biological trait is the effect for which that trait has been naturally selected: the function of 
the eye is collecting and processing light as this is the effect for which eyes have been 
historically selected. Due to its reliance on natural selection the SE conception can only 
apply to explicitly biological and evolved traits- a bullet which its supporters are happy to 
bite as it also provides a reliable means through which biological traits may posses a 
function despite not being currently able to perform it. The function of the eye is to collect 
visual information on the organism’s environment, as that is the effect for which eyes have 
been historically selected; this remains the case whether an eye is currently performing this 
function or is not.  
Notice that despite these profound differences, biological functions defined by CR and those 
defined by SE are largely coextensive; they rarely disagree about what the function of any 
particular biological trait is and only then in somewhat esoteric circumstances. Both 
versions would agree that the function of the heart is to pump blood, that the function of the 
 Wouters (2003) Identifies and defends four different ways that an enquiry into function might be spelt out in 12
biological study. We might here be asking: ‘what does it do?’, ‘how is it used?’, ‘how is it useful?’ or ‘for what effect 
was it selected for in the past?’ (Ibid p636). I am sympathetic to Wouter’s analysis, but the distinction between the first 
and second of these senses, which hinges on what an ‘item’ does by itself independently of any selective advantage or 
role that the item plays in a wider system, need not concern us here. Wouter’s third ‘biological advantage’ construal of 
function is already- to my mind at least- distinctly normative in that it describes the effects of traits that are ‘useful’ to 
their owner. This will not concern us here either. We will achieve little by extracting values from a concept which is 
already evaluative.     
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eye is to see, and that the functions of leaves are to receive sunlight and exchange gases 
provided the ‘higher system’ required for CR functions is the fitness of an organism. This 
alignment mostly holds because when CR and SE advocates do disagree it is typically over 
why traits have the particular functions that they do. For defenders of the CR view, the 
functions of leaves are collect sunlight and exchange gases and the function of eyes is to see 
because these are the roles that these traits play to contribute to the higher functioning of the 
system of which they are a composite part: here the fitnesses of the plants and animals and 
which possess them. For defenders of the SE view, these traits have they functions they do 
because ‘seeing’ is the activity that eyes have historically performed and for which they 
were naturally selected, and leaves have the functions of gas exchange and sunlight 
collection because these are the activities for which these traits were selected in the 
ancestors of today’s vascular plants.  
It is only when a trait’s current contribution and its past activities differ that these 
descriptions come apart. If a trait originally adapted to perform function ‘A’ now contributes 
to the fitness of its owner by producing an effect that is not A, CR will identify this new 
activity as a different function: ‘B’. SE will not identify this novel effect as a new function 
until it has been selected for and this requires supplementary conditions: the trait’s new 
effect must be inherited along with the trait which in turn will require some environmental 
stability, the new effect must provide descendent organisms with a selective advantage, and 
selection must be cycled through multiple generations so that an explanation for the trait’s 
prevalence in the ancestral organism’s decedents will include the beneficial ‘selected effect’. 
Only once all these conditions have been met will SE and CR reconcile in recognising the 
novel effect as ‘function B’. 
The relevance in how each of these approaches awards traits with their specific functions 
however has wider consequences than mere disagreement over marginal cases. The CR 
interpretation of the sentence ‘the function of the eye is to see’ will tell us that the eye is 
now contributing to the fitness of the organism possessing it by seeing- but that is the limit 
of the information conveyed. We cannot read-off from this CR application a reliable track 
record of eyes contributing to the fitness of the ancestors of contemporary organisms. What 
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eyes used to do in terms of CR functionality is considered irrelevant, it is what they do now 
that is important. Notice that this, metaphorically speaking, absolves the eye of any 
functional responsibilities in that there is nothing that eyes are ‘meant to do’. When the 
functionally of any given trait is contingent on the fitness benefits of its current effects, 
there can be no ‘established’ standard to which traits of the same type should be expected to 
conform. This is often considered a problem for the CR account, as it appears there is no 
straightforward way that traits can dysfunction without first establishing what their correct 
functioning is (Neander 1995c, Schwartz 2007) 
For SE advocates the statement ‘the function of the eye is to see’ contains a much wider 
implicit claim as function allocations do not directly refer to the effects that current traits 
have on their owners’ fitness, but to the vast number of similar effects ancestral traits 
granted to ancestral organisms, specifically those which provided a selective advantage and 
so aided the traits’ propagation. As successive rounds of historical selective advantage have 
established what the function of a trait is, unlike with CR functions, current effects can be 
compared and contrasted with their previous performances. This permits a concept of 
dysfunction which is straightforward and intuitively agreeable: if a trait is currently 
producing effect A and was selected for producing effect A then the trait is functional; if a 
trait is currently not producing effect A, but was selected for producing effect A then the 
trait is dysfunctional . So eyes that are unable to see are dysfunctional; not because they 13
compromise current fitness, but because the selective advantages of eyes came by virtue of 
them seeing; leaves that cannot exchange oxygen and carbon dioxide are dysfunctional: as 
exchange is one of the effects that leaves were selected for and so on. But note that although 
individual ‘token’ traits may qualify as either functional or dysfunctional through their 
 Notice that for the SE approach, as functions are the effects for which a trait has been selected, confirming 13
the specific functions of traits will be a historical matter, and in common with all historical events - 
evolutionary or otherwise - the evidence required for this confirmation may be empirically inaccessible. The 
weight of evidence required for an adaptive explanation is central to the wider adaptationism debate, and has 
been given considerable philosophical attention (Gould & Lewontin 1979, Orzack & Sober 1994 & 1996, 
Brandon & Rausher 1996, Griffiths 1996, Sober & Orzack 2003, Sober 2008, Forber 2010). Orzack & Sober 
(1994 & 1996) consider an ‘ensemble approach’, where the strength of natural selection in the evolution of 
traits could be discernible through a comparison of predictive models which allow for natural selection only 
against the predictions of multiple alternative models whose included evolutionary influences are more 
varied (although see Brandon & Rausher 1996 for methodological criticism). Sober & Orzack (2003) update 
this approach by suggesting that the importance of natural selection may be appreciated in descendent traits 
given background assumptions on their shared ancestry.   
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comparison to past ‘type effects’ when we label a given effect as a ‘function’ we are making 
an existential claim about a series of similar effects that ancestor-traits of the same the type 
have successively produced and benefitted from. Trait T cannot have function A, unless 
there is a sizeable heritage of traits ancestral to T whose ‘A-ing’ provided them with a 
selective advantage. The history of traits ‘following in the family business’ in this way 
seems to impose certain expectations. If eyes favoured the selection of ancestral organisms 
possessing them, then this, at least partly, explains why eyes persisted and proliferated. If 
the selection advantages granted by the possession of eyes were by virtue of them seeing, 
then we seem to have possible warrant for claiming that seeing is what eyes are for- they are 
present in today’s organisms because they allowed their ancestors to see. The existential 
claim of a tradition of traits T with the functional effect A appears to justify the prescriptive 
claim that A-ing is what Ts are meant to do.       
It is perhaps more striking than is usually recognised that stipulating that functions are the  
effects for which traits have been selected appears to simultaneously bestow on them 
qualities long thought exclusive. Functions now appear to be normative in that they inform 
us of the effects that traits are ‘meant’ to have, but equally functions are now natural in that 
they describe real properties of organisms entrenched firmly in the material nexus of cause 
and effect. However, as we will now see, SE’s acknowledged claims to normativity - at least 
in this respect - are considerably less secure than is often assumed.   
Firstly, normativity. Or at least the type of normativity suggested to permeate SE functional 
statements. If we return to Christensen’s earlier distinction it is clear that it is of a different 
stripe to the normativity appropriate for the fastest sprinter or the most efficient design 
solution. If Ts are ‘meant’ to A this does not describe performative-normativity, as it does 
not compare the A-ing of Ts with the A-ing of anything else, it merely states that they 
should A. Nor is the statement constitutively-normative: it does not require Ts to A in order 
to count as Ts. This point is given particular emphasis by Neander (1991a) who stresses that 
traits which cannot perform their functions must still have their functions if we are not to be 
prevented from discussing dysfunctional traits for fear of logical contradicton. The claim 
that ‘Ts are meant to A’ is of a much stronger kind of normativity: it is distinctly 
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prescriptive. SE functions appear to stipulate what traits ought to do. Our earlier suggestion 
that hearts which do not maintain blood pressure have more in common with faulty 
televisions than they do freak weather events appears partly justified by this development. 
Televisions ought to broadcast in the full colour spectrum because that is what they are for- 
doing this explains why there are colour televisions; perhaps hearts equally ought to provide 
adequate pressure because that is what they are for- doing this explains why there are hearts. 
‘The weather ought not to snow in April’ is not a prescriptive statement of this type as 
previous snow-free Aprils do not explain why later Aprils largely share this quality.     
But closer attention to the prescriptive ‘ought’ at play here shows it to be somewhat 
mysterious. Consider again the terminological shift from: i) ‘ancestral eyes gave the 
organisms possessing them a selective advantage by seeing’ to ii) ‘eyes are for seeing’. We 
can recognise i) as a straightforward SE function claim, past effects (seeing) which provided 
a selective advantage become the trait’s (eyes’) function. Statement ii) is also a function 
claim, but unlike i) it is ambivalent about what sort of function it considers ‘seeing’ to be. It 
could refer to a CR function and claim that seeing increases the fitnesses of sighted 
organisms; it could be refer to a SE function, and so be equivalent to i); or it could refer to 
neither of these, and perhaps cite instead the intentions of a divine creator or similar. Clearly 
these differences have major consequences for whether we think the shift from i) to ii) is 
terminologically justified. If the function cited in ii) is a CR function then this in 
conjunction with i) is an empirical claim: the effects which gave ancestral eyes a selective 
advantage are the same effects that currently increase sighted organisms’ fitness; if the 
function in ii) is an SE function then ii) is a straightforward restatement of i); only if the 
functional ‘is for’ in ii) is genuinely intentional are we straying beyond the remit of 
describing natural phenomena. So long as we are clear that this is not what the ‘for’ in ii) 
means, we are either making claim about the similarity of past and present effects or 
restating the information conveyed in i).  
Now consider the shift required to justify this third statement iii) ‘eyes are supposed to see’ 
or perhaps ‘eyes are meant’ to see’. Unless we have departed from natural explanation and 
believe the ‘for’ in ii) to be explicitly intentional, the prescriptive qualities of ‘meant’ have 
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been imported here without warrant. As we have seen, CR functions only describe current 
effects, and so have no bearing on what traits are ‘meant’ to do per se, but neither do SE 
functions tell us what traits are ‘meant’ to do either. That traits have an ancestry of granting 
a selective advantage is simply a statement about the effects that those traits had on past 
organisms, like the lack of April snow it is a historical claim. SE functions differ from 
weather conditions in that past effects of traits account for their current prevalence, but this 
is a recognisably causal claim about the conditional existence of contemporary traits, it is 
less clear that this is a prescriptive claim about what traits are ‘meant’ to be doing. As we 
can appreciate from Christensen’s taxonomy, the normativity alleged to be in play is of the 
stronger Evaluative variety, and its application is simply not justified here; at least not 
without a more explicit explanation of what the ‘meant’ in these statements is intended to 
convey.   
SE advocates might, we suspect, offer the following defence. Artefacts of course do have 
effects expected of them as there are conscious agents like ourselves justifying this by virtue 
of us doing the expecting; so the ‘meant’ in ‘televisions are meant to broadcast in colour’ 
does not describe any properties of televisions themselves so much as the properties of those 
doing the expecting, these could perhaps be characterised as certain mental states. Due to 
the formal similarities between some artefacts and some traits, it may on occasion be 
heuristically beneficial to think as though traits had ‘obligations’ like it is often thought  
beneficial to consider anatomical ‘designs’ or the ‘reasons’ for evolved behaviours and 
adaptations. But notice that if this is the way that SE functions ‘normativise’ natural 
phenomena, then like the terms themselves the prescriptive aspects of functional effects can 
only ever be metaphorical. Anatomies have actual designs which can be discussed and 
investigated, behaviours and adaptations have actual reasons which we can try and 
discover; it is quite unclear what investigating the ‘obligations’ of a biological trait would 
amount to (how obliged the trait is to produce its given effect? The circumstances in which 
its obligation is lifted?) Once metaphorically prescriptive statements like ‘eyes are supposed 
to see’ are unpacked the ‘supposed’ disappears and all claims to normativity leave with it 
revealing a statement about causes and historical events only. If this is right, then clearly the 
suggestion that SE functions bridge the fact/value gap has been somewhat overblown. 
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3.4 Normativising nature #2: The performances of biological traits. 
There is an alternative means of normativising nature. In common with the failed approach 
above, the genuinely normative aspects of evolution that the SE conception does bring to 
light are accessed through its ability to establish functions as natural. As we saw, SE 
functions are not relativised to any given system as are CR functions, but are objective 
features of biological entities which have been caused - by natural selection - and in turn 
have produced effects - the propagation of the organisms possessing them. This not only 
permits an entirely naturalistic construal of functions but importantly, also allows us an 
entirely naturalistic construal of functional performance. To appreciate this we must briefly 
return to the sports field. Recall that we paused our investigation into performative norms 
by highlighting the objectivity of the competitors’ performances. This was demonstrated by 
the ease with which certain events can be adjudicated. If the output of each performer is a 
straightforwardly measurable quantity then the comparison of those quantities will itself be 
a factual matter. What makes some kinds of performances unnameable to direct empirical 
measurement is the broadness of skills which competing in these events require; there is one 
way only to win a sprint or a long jump, whereas out-performing your competitors in 
gymnastics requires speed, strength, dexterity,  precision, tempo, and many other abilities as 
necessary (but by no means sufficient) conditions. There is a clear distinction here between 
performances that are measurable because they are objective, and those which must be 
judged because they require some conscious discernment when comparing performances. 
We do not need to draw up a comprehensive list, it should hopefully be clear that activities 
such as sprinting, jumping and lifting are independent of judgement because they are 
empirically quantifiable. As we appreciated through Christensen’s normative taxonomy in 
3.2, as long as these activities are regulated and their constitutive rules enforced, the better 
performances in these types of activities will be objective.     
With our analysis of SE functions still fresh in our minds the relevance of this analogy  
should be increasingly clear. As the function of a trait is constituted by its history of 
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selection we can be assured that the functions of traits are as natural and objective as the 
traits are themselves. Participants in the functional debate often see this too as a weakness of 
the CR conception, particularity when applied to biological traits: the CR functions of items 
appear to be limited only by our imagination in conceiving of certain effects as productive 
in a higher system (Millikan 1989a). This is emphatically not the case with SE functions; we 
can be confident that the function of eyes is not to support the eyelid or to itch when tired 
etc because we can be confident that ‘seeing’ is what eyes were selected for . Note that by 14
virtue of telling us what the functions of traits are, the SE conception also supports trait-to-
trait functional comparisons because it informs us that the closer the shared selection history 
of any token traits, the closer the functions of those traits will be. This bonus ability ‘comes 
for free’ if we hold that functions are selected effects, as shared etiology ensures that the 
constitutive-norms normally provided by convention in sporting events have been satisfied.  
This claim may initially appear somewhat implausible but consider two full siblings; 
according to the SE conception of function, the functions of any traits that they have in 
common will be identical because up until their shared parent(s) produced them the 
selective history of these traits was identical. This is not coincidental or contingent: for the 
SE conception shared ancestral selection necessitates shared function. Not only do ancestor-
descendent traits have functions in common, closely-related traits have functions in 
common too. Identity of function will hold in this way until the divergent lineages of 
‘sibling’ traits undergo enough differential selection so as to make their causal histories 
distinct. Before a lineage diverges to the extent that they have distinct selection histories and 
thus possibly distinct functions, related traits will have the same functions, so like the rules 
which constitute the fair participation in the sporting event, this guarantees that the 
performances of the traits - if their SE functions have been correctly identified - will be 
 Identifying the actual SE function of a trait will not always be as straightforward as ‘seeing’ is for the eye 14
and in many cases this procedure may well be beyond our investigative capacities. As Sober (1984) 
(following Wright (1973)) emphasised, there is an epistemological imbalance here: we may be confident that 
there has been selection of certain traits - as evidenced through their increased populational representation - 
more than we may be confident of the specific effects of that trait which have been selected for. The effect of 
natural selection may be quite clear, while the precise casual circumstances of the selection remain opaque.      
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comparable in an objective and principled way . Notice that the constructive norms 15
characterised by Christensen as mediated through cultural practice or custom are here 
established quite naturally. We know Bolt was the fastest, because the rules of the 100m 
ensured that the performances of competitors were objectively comparable; here we know 
the performances of traits are objectively comparable as shared causal history ensures that 
their performances will be performances of the same type. 
             
So if the functional performances of biological traits can be shown to be measurable- like 
running or weight-lifting etc- as opposed to judged- like gymnastics or ice skating- then we 
have an alternative, solid basis for the application of normative terms to biological function, 
and one that does not rely, like the more established normative route, on equivocal 
terminology.  Although the SE view cannot tell us what traits are ‘meant’ to do in 
Christensen’s Evaluative-prescriptive sense, it does tell us that traits with the same selection 
histories have the same function - even if the specific details of this history are unavailable. 
So when we do have grounds for knowing what the particular function or functions of a trait 
are, we will also have grounds for knowing how well any particular trait is functioning, and 
therefore also have grounds for knowing when any particular trait is functioning better in 
comparison to the performances of other traits of the same type.   
  
This can be shown this quite clearly as follows: take two traits T and R belonging to two 
closely-related organisms (we may for simplicity consider these as allelic variants). As the 
selection histories of both T and R are near-identical, we know that the functions of both T 
and R must be the same function. Even if we do not know the empirical facts, we can be 
sure of this because the etiological perspective granted by the SE conception of function 
tells us in general terms what the function of the trait is: the selected effect which gave the 
shared ancestors of T and R a reproductive advantage. We will call this - perhaps undefined 
 When the precise nature of a trait’s selected effects are beyond empirical reach, this will clearly also place 15
any comparison of trait-to-trait functional performance out of reach also. This epistemological difficultly 
does not threaten our central point: for there to be a difference in selection benefit, the effects of the traits 
must be different, and the cause of this difference will either be due to differences in functional performance 
or due to one or both traits producing a novel effect- even if we are unable to discern which one of these 
distinct eventualities has occurred. I am indebted to one of my examiners for pushing me for clarification on 
this point.  
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- selected effect s. Now consider how we would explain differences in T and R’s fitness. We 
will of course be able to discern if there are differences in T and R’s fitness due to their 
systematic differential reproduction; here we will say T has this advantage. As we know 
organisms with T have a selective advantage over those with R we know that these traits are 
having different effects - obviously. But we also know, due to their shared casual history, 
that T and R have the same function. Notice that this would not be possible from the CR 
perspective. There can be no guarantee for T and R having the same CR function because 
their contributions to the fitnesses of the organisms possessing them are different 
contributions. In CR terms this could be understood as T and R performing different 
functions, whereas the SE conception prevents this: etiology dictates function, and the 
etiology of T and R is near-identical.       
So far we know that both T and R are doing the same thing: s, but that T is doing s 
differently to R to the extent that it gives T a fitness advantage. Now it may very often be 
the case that the nature of T and R’s function s will remain mysterious; perhaps because 
their population is hard to access in some way, or if the performances of T and R are quite 
subtle. But even absent this information we know that s-ing was selected for, and that T is s-
ing better than R because the effect which defines both T and R as functional is here making 
T more functional. This particular shift in terminology may initially strike us as being 
equally as incongruous as the previous introduction of ‘meant’ and ‘ought’ to impose 
expectation, but here it is quite warranted. Due to the specifics of the SE account the 
‘function-of’ equates with those effects for which the trait was ‘selected-for’, if T and R 
have the same selection history, they will have the same function; if T enjoys a fitness 
advantage over R, then this will be due to T interacting with its environment in a way which 
is novel or idiosyncratic or it will be due to T performing its SE function, but performing it 
to higher standard than does R.     
This dynamic can be shown more clearly by applying it to a solid example. Suppose we 
identify T and R as the wing patterns of a population of butterflies, and identify T and R’s 
shared function s as camouflage. We notice that the T-pattern’s representation in the 
population is increasing compared to the R-pattern and conclude that the T-pattern gives the 
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organisms possessing it a selection advantage. How do we explain this? Given access to the 
requisite empirical evidence, we deduce from their shared histories that the function of both 
T- and R- patterns is camouflage, given this we then know that T is doing this more 
effectively than does R: we know that Ts are better camouflaged than are Rs. Note that the 
‘better’ functioning of T here is a straightforward description of an empirical phenomenon 
in the same way that describing Bolt as a better runner was a description of a empirical 
phenomenon. It is just the means by which the competitions are constituted that is distinct: 
comparative performance in sporting events is constituted by agreed-upon rules; 
comparative performance for trait variants is constituted by their shared selection history. 
Once the competitions have been constituted- then the performances within the 
competitions are amenable to objective measurement.  
This application of ‘better’ functioning can be applied to evolutionary dynamics quite 
generally if the functional identity of the competing traits is ensured by their shared history 
of selection in this way. The function s here could just as easily refer to ‘anaerobic 
respiration’ and T and R as two closely-related protozoans. We notice the systematic 
reproductive advantage T-organisms have relative to R-organisms, and - provided the 
empirical facts on the ground are available - are able to deduce that T and R’s function s is 
anaerobic respiration by their selection history. Given that both Ts and Rs were selected 
because of their benefits to anaerobic reparation, if they are functional now they are still 
doing this, and if Ts have a selective benefit over Rs, it is because they are functioning 
better than Rs. Selection for anaerobic respiration was responsible for the spread of the traits 
ancestral to T and R, and now selection is responsible for the greater propagation of T traits 
in contrast to the spread of Rs. Unless T is producing an entirely novel effect, this is because 
the way in which Ts are s-ing is superior to the way in which Rs are s-ing.    
But will this always be the case? And even when it is, will it be as clear as our examples so 
far have suggested? Someone resistant to the idea that functional improvement may be 
straightforwardly read-off from a trait’s current selective advantage, coupled with evidence 
of the trait’s selection history, might respond with the following observation.  All we 
actually know is that Ts have a reproductive advantage to Rs, and what effects the traits  
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ancestral to T and R used to produce which gave them a selective advantage historically ; 16
this does not tell us that Ts are now doing the same thing as Rs, as the effects Ts are now 
producing may be entirely novel and unrelated to s. Perhaps it is not that Ts are doing the 
same thing as Rs are doing but doing it ‘better’ which provides them with a selection 
advantage, but that Ts are doing something else e that Rs do not do at all. This is a valid 
criticism, but it only limits the scope for functional improvement, it is not our intention here 
to stipulate that all natural selection of closely-related traits occurs through an improvement 
in their previously selected effects alone.  
This can again be made clearer using a well-known example, the dark-winged moths in the 
north of England that possessed a selective advantage in the areas affected by industrial 
pollution. Due to the sudden change in their environment, the darker members of a mixed 
population of light and dark moths gained an unexpected selection advantage due to the 
novel camouflaging effects that they, but not their light coloured conspecifics, enjoyed in 
their newly-blackened environment. Note that the effect of the darker trait here is novel and 
fortuitous; it is not an improvement of a function that all moths previously possessed and 
which the darker variant now performs to a superior level in comparison to the performance 
of the lighter variant, but a change in environment which has suddenly made the darker 
variant selectively beneficial. Other than the fitness of the darker moths nothing is ‘better’ 
than it was before the environment darkened. The language of improvement seems 
misapplied here though the reasoning quite accurate: on many occasions a change in 
 The issue of which exact period of trait’s selection history should be considered as authoritative for an 16
accurate functional diagnosis remains contentious (Millikan 1989b, Kitcher 1993, Godfrey-Smith 1994) and 
is thought by some to fatally undermine an etiological approach (Cooper 2002 & 2005). Evolutionary 
histories, by necessity, cover vast spans of time and what was a trait’s function in the distant past might well 
not be that trait’s function in its contemporary setting; feathers being a notable example: whatever their 
original function - now thought to be insulation, or perhaps display - it could not have been flight as the first 
feathered animals lacked the supplementary anatomy to achieve this. Clearly as our attentions are concerned 
with the functional effectiveness of contemporary traits, our interests will lie with a ‘modern history’ 
approach like that of Godfrey-Smith (1994) who identifies the relevant period as the ‘recent past’. Although 
Cooper (2002) is right to suggest that the selection histories of traits will very often be difficult, if not 
impossible, to uncover, this is not as damaging to our account as one might suspect. Firstly: by stipulating 
the recent past as the period in question the loss of evidence will - ceteris paribus - be ameliorated to some 
degree, certainly in comparison to potential evidence located in the ancient past. Secondly: as demonstrated 
by our leaving the precise selected effect of s originally undefined, even if the selection history, and thus 
functional identity, of competing traits is inaccessible the lacuna is epistemological, the metaphysical point 
still stands. 
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environment or appearance of a novel variant will grant a fortuitous fitness benefit for 
idiosyncratic reasons. 
But the arrival of a new variant will be accompanied by the arrival of a new function only in 
a minority of cases; environments change and novel variants arise, but we would be over-
populating the category of ‘function’ quite dramatically if we were to think that all 
environmental or phenotypic novelty produced a new function Sui generis each time one of 
these provided a selection advantage. In the greater number of cases selection will be due to 
traits functioning to a higher standard than to traits performing functions that other traits do 
not have at all. As we saw, our exclusively T or R moth population has two distinct variants 
only, one of which has a function and other of which does not- camouflage is either ‘on’ for 
the moths of this population of it is ‘off’, but in the majority of cases the composition of a 
population, and the functional effectiveness of the traits within a population will be 
considerably more nuanced and varied. 
For example: let us now suppose that our moth population is more diverse, and instead of 
two types of trait it now features three: the dark trait T, the light trait R, and an intermediate 
grey trait G. We notice that G provides a selection advantage over R, but not to the same 
extent as T does. In these circumstances analysing the effects of these traits as either 
‘functional’ or ‘non-functional’ will be inadequate as we have three values that require 
explanation. The natural way to approach this would be from the basis that whatever 
selected effect T produces, G produces less, and R produces even less of - if at all. This 
might be quite clear in some examples like the trivariate moths where the intermediate grey 
phenotype is understood as providing intermediate camouflage, but very often trait variance 
will not be discrete in this way and be manifested on a continuous scale.  
Let us now further suppose that this is the case with yet another moth population; one where 
the appearance of its members now ranges continuously - and we may add, more 
realistically - across the grey scale from dark to light in the wings of the moths comprising 
the population; we notice that the darker the trait the higher its fitness advantage. Coupled 
with environmental information, the colour of the foliage, the visual capacities of the moths’ 
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predators and so, we would be quite justified in explaining the proliferation of darker 
variants by reference to them being better-camouflaged; to explain the compromised fitness 
of lighter moths due to them being poorly-camouflaged; and to explain the fitnesses of those 
traits of intermediate shades as due to them being better-camouflaged than some, but not as 
well-camouflaged as others.    
Notice that unlike the use of ‘highness’ to describe anatomical or behavioural complexity, or 
the use of ‘success’ to describe a taxa’s endurance, diversity or distribution, the use of the 
performative terms ‘better’ ‘poorly’ and ‘well’ here is not metaphorical but accurately 
describes how these traits’ differences in appearance affect the fates of organisms possessing 
them. Camouflage is a real effect, it can be empirically quantified, and moreover the 
qualitative variation in this ability has casual efficacy, the population’s environment is such 
that the more effective a moth’s camouflage, the higher its chances of survival and 
reproduction. Natural selection is here promoting better-camouflaged moths at the expense 
of those which are concealed less effectively, so over time - ceteris paribus - we would 
expect those with the darker traits to proliferate as darker traits provide better camouflage 
than do the traits with lighter colouration . If will still feel that normative language has 17
somehow been smuggled into this description of empirical reality without warrant, consider 
how we might explain the differential fitness of the wing colours in this population without 
the use of ‘better’ or ‘worse’ or their performative equivalents. The explanation - if possible 
- would strike us as peculiar and contrived. When we wish to understand not only the 
diversity of trait variants but how their diversity can translate into differential fitness, the 
relevant effects will be those that have historically promoted their bearer’s survival and 
reproduction: the trait’s functions. When we describe the various differences in functioning 
which different traits produce, ‘better-than’ and ‘worse-than’ are not normative terms which 
 Our expectations may of course be confounded as there are many reasons why the improvement in 17
biological functioning described here could be halted or reversed - even discounting the non-selective 
evolutionary influences of mutation, migration and drift. The developmental basis for the darker wings for 
example may have adverse effects elsewhere in the organism; selection for the darker phenotype perhaps 
ameliorated by selection against other pleiotropically-linked traits. Traits do not reproduce by themselves 
independently, they come as a package deal together with other traits of the organisms possessing them. If 
darker moths are slower moths or less fecund ones due to developmental inevitability, natural selection could 
eliminate the cryptic trait as a consequence. 
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are imported without license, they perform an essential role in explaining the nature of the 
evolution which has taken place. 
3.5 Functional improvement and progressive evolution.  
Let us pause briefly to review this chapter’s findings so far. Through the application of the 
SE conception of biological function we know that the effects for which traits were selected 
- their functions - are real, these are not metaphorical, nor they are not merely projected onto 
biological phenomena for instrumental reasons. Although this is often seen - in 
Christensen’s terminology - as warranting an Evaluative-normative approach to biological 
function in that traits have effects that they are ‘meant’ or ‘obliged’ to produce, we remained 
sceptical. Claims of historical selective advantage are simply historical claims, they are not 
normative ones. Knowing the selected effects of traits however does allow us compare the 
performances of those traits. As etiology tells us what the function of a trait is, it also tells us 
that traits with the same etiology have the same function. This provides the constructive 
norms required for the comparisons of biological performances to be justified as 
performances as the same activity. When traits with the same function are producing 
different effects, one or both are dysfunctional or both are functioning but to different 
degrees; when this is the case one will be functioning better than the other. So applying the 
SE conception of function in this way not only provides us with sufficient grounds to 
establish functions as natural and to recognise the same function as possessed by instances 
of different trait tokens, it also provides us with a natural source of normativity - at least of 
the performative kind. History tells us what functions of traits are - thus satisfying the 
constitutive norm required for appropriate comparison - and given access to this history we 
can know when traits are performing their functions to a better or worse degree. 
So far, those sceptical of this chapter’s initial claims concerning the normativisation of 
nature might remain unimpressed. We started by demonstrating that the performances of 
athletes and designers are ‘better’ than others - a performative-norm -, and only then 
because the competition - maintained by constructive-norms - is highly artificial. Following 
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this, although we managed to secure the performances of biological traits conceptually 
using their histories of selected effects as natural constructive-norms, the most that this 
shows is that the comparisons of performances of biological traits or behaviours are similar 
to the comparisons of athletic performances in being ‘better’ or ‘worse’ and common sense, 
plausibly, does this for us already. Notice however than the ‘thin’ type of non-evaluative 
normativity provided by the naturalisation of functional performance has significant 
consequences for this dissertation’s overarching project.     
As we saw, differences in functional effectiveness can have significant evolutionary effects, 
the prevalence of darker wings in our moth population with continuous variation being a 
paradigm example. If our reasoning up to this point is sound then it would seem that in 
cases like this, where the evolution of the population is driven through the functional 
superiority of certain traits in comparison to performances of others, that the evolution in 
question could be rightly considered as ‘progressive’. Members of the population, by virtue 
of their better-functioning traits gain a selective advantage due to those traits, and ceteris 
paribus, given repeated rounds of this dynamic the functional performance of the traits 
under selection should increase. We have evolution - as the composition of the population is 
changing, and we have progressive evolution - as the differential selection of certain traits is 
driven by their functional superiority. Natural selection is here influencing the population to 
improve in that function. In our idealised moth population, as camouflage is empirically 
quantifiable, whether one member of the population’s camouflage is better than another 
member’s given their shared environment will be a factual enquiry, and one that given 
adequate evidence empirical analysis could provide an answer for. 
Notice that conceiving of progressive evolution in this way avoids two acknowledged 
pitfalls. Firstly, it is not impressionistic, relying on an abstract notion of ‘highness’ or 
‘superiority’ or similarly-vague judgments concerning which parts of the natural world 
present themselves as more advanced than others. And secondly, although this type of 
progressive evolution is produced by natural selection, the progress here does not consist in 
making individual organisms or species simply ‘fitter’ - as some naive readings of 
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evolutionary progress might contend - but in improving their performance at a real and 
potentially quantifiable functional ability.                   
The profound difference between progressive increases in functional improvement and 
increases in fitness per se can be brought into sharp relief by considering the following: 
depending on the overall size of the population, the fitness of the average moth after 
repeated rounds of selection for darker variants might be higher, the same, or perhaps even 
lower than that of the ancestral moth population featuring continuous variation. Over time 
the population would get darker, but the average moth would not necessarily get fitter. The 
selective benefits of darker traits are contingent on the population’s dynamics. The darker 
traits posses a selective advantage over the lighter traits, but as we observed in chapter 2, 
traits are not simply selected or not- selected, they are selectively-favoured or disfavoured; 
as the darker traits saturate the population their advantage over the population-average 
pattern peters out as the average itself becomes darker. Being selectively-favoured requires 
the presence of alternative traits less-likely to promote survival and reproduction in the 
population, without this variation natural selection has nothing to select from.  
So after repeated rounds of natural selection the average moth could be no fitter than the 
average moth in the ancestral population, nor could the darker traits be of any selective 
benefit, so in many ways the evolution which we are here describing as ‘progressive’ leaves 
the population very much as it was. The average moth will be darker however, and the 
crucial point here is that provided the environment remains constant the average moth in the 
later population will be better camouflaged than the average moth in the ancestral 
population. Progressive evolution - or at least, the type of progressive evolution that we are 
defending here - does not make individuals ‘higher’ nor does it necessarily make individuals 
‘fitter’, but it does make individuals better at certain functions than their ancestors were. It 
is difficult to see how this chapter’s observations so far might be considered controversial. It 
is certainly unclear what a description of evolution making species ‘higher’ might mean, and 
partially unclear what would be meant if we were to claim that evolution made species 
permanently ‘fitter’, but we have been quite clear about what ‘better’ means, and evolution 
certainly can make populations ‘better’ at performing certain functions. The later moth 
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population possesses superior camouflage to that of its predecessors, and evolution by 
natural selection is the mechanism responsible. 
So although the type of normativity provided by the SE conception of biological function 
fails at providing Evaluative normativity, and the non-Evaluative normativity which it does 
provide may seem somewhat pedestrian, it does however provide a solid conceptual basis 
for thinking that natural selection can in certain circumstances be progressive. Not all 
natural selection will be progressive in this way, but when the traits of organisms provide a 
selection advantage by virtue of them performing their selected effects at higher standard 
these traits will be improvements on those which proceeded them, and the evolution 
responsible will be progressive as a result.  
We will finish this section by heading-off some potential problems. 
Firstly, and for the sake of clarity, it may be instructive here to make a specific point about 
what we are not claiming. Our positive claim is that in the circumstances described, where 
traits with the same function have different functional performances, one trait will be 
performing better than the other, and that when this dynamic is sustained the evolution 
produced will be progressive. We will return to the prevalence of this type of evolution 
shortly, but note that we are in no way condoning run-away adaptationism in claiming this ; 18
it would be perfectly consistent for us to regard natural selection as a relatively unimportant 
factor in evolution for example, and concurrently hold that when natural selection does 
occur through functional improvement in the way described that evolutionary progress 
occurs.     
Secondly: so far in our examples functional improvement and selective advantage have 
coincided, but the relationship between the two might not always be so straightforward. 
 .....‘empirical’ adaptationism to be precise (Godfrey-Smith 2001). The other two varieties of adaptationism 18
addressed in the wider debate: ‘epistemological’ and ‘methodological’ are more concerned with the status of 
natural selection as a guiding investigative or organising principle in evolutionary science, than with the 
prevalence of natural selection as an evolutionary cause. Although supporters of one type of adaptationism 
generally give the others sympathetic treatment.   
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How might we deal with situations where the two were in conflict? As the darker variants 
spread through the moth population their selective advantage is ‘in step’ with their 
improvement in functional effectiveness, but the simplicity of this example might mislead 
us into thinking that increases in a given ability will always be selectively-beneficial. (It is 
difficult for example to imagine a situation where the moths in question might become too 
camouflaged.) But consider what would happen in alternative circumstances where 
increases in functional performance result in the ‘improved’ traits no longer providing a 
selection advantage and start to become selectively disadvantageous. This time instead of 
the population being comprised of moths, our test population will be comprised of birds; 
specifically nocturnal birds who rely on their sensitive hearing to hunt and navigate in low 
levels of natural light. We know that according empirical data, appraised through the SE 
conception of function, that the functions of the birds’ ears is to detect vibrations though the 
air - sound - as these were the effects for which these traits were selected in the birds’ 
ancestors. Greater sensitivity to sound and a greater capacity to discriminate between 
different sounds may mean both a functional improvement in the trait’s performance and 
provide those individuals possessing the augmented trait with a selection advantage over 
those individuals in the population which do not; but this increase in sensitivity will only be 
beneficial up to a certain point. To the extent that the additional sensitivity aids in hunting, 
predator avoidance, navigation etc it would provide a fitness advantage, but ever-heightened 
sensitivity to sound might rapidly lower the traits’ fitness, perhaps though overwhelming or 
distracting the individuals possessing it. (See fig 3.2) 
Fig 3.2  19
Should this not unrealistic situation occur, then according to our understanding individual 
birds would appear to have functionally ‘better’ hearing - but their fitness pays the price. 
This seems to provide us with a very counter-intuitive result. When evolution is conceived 
of as a progressive process - however vaguely - one property all might agree on is that the 
 Fig 3.2 is a graphical representation of the relationship between the sensitivity of the nocturnal birds’ hearing and its 19
consequences on the birds’ fitness. Birds with little or no sensitivity to sound have a very low fitness, as their hearing 
improves so does their fitness; functional improvement and fitness here are ‘in step’ - at least initially. As the birds’ 
sensitivity to sound increases further however, the trait responsible becomes selectively disfavoured as the birds become 
overwhelmed or distracted by sensory input. (Graphic by Tim Ashton, original to this dissertation). 
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fitness of organisms undergoing the evolution should increase or at least remain unchanged 
at the time the evolution is taking place; it should certainly not be lowered as it could well 
be in the birds with over-sensitive hearing. Whatever we think progressive evolution is it 
should not make things worse. 
Keeping our conception of evolutionary progress as functional improvement intact, there are 
three ways to approach this problem. Approach a) would be to ‘bite the bullet’ and hold that 
functional improvement ‘trumps’ decreasing fitness, and that those birds whose hearing is 
sensitive beyond the point where it provides a selective advantage are still ‘better’ at this 
particular function than their less-sensitive conspecifics, and claim that as far as 
progressive-evolution as functional-improvement goes this is what counts. An unattractive 
option given that it runs counter to how we might think of progress in virtually any other 
context . Approach b) would be to claim that once the trait’s sensitivity compromises 20
fitness, rather than increasing it the trait ceases to be ‘functional’ and becomes 
dysfunctional. As we are here adhering to the SE conception of function, by considering the 
function of a trait to be those effects which have provided a historical selective advantage, 
 The incongruity here between evolutionary ‘advance’ and selective benefit is somewhat reminiscent of the late 19th 20
century claims that the large size of the antlers of stags were due to progressive and directional ‘orthogenetic’ forces, 
promoting growth and acting in opposition to natural selection by making the stags’ antlers heavier and parts of their 
wooded environment less accessible thus compromising their fitness (Ruse 1996). For those holding this view natural 
selection was considered a secondary mechanism, if not dismissed altogether.  
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we might plausibly claim that if the trait’s current effects no longer provide the selection 
advantages of its predecessors then the trait is no longer performing its function as 
evidenced by its history of selection. This approach may seem more appealing than 
approach a) but notice that b) is precisely what we cannot claim. If the functions of traits are 
stipulated to be the precise effects for which they were selected, then any deviation from 
these effects could be considered dysfunctional; not only those increases in ear function 
which cause disorientation in our bird population, but also the deepening in coloration 
which provided the darker moths with better camouflage. It seems that in both the moth and 
the bird populations that the effectiveness of the traits’ functions has increased, but that the 
type of function of both the blackened wing-patterns’ and the augmented ears’ has remained 
the same. If we deny functionality in one of these cases consistency would demand that we 
we deny it in the other.  
This leaves us with approach c): maintain that both the birds’ over-sensitive ears and the 
moths’ darkened wings are performing the effects for which they were selected - and so are 
functional - but that in the case of the moths where functional improvement is ‘in step’ with 
selective advantage the evolution is progressive, whereas in the case of the birds where 
improvement in function and selective advantage come apart the evolution is not 
progressive. This approach may strike us something of an ad hoc amendment, but notice 
that once the functional performance of the over-sensitive trait starts to compromise the 
fitness of the individuals possessing it, the reasons for the trait’s maintenance or further 
propagation in the population change significantly. If the over-sensitive trait were 
maintained or continued to increase in the population we would hold ‘evolution’ per se 
responsible, but as natural selection should eliminate the over-sensitive trait let alone 
promote it, the nature of the processes causing this unlikely event would be arbitrary and 
erratic. Our reluctance in regarding improvements like those which produced over-sensitive 
hearing as ‘progressive’ is surely warranted, but perhaps this reluctance is motived more by 
the random and arbitrary nature of the non-selective causes required for the trait’s continual 
persistence than to the fact that the trait itself is selectively disadvantageous. Our motivation 
for thinking of over-functional traits as non-progressive may not due to their effects - 
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although undesirable - but due to the erratic nature of the causes required to maintain and 
propagate them.    
Let us unpack this claim. Consider how we would explain the persistence of ‘over-
functional’ traits like the birds’ hyper-sensitive hearing in a population featuring other traits 
which are less-sensitive and thus more selectively-beneficial. We know that natural selection 
cannot be responsible for the maintenance or propagation of the over-sensitive trait as it 
decreases the fitness of the individuals possessing it, so if we wish to provide an explanation 
for this in evolutionary terms our options are limited. The ‘over-functional’ trait’s 
representation in the population could be due to the fortuitous differential survival and 
reproduction of those individuals which possess the trait relative to those which do not; it 
could be due to the genetic basis for the trait persisting in the population through repeated 
mutation or genetic recombination; or it could be due to individuals without the over-
functional trait leaving the population or individuals with the over-functional trait arriving 
in the population. In short: drift, mutation, recombination, or migration. Out of these 
possible causes - or combinations thereof - only recombination could be construed as 
entirely non-random in respect of the over-sensitive trait’s representation. By contrast, as we 
saw in chapter 2, while the mechanism of natural selection acts probabilistically, it does not 
act randomly in this way. When increases in functionality are selected for we have a non-
random, mechanistic explanation for the augmented traits’ propagation, but when traits’ 
functional improvement becomes disadvantageous, we must rely on non-mechanistic, 
random - or principally random in the case of genetic recombination - causes for the traits 
continued representation should it persist or increase. So it is not the counter-intuitive effect 
brought about by ‘progressive’ improvements causing a reduction in fitness which should 
lead us to dismiss their evolution as non-progressive; but because the persistence of these 
traits in the absence of positive selection would be due to random and arbitrary causes. 
With our thoughts returning to the issue of ‘drive’ identified in our introductory chapter as a 
recurrent property in previous accounts of evolutionary progress; whatever we think 
progressive evolution is, there appears to be wide agreement that it should not come about 
accidentally. We address this issue in greater depth in chapter 4.   
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3.6 The prevalence of functional improvement 
As we saw above, a trait’s improvement in functional performance and a trait’s selection 
advantage are distinct and can come apart. Improvements in function can be accompanied 
by decreases in fitness - as evidenced in our example of the nocturnal birds’ over-sensitive 
hearing - and increases in fitness can be accompanied without any concurrent increase in an 
established function - as evidenced by our example of darker moths gaining, rather than 
improving in, the function of camouflage due to environmental effects. When functional 
improvements compromise fitness, their evolution ceases to be progressive due to the 
change in the nature of the processes responsible for the ‘over-functional’ trait’s persistence- 
from probabilistic to near-random. When a trait’s functional performance and a trait’s 
selective advantage do coincide however we have a strong grounds for claiming that the 
evolution of the trait is progressive. In such cases natural selection is making the trait better 
at its given function. 
Those still uncomfortable with our evaluative approach to evolutionary biology in this way 
might at this point consider a strategy of containment. Although functions are real - they 
might admit - and traits’ improvements in their functional performances are real, and that 
when this effect is produced non-accidentally we have warrant for thinking of the evolution 
responsible as ‘progressive’ this is a very minor part of evolution and our cherry-picked 
examples are unrepresentative and tailored so as to produce a progressive result. Functional 
improvement may be real, but it is rare, and it should not be used as a perspective through 
which to view the effects of evolution generally or even the effects of natural selection per 
se. So with the legitimacy of progressive evolution secure philosophically we will turn to 
the question of its prevalence, and whether progress in evolution should rightly be 
considered as commonplace or exceptional. 
Firstly we can note that although the main result of natural selection might well be the 
elimination of disadvantageous variation as referred to in chapter 2, populations featuring 
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continuous variation like our final ‘grey-scaled’ moth population are far from an aberration. 
Populations frequently feature substantial diversity in trait-variation, and while a percentage 
of this may have little or no effect on fitness, when trait differences do have a differential 
effect on fitness we will understand this as being caused in a limited number of ways. Traits 
with higher fitness will either be producing an effect which is new and unrelated to their 
selective history, or performing the effect for which it was selected but in a manner that is 
more selectively-beneficial than do other traits of the same type. As we saw, selectively-
beneficial effects may arrive de novo but this is surely the more-exceptional explanation for 
the selective advantage of a trait- variant than a seldom-broken rule. It is not unreasonable 
to suggest that when traits feature variation in form that the reasons for their differential 
fitness benefits could be due to these traits possessing variation in functional effectiveness, 
rather than due to their effects being unique or idiosyncratic.      
Consider again the function of the heart: to pump blood around the body. No-one disputes 
this, and certainly not adherents to the selected-effects conception of biological function 
such as ourselves. But when it is claimed that hearts were ‘selected’ because they pump 
blood around the bodies of the organisms possessing them, a naive interpretation could 
understand this as describing a historical population similar to our original moth population 
which featured either light or dark variants exclusively and where the dark variants were 
camouflaged and the lighter variants were not; only here it is organisms possessing a heart 
gaining a selection advantage over those members of the population lacking one. This is 
clearly incorrect. Hearts do not arrive in the population de novo granting the organisms 
which possess them a selection advantage over those members of the population which do 
not possess them; if other members of your population have hearts and you don’t you would 
not make it to term. Clearly, when it is claimed that the ‘function of hearts is to pump 
blood’, this is meant somewhat elliptically. Rather than suggesting that the presence of 
hearts simpliciter provides a selection advantage over the absence of hearts, what is fully 
meant by this statement is that certain hearts - or evolutionary precursors to hearts - 
possessed a selective advantage to other hearts because they pumped blood around the body 
in a certain way while the other hearts did not. It is not simply the possession of a trait and 
the possession of the function produced by that trait which provides a selection advantage, it 
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is the possession of a trait which functions in such a way so as to promote the fitness of the 
organisms possessing it over those members of the population whose traits do not produce 
the selectively-beneficial effect to the same beneficial degree. 
The differential functional effectiveness of the pumping of the heart and camouflage of the 
moths’ wings are by no means idiosyncratic examples as can be appreciated in the following 
less metazoan-centric case. The function of the flagella found in some bacteria is primarily 
locomotive; the structure either flexes or rotates and the organism is propelled forward as a 
result. The selected effects conception allows us to be confident that this is the function of 
the flagella if it can be shown that this effect was selectively beneficial over the bacteria’s 
evolutionary history. Clearly the claim that the flagellum was ‘selected’ does not refer to a 
time when there was a bacterial population featuring members with flagella in direct 
competition with members lacking flagella and the flagella-possessing members won out. 
As we appreciated in chapter 2 variation in a population is ultimately sourced from mutation 
with genetic recombination as a secondary mechanism, but the random nature of the 
variation produced by these processes at any one time would almost certainly not produce a 
complex trait such as a flagellum from scratch. Complex traits such as this do not simply 
arrive fully formed, they evolve incrementally and gradually over repeated rounds of 
random variation and natural selection. As the evolution of the flagella was incremental, we 
cannot explain its selective benefits by a straightforward comparison of the fitness of 
bacteria which posses the trait in comparison to the fitness of bacteria that do not. This 
would be more of a creative exercise than an empirical one; involving the calculation of the 
selective dynamics of an ancestral population which did not exist.  
So the function of the flagella is locomotion due to its history in providing a selective 
benefit by virtue of this effect, but the bacteria with flagella were not selectively-favoured 
over bacteria absent the trait. If the dynamic in the ancestral population was not flagella-
powered locomotion vs the absence of flagella-powered locomotion, what was it? Clearly, 
the variation in the ancestral population was more subtle; some bacteria had flagella - or 
precursors to flagella - which provided those organisms with improved locomotive abilities 
in comparison to the reduced abilities granted by alternative flagella present in the 
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contemporaneous population. Selection did not favour flagella over non-flagella, just as 
selection did not favour hearts over non-hearts or - in the moth population with continuous 
variation - camouflage over non-camouflage; selection favoured flagella better able to 
perform their function over other flagella, hearts which provided superior circulation, and 
wing-patterns which provided greater crypticity.  
If our reasoning in this chapter is correct, it would seem that progress in evolution is neither 
a baseless metaphor nor a normative ‘curio’ in the otherwise naturalistic practice of 
evolutionary biology, but is characteristic of the processes required to create the complex 
adaptive traits endemic in the living world. Not all evolution will be progressive in this way: 
as not all evolution is driven by improvements in traits’ selected effects, and not all natural 
selection will be progressive in this way: as not all natural selection will be driven by 
improvements in traits’ selected effects either- as the sudden arrival of camouflage in our 
original bivariate moth population demonstrated, traits may gain a selection advantage by 
producing novel effects rather than improving on those which they already possess. But 
when the selection advantage of traits is due to their functional superiority, the evolution of 
that trait will be progressive; the members of populations undergoing progressive evolution 
of this kind will better at their selected effects than were its pre-evolved ancestors.        21
3.7 Chapter recap and conclusions 
We begun this chapter by noting that the prevalence of metaphorical language in evolution 
reaches further than the characterisation of biological phenomena as intentional; terms more 
familiar to normative discourse are often employed to describe certain species, organisms or 
their traits. Sometimes the use of metaphor can be directly replaced by empirical 
 This contrast between traits performing the effects for which they were historically selected, and performing 21
alternative effects which now promote fitness fortuitously is not an original observation. This topic was approached 
explicitly by Gould & Vrba (Gould & Vrba 1982) in their distinction between adaptations (traits which are currently 
performing the effects for which they were originally selected) and exaptations (traits which currently produce a fitness-
enhancing effect for which they were not originally selected) and was recognisable in our earlier discussion of the 
differences between the SE conception of function which identifies functions which their historically selected effects 
and the CR conception of function which ignores history in preference to the contribution a trait plays the functioning of 
a higher system: in biology, typically the fitness of organism possessing it.
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description, although its use on other occasions remains problematic: traits do not have 
‘obligations’, traits do however have functions- their selected effects. As the SE conception 
of function secures the identity of a trait’s function naturalistically it is possible to tell when 
traits are performing their functions. From this it is possible to tell if the functioning of traits 
is comparatively better or worse; and from this we may discern when evolution is 
progressive. This is not a rare event; to the extent that natural selection operates through 
differences in the functional performances of traits evolution will be progressive. 
Our confidence that we were applying performance-norms appropriately was secured by the 
ability of the SE conception to provide the required constructive-norms. We argued that the 
functions of closely related traits will be the same function, as functions are selected effects 
and the effects for which closely-related traits were selected will be the same, we may not 
know what the functions of many traits are - the details of selection being out of empirical 
reach - but when we do have access to this information we are warranted in their 
comparison. Our findings in this chapter relied heavily on both  Christensen’s normative 
distinction, and the SE conception of function but despite keeping to the letter of the SE 
approach, we disputed one of its oft-suggested consequences on the one hand, and 
highlighted an often overlooked consequence on the other. The SE conception identifies past 
selected effects and thus establishes a ‘constructive norm’ - as described by Christensen - 
concerning their functional identity through doing so, but it does not tell us what traits 
‘ought’ to do; there is no normativity of the ‘Evaluative’ kind - also according to 
Christensen’s rubric - to be found here, although some SE adherents claim otherwise. On the 
other hand the term ‘selected’ in selected effects refers to a process, rather than an event; the 
selection dynamic in the SE conception is not one of the effects of traits being selected or 
being not-selected simpliciter, but one of traits being favoured or disfavoured due to 
functional differences in their performances. Holding the SE conception of function requires 
an implicit commitment to the this type progressive evolution brought about through 
improvements in the performances of traits’ selected effects.       
With some of the possible consequences of natural selection addressed in this chapter, 
chapter 2’s findings can be viewed from a fresh perspective. There we defended the 
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traditional view of natural selection as a process which is both causal and creative, and 
found the non-casual argument to be unfounded and based upon a preference in explanatory 
framing, rather than a difference in casual reality. Individuals interact with their 
environments, and ipso facto populations of individuals interact with their environments. 
The contention of the non-creative view was also discovered to be unfounded: natural 
selection is not merely eliminative, but is instrumental in maintaining the representation of 
favourable traits in the population, and through this promotes the combination of favourable 
traits that without natural selection would be exceedingly unlikely. Now through this 
chapter’s findings we can appreciate how the theoretical perspectives of natural selection in 
chapter 2 might play out empirically.  
Consider the reasons for, and the results of, natural selection’s retention of favourable traits 
and its contribution in their otherwise unlikely combination. Recall in chapter 2 we 
observed that the arrival of the XY combination trait was made far more likely due to the 
selective advantage of X promoting its retention and propagation prior to the subsequent 
arrival of, and combination with, Y. In light of this chapter’s findings, let us label the 
beneficial effect which X provides to the individuals possessing it as v. How might we 
explain any selectively-beneficial effects brought about by the combination XY? Through 
the perspective of function provided by the SE conception, we would either characterise 
these effects as novel if the XY combination were doing something new and different to v, 
or we would characterise these effects as the same effect v as provided by X alone. If the 
effects of the XY combination were not characterised as v this would be an example of the 
creativity of natural selection, but it would not be an example of progressive evolution as 
although XY brings something new to the table, it does not improve what is already there. 
Whereas if XY provides a selective benefit over X, and does this by virtue of the same type 
of effect v, but by producing that effect to a different standard, then the natural selection 
would still be creative - it has still combined X and Y after all - but in these circumstances 
the evolution would be progressive. The combined trait XY is producing the same effect v to 
an improved standard, and natural selection is the cause. 
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Our grey-scaled moth population provided a brief example of what the results of successive 
rounds of this type of progressive evolution might produce. The traits responsible for the 
incrementally-improving selected effects should - ceteris paribus - proliferate through the 
population, improving successive populations’ functional performances. This was easy to  
appreciate in the idealised moth population as better-functioning mapped directly onto 
darker colouration, but in other circumstances the relationship between improved 
functioning and appearance or anatomy may be less straightforward. Consider traits which 
require a much more diverse range of changes in appearance and anatomy than simple 
colouration for an increase in their functional output to be achieved. In our nocturnal bird 
population for example, to the extent that their heightened sensitivity to sound provided a 
selection advantage we recognised its incremental increase to be progressive; but the 
anatomical changes required to produce heightened functioning in the birds’ auditory 
systems will be far more complex and intricate than mere differences in colouration. This is 
clearly the case in our example of the better functioning heart also; an improvement in the 
selected effects of an organ as anatomically complex as a heart will require far more 
‘refined’ changes than the cosmetic ones required for the wings’ increased camouflage 
ability.  
So natural selection can be creative, and natural selection can be progressive, and some 
progressive increases in functional ability will require more complicated types of variation 
in the traits which produce them than do others. As we concluded in chapter 2, the greater 
the number of unlikely combinations required for any given trait, the greater the probability 
that natural selection would be required to produce it. In the light of this chapter’s 
observations we can appreciate that complex traits such as ears and hearts, gills and spines 
which provide organisms with a greater adaptive ‘fit’ to their environments require not just 
natural selection simpliciter to explain their unlikely production, but natural selection of a 
special sort. As we saw, the nature of the selection history for hearts, flagella and other 
complex traits is not one of such traits providing a selection advantage over their absence, 
but of them providing a selection advantage due to their functional superiority over other 
rival traits whose functioning is comparatively inferior. The selection advantages 
responsible for the evolution of complex traits such as these will be progressive, in that the 
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functional identity of the trait undergoing selection is maintained but its functional 
performance is improved upon, and the process must be maintained over substantial 
amounts of evolutionary time. We could imagine the variation required for the moths 
darkened wing colouration to be achieved reasonably quickly, the variation required to 
produce complex traits such as auditory systems and hearts would be far more considerable, 
and require a much greater span of progressive evolution as a result. 
We will return to progressive evolution over longer timescales like these in chapter 5: how 
evolution within lineages is represented, when progressive representations are warranted, 
and when progressive representations are in danger of misrepresenting the type of evolution 
the lineage has undergone. Then discuss more throughly the relationship between progress, 
adaptation and the ‘design-like’ nature of traits in chapter 6. Before this however, our task in 
chapter 4 will be a slight detour thematically. In the following chapter our investigation is of 
patterns, their general abstract features and the kinds of processes and mechanisms 
responsible for producing them. We saw in 3.6 that once traits become ‘over-functional’ and 
compromise fitness, the accidental nature of the processes responsible for their maintenance 
and propagation mean the evolution responsible is no longer progressive. Our work in 
chapter 4 will build on this observation by investigating further the differences in the nature 
of the processes responsible for genuine patterns, such as the progressive evolution driven 
by natural selection, and patterns which may appear to be genuine but due to the accidental 
nature of their production are not. We then apply these findings to some suggested patterns 
thought to be characteristic of evolutionary history.  
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Chapter 4 
Natural patterns: authentic & quasi    
4.1 Introduction 
Originally coined in 1953 by the psychiatrist Klaus Conrad, ‘apophenia’ is now more 
commonly known as the pervasive tendency to seek and identify patterns in random and 
unconnected information than for its original intended use of characterising the early 
symptoms of schizophrenia (Brugger 2001 p13). Far from being a diagnostic indicator for 
metal illness, human sensitivity to recognise patterns has been re-evaluated as an 
evolutionary adaptation in working order. In a dangerous and uncertain environment, it may 
be preferable to have your pattern-recognition set to ‘paranoid’ and be disturbed needlessly, 
than to risk not being alerted due to an insensitive recognition threshold.  
Fortunately, contemporary cases of apophenia typically have less life-threatening 
consequences. They seem to be particularly evident in matters supernatural; the patterns in 
the stars which motivate astrological predictions, the bet placed according to your lucky 
number and so on. But not every case is so clearly erroneous and the history of science 
features a litany of notable examples. Nicolaas Hartsoeker (1656-1725) for example, 
inventor of the screw-barrel microscope and far from a ‘crank’, believed miniature human-
like forms could be seen contained within sperm at magnification; and the astronomer 
Giovanni Schiaparelli (1835-1910) infamously witnessed the patterns of networked canals 
irrigating the surface of Mars. Both patterns were widely believed to have their basis in 
genuine phenomena for some time. As we know, Hartsoeker and Schiaparelli were both later 
proved to be mistaken when advances in optics showed homunculi and canali respectively 
to be mirages rather than actual structures, but conversely the history of science also 
features equally high profile cases where initially impressionistic patterns were later found 
to be fully justified. The patterns of inheritance discovered by Gregor Mendel (1822-1884) 
for example were subsequently found to be real effects produced by the genetic 
configuration of sexually reproducing species, as was the actuality of continental drift as 
103
suggested by the ‘fit’ of the eastern coast of South America into the west coast of Africa. In 
both of these cases, what started out as perceived regularities were corroborated with 
incremental but cumulative evidence before eventual vindication for them occurred through 
the discovery of the underlying mechanisms responsible. Once it was known how these 
patterns were produced, it was known that they were produced- by something other than 
over-sensitive observers.    
This chapter will concern itself with patterns, their general, abstract features and the kinds 
of processes and mechanisms that produce them. This will, at start, be a preparatory 
exercise. Later we will be looking at some patterns suggested to have been manifest through 
the course of evolution in order to see how they withstand ‘stress-testing’ by our newly-
clarified terms and concepts.  
Life on Earth looks very different today than it did at its inception around 3.5 billion years 
ago. But what exactly has changed? And how should these changes be understood 
philosophically? As they can be interpreted quite liberally, attempts to address these 
questions have come from a variety of quarters: evolutionary biology (Huxley 1942; 
Dawkins 1996a & 1997 , Maynard-Smith & Szathmáry 1997, Wilson 2001), palaeontology 
(Simpson 1974, Raup & Jablonski 1986, Fischer 1986, Gould 1998, Conway-Morris 2003) 
and philosophy (McShea 1998, Shanahan 2004, Ruse 2009, McShea & Brandon 2010, 
McShea & Simpson 2011). That there are patterns of some sort to be found in evolutionary 
history is generally accepted- and acceptable- but claims concerning the causes of these 
patterns and their wider interpretation remain contentious. Darwin’s demystification of the 
teleological aspects of evolution as a kind of ‘force’ driving species, clades or even 
individual organisms in the case of Lamarck, ever closer to perfection seems to be 
accompanied by implicit theoretical corollaries. If the mainspring of evolution is the 
adaptation of species to the shifting goal of capricious environmental challenges, later 
species should not be qualitatively distinct from those that have gone before; aside perhaps 
from being better-adapted to the specific environments which they inhabit although even 
this is far from guaranteed (Van Valen 1977, Sober 1993, McShea 1998). Parochialism 
would seem to imply that any patterns discernible in the history of evolution at scales larger 
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than local adaptation will not be due to any ‘pattern-making processes’ of the evolutionary 
theory itself. Such regularities, it is often suggested, must be explained through the actions 
of non-selective influences such as diffusion away from a minimum level of phenotypic 
complexity (Gould 1996, McShea 1998), or the requirement that later organisms will by 
necessity inherit and thus incorporate the developmental systems of their predecessors 
(Wimsatt 2001).                          
But the adoption of these corollaries is not merely a matter of philosophical disposition and 
has been repeatedly transgressed. E.O.Wilson for example claims:  
“During the past billion years, animals as a whole evolved upwards in body size, feeding 
and defensive techniques, brain and behavioural complexity, social organization, and 
precision of environmental control- in each case farther the non-living state than their 
simpler antecedents did. More precisely, the overall averages of these traits and their upper 
extremes went up. Progress, then, is a property of the evolution of life as a whole by almost 
any conceivable intuitive standard, including the acquisition of goals and intentions in the 
behaviour of animals.” (2001, p175) 
Richard Dawkins, in a similar vein, writes:  
“.....adaptive evolution is not just incidentally progressive, it is deeply died-in-the-wool, 
indispensably, progressive. It is fundamentally necessary that it should be progressive if 
Darwinian natural selection is to perform the explanatory role in our world view that we 
require of it.....I do insist that in a majority of evolutionary lineages there will be progressive 
evolution towards something. It won’t however, be the same thing in different 
lineages.” (1997, p1017 & p1018) 
Are these authors and others like them suffering from apophenia? And like Hartsoeker and 
Schiaparelli erroneously identifying patterns that do not exist? Or are they more like Mendel 
and the early proponents of continental drift in that the patterns they describe are authentic 
but perhaps currently lack a satisfactory explanation? Or do their claims fall somewhere in 
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the middle? Perhaps as side-effects of genuine processes, rather than being characteristic of 
them?  
In section 4.2 we will be looking at the general properties of patterns and identifying the 
different types that our observations of nature present to us. These may be features 
belonging entirely to the natural world: ‘authentic-patterns’, or may be partially constructed 
by human observers: ‘quasi-patterns’. The role a ‘mechanism’ plays in discriminating 
between these different types will be explained, and we will recognise a five-part heuristic 
which can indicate which sort of pattern we may be dealing with. In 4.3 we will be looking 
at two natural real-world patterns in order to demonstrate the practical application of these 
heuristics. Although both of these patterns are extremely familiar, only one of them is 
authentic according to the procedures spelt out in 4.2, while the other is quasi-. In 4.4 we 
address the nature of the patterns suggested by Wilson and Dawkins to be present in the 
history of life. Here again through the application of our heuristic we observe that one of 
these suggested patterns is authentic, while the other is not. In 4.5 we discuss the wider 
ramifications of finding what appears to be an authentic pattern in ‘large-scale’ evolution to 
actually be quasi-, and suggest the properties that a genuinely authentic pattern at taxonomic 
scales at genera and above would have to possess. Section 4.6 recaps this chapter’s findings 
and places them in this dissertation’s wider perspective in preparation for the work ahead in 
chapter 5.  
4.2 Patterns: elements, relations & mechanisms   
The term ‘pattern’ is an ambivalent one covering a wide range of disparate cases. At one 
extreme we have patterns like the constellation of Orion created by our association of stars 
that are actually distantly remote, while at the other extreme we have patterns that reflect 
empirical reality more accurately: the fluctuations of temperature according to season, the 
specific proportions of elements in chemical compounds, and the near-universal presence of 
DNA in living organisms being obvious examples. The impressions and regularities that we 
call ‘patterns’ clearly form quite a diverse and loosely-defined set. The task of identifying 
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the sort of pattern we are dealing with is made considerably easier when the mechanism 
responsible for it is understood to some degree. We can explain the pattern of seasonal 
temperature changes at various locations for example as primarily due to the orientation and 
position of the Earth relative to Sun during its yearly orbit. We know that chemical elements 
combine in predictable quantities due to the specifics of their atomic and molecular 
configuration, and that the ubiquity of DNA in living organisms is explained by distant but 
common ancestry. There is no equivalent explanation of this kind for the pattern of stars that 
comprise Orion’s Belt. Of course, we may safely assume its arrangement is due to 
interactive astrophysical processes that we have some hope of understanding (if not actually 
calculating due to the vast amount of data it would involve) but an explanation of 
astrophysical processes will be of a very different stripe to an explanation for why those 
stars should have settled specifically into a formation such that it appears belt-like when 
viewed from the perspective of a terrestrial observer. The stars themselves are real and their 
positions are real, and the processes that created those stars and arranged them into their 
current positions are real, but our interpretation of these elements and their relations as a 
pattern forming a ‘belt’ does not reflect empirical reality. It is imposed on them by human 
observers. 
We can observe a three-way split in these types of pattern. The patterns are either: i) entirely 
imaginary: as in the cases of Hartsoeker and Schiaparelli, where closer inspection 
demonstrated the observed phenomena to have no basis in reality; ii) partially real: as in the 
case of Orion’s Belt, where what we might call the identified pattern’s ‘elements’ are 
objectively real, and their configuration is real but where their resulting pattern is artificial 
and imposed; or iii) real: as in the cases of Mendelian inheritance and continental drift, 
where both the pattern’s elements and arrangement have no dependence on human 
recognition. Type i) patterns may be of psychological interest to practitioners such as 
Conrad, but will be of little further particular importance to us. The natures of type ii) and 
type iii) patterns and the reasons for the differences between them are of considerable 
importance however. 
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We are of course not the first to address patterns philosophically. Dennett’s highly 
influential ‘Real Patterns’ (1991) being by far the most seminal example whose insight  
continues to motivate discussion - even in areas not originally intended. (Tolliver 1994, 
Fodor 1997, Wilkerson 1997, Seager 2000, Ross 2004, Joslin 2006, Ladyman & Ross 2007, 
Chalmers 2012, Sterelny & Griffiths 2012, Burnston 2017).  
Although I am unsure as to how a detailed comparison of this chapter’s findings might 
compliment - or indeed contrast - with those of the Real Patterns debate I mention it for two 
reasons. The first is terminological: however distinct the patterns which concerned Dennett 
may be from those which will concern us, and however appropriate the label ‘real patterns’ 
may be for some of the phenomena we analyse below, the term is too firmly associated with 
Dennett’s philosophy and its subsequent literature for semantic reassignment. So for the 
sake of clarity and in an attempt to establish our reasoning in what follows as distinct from 
the Real Patterns discussion alternatives will be used. The second reason is that at least one 
aspect of Dennett’s approach is informative by comparison. For Dennett the nature of the 
patterns which originally concerned him - certain mental states, scientific abstractions, 
obscured diagrams - hinge on their interpretation , he is not concerned, at least explicitly, in 22
associating their ontological status to the means of their generation . (This is particularly 23
evident in one of his main examples: a gradually obscured pattern which degrades from five 
distinct squares into what appears to be random visual ‘noise’. Despite each member of this 
series being produced by the same computerised process, with the various levels of noise 
added artificially, their ‘status’ as patterns remains mixed.) In contrast, the patterns of 
concern to us are ones that are easily-perceivable and well-known (and so, quite ‘real’ 
according to Dennett’s approach), but whose means of generation play a vital role in how 
we think about them. At best it would be of tangential relevance to Dennett if his five-
 Although, of course, not only their interpretation. Dennett deftly avoids the charge of instrumentalism 22
through his insistence of a ‘compressibility requirement’, in short: a pattern is real iff there is a more efficient 
way of describing it (1991, p32). The possibility of compression without loss of information is decided by a 
mathematical operation, not an interpretive one (Ross, Ladyman & Collier p205, in Ladyman & Ross 2007). 
 Dennett has consistently tried to avoid any specifically ontological commitments that might be implicit in 23
his work on Real Patterns (uncharitably labelling ontology: ‘...the caboose, not the engine...’ (Dennett in 
Ross, Brook & Thompson 2000, p358)). Although he has perhaps not been as successful in this as he might 
have hoped (See Ross’ chapter on ‘Rainforest Realism’ in Ross, Brook & Thompson 2000, and Ross, 
Ladyman & Collier on Dennett’s ontological difficulties in Ladyman & Ross et al. 2007, p196) 
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square sequence were generated by a the hand of an artist or by waves washing stones 
randomly up on a beach, whereas for us this would make all the difference.  
At their most abstract, patterns are regularities, and regularities must be regularities ‘in’ or 
‘of’ something. The Fibonacci sequence for example is a pattern made of numbers, the 
pattern of concentric rings from a stone dropped in water is made from the wave motion on 
the surface of the liquid, your daily schedule will be a pattern of activities such as working, 
shopping, eating, maybe childcare and hopefully plenty of sleeping and some leisure 
activities. Patterns have elements, the various things that together from the pattern; the 
elements of a chessboard are black squares and white squares, the elements of the Fibonacci 
sequence are numbers, the elements of the wave pattern are the movements of the water.   
But elements of a pattern must be related in a certain way. The relation between elements 
may be quite loose and informal such as in the relation between the activities that comprise 
your daily schedule, alternatively the relation maybe quite strict and linear as in the 
Fibonacci sequence, where the next number in the sequence is the sum of the two preceding. 
Some other relations may be quite closely linked, but not be ‘sequential’ in this way. This 
will very often be the case when the elements of a pattern may appear independent, but are 
in fact jointly produced. We may think of the various clues that together indicate the identity 
of the murderer: the fingerprints on the gun, the lie told to the police, the secret inheritance 
etc as forming a very different type of pattern from that of the Fibonacci sequence or your 
routine. Sometimes patterns may remain undiscovered due to the obscurity of the relations 
between their elements, like an unlucky detective failing to properly piece together the 
evidence.           
For our purposes the relations which hold between the elements of a pattern must not be 
generated accidentally . However strongly they impress themselves upon us, there must be 24
a cause or reason to explain why a pattern’s elements are related in the way that they are. 
 As we saw in our chapter 3 example of the nocturnal birds’ over-functional hearing, knowing how an evolutionary 24
sequence is generated makes a significant difference in how we interpret the results. When increases in the bird’s 
abilities were driven by their selection benefits - ie non-accidentally - we thought of the evolution as progressive, when 
further increases were disadvantageous and not driven by selection, the accidental nature of the non-selective processes 
responsible for the continuing increase: drift, mutation, migration etc stopped ‘progress’ in its tracks.    
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We generally regard non-accidental patterns differently from accidental ones even if the 
patterns themselves are phenomenally indistinguishable - and for good reason. Suppose we 
used a random-number generator to produce the sequence 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, while this 
would be just as much an instance of the Fibonacci sequence as it would be if generated by 
the formula as stated above, knowing the specifics of its generation - the precise means 
taken to generate each element in the series - would not expand our knowledge in any way, 
or if it did, it would not tell us anything more about the Fibonacci sequence. If we came 
across the same sequence in some other form however, perhaps in the dimensions of a 
spiralling shell or whorls of a hurricane, it would be a pattern whose regularity we would 
certainly want to investigate further as it might tell us more about how the surface 
phenomena was generated, and perhaps a lot more. How patterns come about can be 
important because if they are accidental they do not signify anything, if they are non-
accidental however, they might.                   
It might be tempting here to place some of the explanatory burden concerning the 
generation of patterns by stipulating than a ‘genuine’ pattern be the result of a genuine 
‘process’, and indeed much of the literature concerning evolutionary patterns employs the 
term in a confirmatory way (Raup & Jablonski eds. 1986; Emerson 2002;  Wake, Wake & 
Specht 2011). We will avoid this. The difference here may seem cosmetic, but as our aim is 
to emphasise the differences between accidental and non-accidental patterns and as both of 
these will be the result of processes per se the use of the term ‘process’ will not make the 
required distinction. There is instead however a subtle difference between ‘process’ and 
‘mechanism’ that can be capitalised upon. Consider again the stars that make up Orion’s 
Belt, or the numbers of the randomly-generated Fibonacci sequence. It would be wrong, I 
think, to say that the elements of these patterns were not produced by genuine processes. 
The stars that comprise Orion’s Belt for example where produced by physical interactions 
that we know, more-or-less, and have a fairly good hope of fully understanding. The 
elements of the randomly-generated Fibonacci sequence would also be the result of 
processes so described. I do not know how random.org  or other random-number 25
 https://www.random.org25
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generators produce the numbers they do, but we know there will be some process that 
allows them to do this reliably and promptly upon request. If the elements of these two 
accidental patterns are the result of processes, then the patterns produced from these 
elements are also the result of processes. We might like to think that the three stars that 
comprise Orion’s belt are the result of three separate processes (they are quite far apart after 
all), and that the seven numbers generated randomly are the result of seven different 
processes, this, at least, is how I would characterise it. But any potential confusion as to 
what counts as a single ‘process’ or plural ‘processes’, or any potential confusion between 
the kind of process that produced the Fibonacci sequence through application of a formula, 
meteorological dynamics, or engineering principles, and the kind of process that generated 
the Fibonacci sequence by accident is ameliorated by the introduction of a generative 
mechanism.  
As with patterns, mechanisms come in many different stripes, and as with patterns we are 
far from the first to give their application philosophical interest (Machamer, Darden & 
Craver 2000, Glennan 2002, Woodward 2002, Skipper & Millstein 2005, Barros 2008, 
Matthewson & Calcott 2011, Moss 2012, Nicholson 2012, Cartwright 2017). Debate 
continues, although there is broad agreement that all mechanisms are mechanisms of some 
phenomena. They may produce phenomena, when a causal sequence produces a distinct  
end-product, such as when a virus produces the symptoms of a disease, or when an act of 
parliament produces a piece of legislation; they may underly phenomena, such as the 
mechanisms of the engine that underly an aeroplane’s movement; or they may maintain a 
phenomenon, such as the mechanism in your thermostat that keeps the room temperate- a 
state of affairs that is preserved by the thermostat’s mechanism.  
Unlike the description of processes, mechanistic explanations separate the accidental from 
the non-accidental by drawing our attention to the importance of reliability. Mechanisms are 
‘structured’ in a way that processes, largely, are not, something which greatly promotes our 
ability to understand them. A mechanism that maintains the HbS gene in human populations 
exposed to malaria for example is more reliable and repeatable than a process that produces 
the same effect. This does not necessary mean that processes are always idiosyncratic 
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events, or that mechanisms are always repeated. We may easily conceive of a mechanism of 
which there was only one (perhaps a prototype) and which was used only once or perhaps 
not at all, and the mechanisms of history are no less mechanisms for being singular. 
Discussion of unique or erstwhile mechanisms will inevitably draw our minds towards 
evolutionary history. Certain seagrasses have a unique approach to pollination (Pettitt, 
McConchie, Ducker & Knox, 1980) and certain species of frog are able, uniquely, to survive 
the partial freezing of their body fluids (Layne & Lee Jr. 1995). It is highly likely that these 
adaptations were produced only once through the mechanism of natural selection- although 
additionally natural selection may maintain these traits in the relevant populations. That 
these adaptations are unique does not then demote natural selection to a mere ‘process’. 
Mechanisms do not need to be repeated, but they do need to be repeatable, and this requires 
structure and regularity in the sense that given the same or very similar initial conditions the 
mechanism will behave in the same or very similar ways, not that is has actually done so. 
The structure and regularity of mechanisms can be understood counter-factually: had there 
been no natural selection, then these adaptations would not have existed (Woodward 2002), 
although consistent with our defence of natural selection’s creativity (in chapter 2), 
mechanisms can also be understood stochastically, as raising the probability of possible but 
exceedingly unlikely phenomena occurring (Barros 2008). Either way, mechanisms do not 
need to have their regularity and structure explicitly demonstrated by repeated instances 
(Glennan 2010).        
Additionally we should not conflate mechanisms themselves with mechanistic explanations 
(Matthewson & Calcott 2017), so some caution is required. Although this practice may be 
largely innocuous, it obscures the fact that comparatively simple mechanistic explanations 
can be applied to complex and disparate phenomena, very different from mechanisms as 
more traditionally conceived. The mechanisms that produce, underly or maintain patterns 
come in many different varieties, as do the target phenomena themselves. The mechanism 
that we understand to produce a thunderstorm for example will be very different in nature to 
the mechanism inside a smoke detector, although both of these are composed from a number 
of sub-systems or ‘components’ acting in a fairly prescribed manner to jointly create the 
target phenomena. We can see the components that jointly comprise the mechanism of the 
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storm are not physically- distinguishable separate ‘parts’ whose interactions are 
straightforwardly-localised, although a mechanistic explanation for the storm’s behaviour 
might treat it as such. There is no specific location within the storm’s mechanism where the 
component of ‘low air pressure’ interacts with ‘high air pressure’ for example, this happens 
throughout, so in contrast to its mechanistic description the number and type of actual 
interactions between the storm’s components will be vast and hugely complex. This is not 
case with a more traditional mechanisms- a carbon monoxide detector for example. Its 
specific components- the chemical detector, LED, alarm etc are quite discrete, localised and 
interact in a very limited number of ways. The components of the detector are of course 
themselves comprised from other parts, and ultimately from the interactions of its 
constituent atoms, this is a major advantage of identifying the processes responsible for a 
pattern as a mechanism. Mechanisms ‘screen-off’ what can be described as the 
“concatenation of lower-level causes” (Fischer 1986); if there are processes and sub- 
mechanisms with their own dynamics operating within the larger mechanism, mechanistic 
explanations often provide us with the option of ignoring them.   26
Mechanistic descriptions provide a natural cut-off below which an explanation need not go 
in order to provide a satisfying explanation for the target phenomena- they ‘bottom 
out’ (Woodward 2002). In contrast, when we conceive of a process, it is very often a process 
‘all the way down’- perhaps to its most fundamental interactions, in many cases this will 
mean there is no natural place for an analysis of its dynamics to ‘turn its spade’ and stop. 
Consider the process of coastal erosion for example, a paradigm case of a process operating 
simultaneously at multiple levels of analysis. Large-scale phenomena such as currents and 
tides manipulate the oceans such that they interact more strongly with other large scale 
phenomena such as land-masses, at a level ‘down’, we may recognise waves as interacting 
 In light of the phrase ‘screening-off’s’ established use (Brandon 1990, Sober 1992) we might be tempted - as we were 26
with Dennett’s ‘real’ patterns - to use fresh and untainted terminology. Our use here however is quite in line with 
established use in some respects. We remain neutral here on whether the ‘screening-off’ of lower level events addresses 
the ‘levels of selection problem’ as suggested by Brandon, or if the suggestion that phenotypes ‘screen-off’ genotypes 
casually demonstrates natural selection acting on - and only on - phenotypes. We are partially committed to another of 
Brandon’s claims however: our use of ‘screening-off’ here may be ambivalent on causality but not on explanatory 
clarity and simplicity. When a mechanism screens-off lower level events, as with the omission of the movements of 
individual grains of sand in an explanation of coastal erosion, it will provide a better and more efficient explanation. 
Too much detail in this regard can compromise understanding, ‘screening-off’ provides a valuable service by 
ameliorating this.     
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with specific types of features like beaches, shorelines and cliffs- perhaps beaches with a 
flatter gradient are less prone to erosion while cliffs directly at the water’s edge are more 
prone etc. At another level down again, we may be interested in the chemical composition 
of these features: is the process of erosion exacerbated by water with higher acidity? Does 
the composition, say the amount of limestone, of coastal features make their erosion more 
probable or more severe? An investigation of the process of coastal erosion undertaken at 
any of these levels would be warranted and potentially informative. This is not the case with 
mechanisms. They may share with processes a similar type of compositional hierarchy, but 
unlike those of processes some levels of mechanisms have clear priority over others .  27
In contrast, now consider a more traditionally-conceived mechanism: the machinery of a car 
plant. The mechanism of the car plant produces cars- this is the end product of the various 
sub-systems, operations or ‘sub-mechanisms’ that together comprise the plant’s ‘top’ level 
mechanism. Notice that although the plant will no doubt be composed of various smaller 
sub-mechanisms, these do not contribute to the final product by producing smaller cars 
which then add up quantitively to make normal-sized cars once production has ended. These 
sub-mechanisms produce car parts which are then jointly assembled to make the end 
product. Cars are produced at this final ‘upper’ level and only at this final level, they are not 
produced at any level below that. This dynamic is repeated in abstract form when parliament 
produces a new piece of legislation; the debates, the deals, the votes etc are all vital parts of 
the legislative mechanism, but they are not all acts of ‘sub-legislation’ which ‘add up’ to the 
final product. This was not the case for coastal erosion. At each compositional level in the 
processes described was erosion occurring: at the largest scale of oceans and land-masses, 
and at the level of beaches and waves, and at the level of the chemical composition of the 
water and costal features. Different investigators of course may be interested in the different 
levels at which the process of erosion is occurring and may prioritise them accordingly. But 
this is up to them, their target phenomenon does not naturally provide any given level at 
which its investigation should be carried out, whereas an explanation in terms of mechanism 
 As we saw in chapter 2’s discussion concerning the viability of individual or population level causality, at which 27
precise level the parts of the mechanism are identified may not always be obvious. For Walsh it was the interactions of 
individuals, for Millstein it was interactions of populations.     
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does have a natural, prioritised level: that one immediately below the level at which the 
target phenomenon is produced.  
Should we wish to investigate the mechanism of our thermostat for example, we start with 
the target phenomenon of ‘temperature regulation’ and see how the component systems at 
the next level down together produce that phenomenon. This would no doubt include a 
thermometer and means of communication so that it can instruct the central heating as to 
what it should do, and both of these subsystems may be of interest in their own right- there 
is nothing stopping us from investigating further-  but once we start investigating them our 
target phenomenon has changed, we will be looking at the mechanism of temperature 
detection and the mechanism of communication respectively. This ‘modular’ feature of 
mechanisms follows naturally from the observation that they are always mechanisms of 
some phenomenon; once mechanisms have their own sub-mechanisms they may well be 
‘distant’ enough from the target phenomenon so that they are no longer mechanisms for that 
phenomenon. A sub-system that produces tyres is suitably distant from the target 
phenomenon of ‘car’ that they are not a mechanism of car production, and- lest we think this 
only applies to artifactual mechanisms- air humidity is suitably distant from the target 
phenomenon of ‘electric storm’ that it is not a mechanism of storms. Mechanisms bring to 
our attention the mutli-variate causes of phenomena but conveniently for our purposes also 
direct us towards the level of analysis that ultimately matters; the final level below which 
the phenomena of interest is produced. 
Notice that mechanisms are also regulatory through their ability to reliably group entities 
and processes of the appropriate type. The elements that together comprise a pattern must of 
course share a similarity of some kind (only someone in the most severe grip of apophenia 
would claim to have discerned ‘patterns’ comprised from elements with no similarity 
whatsoever). But in many cases the precise nature of the similarity may not be readily 
apparent. A regularity of some sort might impress itself on us without us knowing explicitly 
what the relation between its component elements are or how they are achieved. As we will 
shortly see the converse is also true: some patterns may strike us quite forcefully as certain, 
objective and comprised from elements related in ways that are clear when in actuality they 
115
are not. Suppose we have phenomena A and phenomena B, and we suspect that they are 
related in some way and that they may form part of a bigger pattern that we might be 
interested in investigating, but that we are unsure of- we just have a ‘hunch’ that A and B 
might be important in some way. We may look into the processes that cause A, and those 
that cause B and these may be suitably familiar enough for us to group the two phenomena 
together as elements of a pattern. The mechanism that produces the target phenomenon 
resists this kind analysis; we need a mechanism for the pattern itself not just for its 
elements. Consider again the example of Orion’s Belt. We may investigate the three stars 
that comprise the belt and find the mechanisms that firstly produced the stars and those that 
currently maintain them are very similar- near identical perhaps. Justifying our belief that 
these phenomena are of same type or kind. But these are production and maintenance 
mechanisms of stars, not of star-constellations. We require a mechanism to account for the 
target phenomena, the appearance of a belt-like formation as observed by someone on Earth, 
the mechanisms responsible for the existence of the stars themselves can be ‘screened off’ in 
this context. Although its elements and their relations are objective Orion’s Belt was not 
created through the actions of a mechanism, for this we would require a constellation-
creating mechanism, which we do not have. Like the accidentally-produced Fibonacci 
sequence, we can provide no better explanation for its regularity other than saying its 
elements just happened to fall into that particular arrangement.  
Even compelling patterns may be dismissed as impressionistic by virtue of a lack of 
mechanistic explanation. When one is available however, mechanisms may also be 
confirmatory, by showing that what may appear to be disparate phenomena are actually 
elements of a larger, though hard to discern, pattern. McShea & Simpson (2011, p22) 
provide an excellent example of this, which is made all the more compelling in that the 
phenomena it describes are not physical in the manner of constellations and costal erosion 
but are historical incidents, illustrating that the principles of mechanistic explanation can be 
applied quite generally. They ask us to consider the following events, or in our parlance 
‘elements’: the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Iran in 1953, the 
construction of the Berlin Wall in Germany in 1961, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by 
Soviet forces in 1968, the USA’s involvement in Vietnam from the 1960s to its withdrawal 
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in 1973. To this we may add the Moon landings in 1969 and Bobby Fischer’s victory over 
Boris Spassky at the world chess championships in Reykjavík in 1972. This appears very 
much like the makings of an outlandish conspiracy theory; but these are in fact all elements 
of an authentic pattern that we can understand quite straightforwardly. They were all 
produced through the underlying common ‘mechanism’ of the Cold War that occurred 
between the Soviet Union and the USA in the later half of the twentieth century. Our 
impressions that these elements might be related in some way that is difficult to make fully 
explicit would be justified. The introduction of the mechanism confirms that these are 
elements of a larger pattern and that their relation is quite genuine independently of our 
perception.  
Let us briefly recap the ground covered so far. We have discussed: elements- those parts of a 
pattern that together create the pattern’s apparent features, these could be numbers in the 
case of the Fibonacci sequence or coastlines in the case of continental drift. We also 
identified: relations-  the affinities between the elements of a pattern, these may be entirely 
impressionistic: like the ‘belt-like’ arrangement of Orion’s belt, or genuine: like the ubiquity 
of DNA in terrestrial organisms. Lastly, we investigated mechanisms of patterns, noting that 
although the elements of a pattern may be the result of their own ‘element mechanisms’, 
patterns themselves must have their own ‘pattern mechanism’ if they are to be regarded as 
genuine. Some impressionistic patterns may be found to be less that fully real in virtue of 
this absence (Orion’s Belt), while some initially quite dubious patterns (like the events 
underwritten by the Cold War) will enjoy strengthened credibility or even confirmation if 
the discovery of the right kind of underlying mechanism is found to be acting at the 
appropriate level.           
With these terms in place let us turn our attention back to the different types of pattern that 
were identified by means of the three-way split established earlier in 4.2. Those that were 
originally filed under ‘type ii)’: patterns that were ‘partially real’ by virtue of their elements 
and relations being objective but whose generation we will now recognise as non-
mechanistic we will term quasi-patterns. While those filed under ‘type iii)’: patterns which 
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featured objective elements and objective relations but whose generation was non-accidental 
and mechanistic we will term authentic-patterns. 
At first pass, the distinction between quasi-patterns and authentic-patterns may seem fairly 
direct; quasi-patterns seem to be artificial and observer-dependent, whereas authentic-
patterns are natural and independent of human observation. As we have seen, some cases 
slot neatly into this description: the Belt of Orion is dependent on observers like ourselves 
viewing its components from just the right perspective, while the pattern made by the 
ubiquity of DNA in living organisms exists whether we are observing it or not. But this 
classification is not quite so straightforward. Many, arguably most, of the patterns we 
experience in everyday life are quite authentic, but also ‘observer-dependent’ in the sense 
that we as observers were a necessary part of the process for their creation. Notice also that 
the patterns designed by human activity such as architecture, agriculture and other cultural 
manipulations of the natural world are dependent on their observers in quite a trivial way. It 
took human beings to produce these patterns; to create and arrange the pattern’s elements in 
their distinctive ways, but not to maintain these patterns; in that these patterns would still 
exist if human life were to disappear tomorrow afternoon. Now consider a subtlety-different 
case of observer-dependence: the patterns and regularities of economic activity. These are 
‘observer-dependant’ like the artefacts of culture, in as much as they depend on the activities 
of human agents who also happen to be observers, but they are also objective in that they 
describe authentic patterns in collective human behaviour independently from any 
observation of them. The role of the observer is important here. Authentic-patterns may be 
natural or artificial, observed or unwitnessed, but they must not require observation to be 
authentic - consider again McShea & Simpson’s Cold War example.      
The first moral to be gleaned from this extended section is that examples of both authentic- 
and quasi-patterns may present themselves to a number of different observers as being so 
clearly genuine that distinguishing between them may often prove impossible based on 
impressionistic information alone. This ambiguity works both ways. Not only can quasi- be 
mistaken for authentic-, conversely authentic- may be mistaken for quasi-; the fact that we 
are aware that our capacities for pattern recognition may slant towards the apophenic does 
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not mean that errors may not slip through despite this, even strikingly authentic patterns 
may be erroneously blamed on over-sensitivity . The second moral is that the discovery of 28
a mechanism at the right level aids us greatly in deciding which type of pattern we are 
dealing with: by virtue of indicating which patterns are authentic- when a mechanism for it 
is found, and which may be quasi- when a mechanism is suspected to be absent. The third 
moral is that the complexity of a mechanism may often not be accurately reflected by the 
complexity of its description. Relatively simple mechanisms like carbon monoxide 
detectors, and very complex mechanisms such as those which produce storms can be 
described as though these phenomena were of comparable complexity when this is very 
clearly not the case in actuality.  
With these morals fresh in our minds, let us see how they inform two particularly 
compelling natural examples. Being astronomical and geographical respectively, these 
continue our temporary hiatus from specifically biological and evolutionary phenomena a 
little further; it will be quite clear however that this is both relevant and informative.      
  
4.3 Authentic & quasi patterns: two real world examples      
From the perspective of an observer standing on Earth, the Moon and the Sun appear to be 
exactly the same size. This is demonstrated quite strikingly during a solar eclipse, the Moon 
obscures the Sun so precisely that aspects of the Sun’s corona - usually swamped by the 
glare from the Sun’s central body- can be witnessed creating the distinctive ‘diamond ring’ 
effect. If the Moon were too small the Sun would appear to us as a glowing donut, if too 
large both the Sun and its corona would be concealed. How do we explain this uncanny fit? 
We have half an answer. Their shared sphericality is due to the effects of gravity, the 
 The twin dangers of mis-recognition can be straightforwardly understood through the following situation: We are 28
lying in bed, semi-asleep, and hear unusual creaking sounds downstairs. We are alerted to the possibility that the noises 
may not be generated randomly by the house ‘settling down’ or similar, but are perhaps caused by an intruder and so 
constitute an alarming authentic-pattern... or perhaps the noises, although indistinguishable from those of an intruder, 
are entirely unrelated ‘noises of the night’ and so constitute a quasi-pattern? As indistinguishability works both ways, 
we might just as easily get up to confront an intruder when our alarm was actually caused by something benign and 
routine, as we might ignore the disturbance made by an intruder believing their movements to be random noise- 
especially should we believe ourselves to be somewhat apophenic and over-reactive.                
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material of both bodies are evenly attracted towards their centre of mass making their 
surfaces equidistant from this central point. There is of course an immense amount more to 
be said about how gravity produced and maintains the shapes of the Sun and the Moon, but 
the basic idea can be conveyed simply enough by the mechanism of a force which attracts 
matter equally through three dimensions. The specifics, the minutiae of their actual 
formation from gas and from rock can be ‘screened-off’. If it is just an explanation for their 
sphericality that we are concerned with, a simple mechanistic explanation concerning 
gravity and its general effects through the grouping of matter will likely prove sufficient. 
Including the extraneous detail may in fact be counter-productive by making the explanation 
less clear     
What about the other half of the explanation? Like with the positioning of the stars in the 
Belt of Orion, we may be justified in thinking that the processes responsible for producing 
the Sun in its current size and relative position will be fully known and understood, and that 
the processes responsible for producing the Moon in its current size and relative position 
may be fully known and understood also . We are also justified in thinking that an 29
explanation for why both bodies should appear to be the same size from the perspective of 
an Earth-based observer, given their actual sizes and positions, is available; the moon is 
around 400 times smaller than the sun and is also around 400 times closer. So it looks like 
we may have a complete, or at least satisfying, explanation for their striking similarity. We 
can explain the shapes of these two objects (gravity), we can explain why they appear to us 
as being the same size (distance in relation to actual size), and we are also confident that 
both the size and the distances of these bodies can be explained, in principle, by known 
scientific principles - or at least we have no grounds to suspect that this won’t be possible.  
But clearly, this is does not provide us with the right type of answer. We will either be 
discussing the specifics of optics and perspective for observers with our sensory capacities, 
or addressing two separate and distinct processes to account for each body’s individual 
formation- which resulted in their final products just happening to match up. What makes 
 Although our moon is unusually large in comparison to the size of the planet that it orbits. There is ongoing debate as 29
to precisely why this should be the case ( https://www.nature.com/collections/grlzpstdvb) 
120
either of these approaches unsatisfactory is that neither provide a mechanism for why both 
bodies should have formed in such a way and be placed in such a position, such that their 
sizes should appear to us to be the same. This seems to be a fairly clear example of a quasi-
pattern, its elements are real, their relation is real (they do after all appear to us as the same 
size), but we do not have an underlying mechanism to explain the pattern, rather than its 
elements and positions. The closest that we could get to a ‘mechanistic’ explanation would 
strike us a being anything but- a vast collection of matter of various types in various 
positions and quantities and travelling at various velocities etc. There is a clear imbalance 
between phenomena and explanation here. The phenomenon could hardly be simpler: the 
precise match in size and shape between two simple and incredibly familiar objects, while 
anything approaching a satisfactory explanation for why they appear to us in this manner 
would be complex way past the point of plausible calculability. As there is no mechanism 
here to ‘screen off’ the lower level events responsible for their respective sizes we are 
forced to deal with them head-on.       
Now to geology. Consider the case of continental drift; it had been noticed as early as the 
16th century that the contours of South America’s eastern coastline matched closely to those 
of the western Africa, and by the 19th century geologists and naturalists were increasingly 
convinced that the similarities they were discovering in the fossil and sedimentary 
composition of the separated coastlines could not be coincidental (Oreskes 2018). In 
contravention to the prevailing geological orthodoxy at the time, the evidence appeared to 
indicate that Africa and South America comprised, either in whole or in part, a larger 
landmass that subsequently split. Perhaps surprisingly, it was not until the 1960s that this 
conjecture became scientifically respectable. The lack of any convincing mechanism which 
could explain the ancient separation of two continents by many thousands of kilometres 
meant that the apparent similarities in sedimentary composition and fossil type, and near-
isometry in coastal shape were thought, on balance, to be more easily-explained away. This 
authentic- pattern was finally vindicated by the discovery of plate tectonics. By virtue of the 
pattern’s elements being the upper surfaces of enormous geological plates adrift on a sea of 
subterranean magma they are in constant, if unnoticeable, flux. This explained the matching 
patterns in costal composition and shape. Initial impressions turned out to be correct; they 
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had not always been in their current locations and subsequent investigation suggested that 
previous to their separation approximately 145 million years ago Africa and South America 
had formed part of a single ‘supercontinent’ for hundreds of millions years. The costal edges 
of their surfaces were layered by the same combination and type of materials because it had 
accumulated in unison by the same sedimentary processes, and were inhabited by the same 
ancient species also, thus accounting for the similarities in the fossil record. What seemed 
very much like it could be an quasi-pattern was recognised to be an authentic-pattern 
through the identification of the pattern’s underlying mechanism- quite literally underlying 
in this case. Although it now strikes us as undeniable, the match between the two coastlines 
by itself was not sufficient to justify the notion that their similarity was anything more than 
impressionistic, or at least coincidental, even when augmented by decades of additional 
circumstantial evidence. It was only by discovery of the mechanism responsible, quite 
invisible and distinct from the observed pattern, that justification for the pattern was made 
possible. 
Both of these cases have much in common. They are probably the most widely-known 
patterns that are specific instances as opposed to everyday regularities, and the elements in 
both of these cases are very simple as indeed are their respective relations. Where they differ 
of course is in how we describe the causes of these patterns, one has mechanism to explain 
the similarity of their elements while the other does not. The Sun and the Moon’s uncanny 
match remains ‘one of those things’ whereas South America and Africa’s match is, if not 
comprehensively explained, as least explained to the extent that the pattern they comprise is 
considered authentic, rather than quasi by virtue of the mechanism responsible for it. That 
complex series of events may require complex explanations, and that simple series of events 
may require only simple ones will not strike us as particularly revelatory. The lateral 
division of a single object into two separate ones brought about by opposing forces is very 
straightforward and easily-conceived, as is an explanation for the similarity in their 
formerly-unified edges. We may demonstrate this to ourselves by ripping apart a piece of 
paper. Often the simplicity of the description accurately reflects the simplicity of the 
process, we have a simple phenomenon and a simple explanation to match. The explanation 
for the matching coastlines is very much of this type, as evidenced by its simplicity and 
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minimalism; we are able to briefly, but sufficiently, describe the processes responsible for 
their physical similarity quite straightforwardly. We could of course give a considerably 
more complex and detailed explanation for the geological processes responsible, but our 
knowledge of the mechanism means that this is an option, not a requirement that we are 
obliged to provide. This was also the case for our explanation for the shared sphericality 
between the Moon and the Sun; the economy in description matches appropriately the 
apparent simplicity of the  process, we need only mention a very limited number of objects 
and their interaction according to easily relatable physical principles. The comparative sizes 
of the Moon and Sun on the other hand may appear to be a simple phenomenon but in 
actually is not. It is the result of a very complex and disparate series of processes and events 
with no unifying mechanism. Without this there is no possibility of a mechanistic 
explanation, and without that there is no natural place for an analysis of the process to 
‘bottom out’. We may imagine that a description, if one were possible, would have to be 
highly complex and convoluted and so reflect reality of the process itself by being so. 
4.4 Wilson and Dawkins: authentic or quasi?       
With the above contrast between the authentic-pattern produced by the Atlantic coastlines 
the quasi-pattern produced by the Sun and Moon in sharp focus, let us return to evolutionary 
biology and recall the patterns offered by Wilson and Dawkins at the start of this chapter: 
various impressionistically ‘advanced’ phenotypic and behavioural traits and abilities 
showcasing evolutionary advance, and adaptive trajectories respectively. Are these patterns 
authentic like the coastlines of Africa and South America, or are they quasi like the sizes of 
the Sun and the Moon?  
Following our analysis above we now have a five-part heuristic to help us find out: i) the 
patterns should not be accidental, but produced through an underlying mechanism; ii) this 
mechanism should be reliable and repeatable- if not repeated; iii) the mechanism should 
simplify the pattern’s explanation by ‘screening off’ lower-level events when required, so 
providing a ‘natural level’ at which their explanation should be provided; iv) the mechanism 
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should be regulatory, in that it should indicate which elements belong to the pattern in 
question, and which ones do not; and finally v) the mechanism must be a mechanism for the 
pattern in question, its elements and their relation- explaining the production of the elements 
alone without accounting for their integration is insufficient.  
Although our focus will be on Dawkins’ and Wilson’s evolutionary patterns out of the many 
available they are in fact representative of two quite different ways of conceiving of 
progress in evolution. At one extreme we have the traits and abilities of individual 
organisms; how they compare with each other, how they enhance fitness, how well they 
perform their biological functions; we can see our limited defence of normative language to 
describe performances in biological function (in Chapter 3) falls squarely within this 
‘parochial’ perspective. At the other extreme we have evolutionary phenomena at the largest 
and grandest of scales; is there some way that life taken as a whole has ‘progressed’ since its 
inception? Are organisms taken from later epochs qualitatively different in some way to 
those that preceded them ? Clearly there is no theoretical restriction which precludes 
holding both of these views simultaneously and indeed Dawkins in places appears to do so 
(Dawkins 1996a & 2003, Ruse 2006), although we will concentrate on his ideas concerning 
smaller-scale patterns for the remainder of this chapter.         
We will start with Dawkins, for whom natural selection’s ‘progressive’ capacities are a 
theoretical necessity- a general claim quite separable from any particular evolutionary 
pattern that its actions might produce. As long as we accept that there are traits which 
require multiple generational stages for their gradual construction, and as long as we hold 
the retained selective benefits of random variation at each stage to be responsible, we must 
also accept that any ‘multi-stage’ trait - by virtue of its existence alone - acts as evidence for 
evolution’s ‘progressive’ capacities. Following on from our observations in chapters 2 and 
3, Dawkins’ perspective here may strike us as somewhat familiar. In chapter 2 our defence 
of natural selection’s creative abilities was based upon its ability to vastly increase the 
probability of traits requiring multiple and collectively-unlikely combinations coming about, 
whereas Dawkins’ emphasis is on the requirement of such a mechanism for the incremental 
evolution of complex traits. The traits which we considered to be examples of extended 
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progressive evolution in chapter 3 and the traits which Dawkins considers to examples of 
‘progressive’ evolution would seem - impressionistically at least - to coincide also:       
“the evolution of echolocation in bats and river dolphins.... the evolution of electrolocation 
in fish... skull dislocation in snakes for swallowing large prey... the evolution of the complex 
adaptations that equips cheetahs to kill, and the corresponding complex that equips gazelles 
to escape” (Dawkins 1996a, p1018) 
One in particular- the evolution of the mammalian eye- which Dawkins addresses in both 
(1996a) and at length in a separate work (Dawkins 1997) will also be one of our central 
concerns in Chapter 5. If Dawkins has commented explicitly on the SE conception of 
biological function he has done so discretely, although we might imagine someone with his 
established record of adaptationism would very likely give it sympathetic hearing. Notice 
the emphasis on the functions of the adaptive structures in the passage above: 
‘echolocation’; ‘electrolocation’; ‘swallowing’; ‘equips... to kill’; ‘equips... to escape’. It is 
not cumulative selection per se which Dawkins considers progressive, but in common with 
our findings in chapter 3, it would seem to be cumulative adaptation producing functional 
improvements. There is evidently much overlap between our views and Dawkins’ in this 
area.  
But notice that in addition to Dawkins’ theoretical claim - which we might agree with - there 
is also an empirical one which is more controversial. Dawkins commits his brand of 
progressive evolution being present in the majority of evolutionary lineages; essentially a 
restatement of  ‘empirical adaptationism’ (Godfrey-Smith 2001) which considers natural 
selection to have been by far the most significant influence for the majority of evolutionary 
phenomena - and for which Dawkins’ enthusiasm is renowned. The long running debate 
concerning adaptationism in all of its varieties remains contentious (Gould & Lewontin 
1979, Dawkins 1983, Orzack & Sober 1994, Dennett 1995b, Godfrey-Smith 1999 & 2001, 
Sandsom 2003, Lewens 2009), and we offer no stance on this here. We did suggest however 
in chapter 3 that a considerable amount of natural selection will be due to improvements in 
functional performance, rather than idiosyncratic or novel effects - a claim concerning how 
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much of natural selection is progressive in comparison to non-progressive natural selection; 
this is in clear contrast to Dawkins’ claim which concerns how many evolutionary lineages 
feature progressive natural selection in comparison to lineages which do not. We are 
committed to most natural selection being progressive, Dawkins would seem to be 
committed to most evolution being progressive - a much stronger and wider claim, and one 
that we may be somewhat reluctant to support. Let us however interpret Dawkins’ stance 
here more generously, and suggest that many - if not all -  evolutionary lineages show the 
type of ‘adaptive progress’ that he describes. How do the patterns of these organisms’ 
gradual adaptation to the demands of their environments fare in the light of our five-part 
heuristic? 
We can be confident that this progressively-adaptive ‘fit’ of organisms is not accidental; we 
have a clear and well-understood mechanism - natural selection - to account for this 
phenomenon. The echolocation of bats and dolphins for example are traits which have 
expressly evolved via the mechanism of natural selection in response to the nature of the 
environments in which the ancestors of these creatures inhabited. But is the mechanism 
responsible for these phenomena reliable in the sense that given very similar initial 
conditions, the same selection pressures, the same probabilities for the arrival of the 
required variation etc, we could expect it to achieve similar results? Although the debate 
surrounding the contingency of evolutionary phenomena continues (Gould 1990, Beatty 
1995 & 2006, Losos et al. 1998, Conway-Morris 2003, 2006, 2008 (eds.) & 2010, Vermeij 
2006, Arendt & Reznick 2008, Powell 2012, Blount 2016, Blount, Lenski & Losos 2018) it 
is clear that natural selection is not merely potentially repeatable, but has actually been 
repeated many times over evolutionary history. Even if we consider these convergences to 
be of less evolutionary importance than some authors suggest, it is clear that the mechanism 
of natural selection does not operate on a random, chaotic basis. Selection may be 
probabilistic, but it is not arbitrary, and when we see natural selection promoting one 
characteristic at the expense of another, empirical investigation can often find out why 
(Reznick 1985, Endler 1986, Barros 2008, Sober 2008). If natural selection did not operate 
in a structured and reliable manner investigations like this would not be possible.     
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The mechanism responsible for Dawkins’ patterns provides us with a mechanistic 
explanation, and this conforms neatly with the third heuristic by ‘screening-off’ of the lower 
level events underlying the surface phenomena also. If we wanted to understand the 
progressive adaptation of certain snakes’ capacity to unhinge their jaws for example, we do 
not need to know the precise ancestral population dynamics which gave the earlier versions 
of this trait a selective advantage, nor do we need to know the exact genetic mutations 
underpinning the traits’ variation or how they interacted with the organisms’ developmental 
systems. Our knowledge of the mechanism allows us to ignore these details and concentrate 
instead on the phenomena that they are responsible for producing.  
The mechanism of natural selection also acts to regulate the suitability of elements in the 
patterns that Dawkins describes. Suppose we wished to verify ancestor-descendant samples 
in an aquatic evolutionary lineage charting its members’ progressive development of 
electrolocation. Knowing that the mechanism responsible for the trait operates through the 
retention of selectively-beneficial and gradual variation, we would not only very likely be 
able to discern with a high level of accuracy if any given sample belonged the sequence, we 
would also likely be able to arrange the samples which did belong in their correct temporal 
and evolutionary order, so the desideratum that an authentic pattern should have a 
mechanism which accounts for pattern itself - both its elements and their relations- would 
also seem to be sufficiently satisfied. In fact the relationship between the cheetah and the 
gazelle arm’s race in Dawkins’ final example reflects the isometry of the South American 
and African coastlines in some respects. Clearly there are differences, we would have to 
stretch very far back into evolutionary history to find a common-ancestor which then ‘split’ 
to form the cheetah and gazelle lineages, and unlike the coastlines on either side of the 
Atlantic the ‘fit’ of each lineages’ predator and prey adaptations was continually shaped by 
forces occurring long after their original ‘splitting event’ occurred. However, in both cases 
we account for the complementariness of the patterns’ elements through their synchronised 
production by a common underlying mechanism, and in both cases each side heavily 
influences the shape of the other in accordance with the mechanism’s own dynamics.  
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We might suspect that arms-races’ enduring appeal for Dawkins (Dawkins & Krebs 1979, 
Dawkins 1986, 1996a, 1996b & 2004) may be again due in part to his adaptationism. The 
importance of inert and potentially capricious environmental variables in an account of 
adaptation by natural selection are much reduced if the animate and, importantly, co-
evolving environmental variables of a population’s prey or predator species are given 
preferential focus; an observation that might be only of marginal interest if arms-races did 
not also provide Dawkins with a means of characterising adaptation as improvement. This 
again will strike us as familiar: in chapter 3 we saw the Selected Effects approach was able 
to provide an objective basis for comparing earlier and later traits’ functional performances, 
here arms- races perform a distinct although similar justificatory task. In the paradigm arms-
races that Dawkins refers to (Dawkins 1986) later prey are able to avoid or defend against 
earlier predators more effectively than their ancestors, as being able to do this was the 
primary means through which their relative fitness was raised. Equally, later predators 
become more effective at catching and killing their prey as this was the primary means 
through which their relative fitness was improved. Here we see improvement not by 
comparing directly the performances of descendant organisms with those of their ancestors- 
as in chapter 3, but by comparing descendent organism’s performances with the 
performances of their ancestors’ predators or prey. The directional adaptation of each 
warring lineage as their arms-race escalates should - ceteris paribus - promote this. As far as 
one species comprises an environmental variable for another, Dawkins reasoning here is 
sound, although how prevalent and important an influence the arms-race dynamic has been 
in evolutionary history is debatable (Parker 1983, Thomson 1986, Brodie III & Brodie Jnr. 
1999). We might certainly venture that they would not be characteristic of the ‘majority of 
evolutionary lineages’ and can be confident that they will be more exceptional than the 
functional improvements which we surveyed in chapter 3. Indeed, arms-races - where a 
species’ functional improvements are matched by another species’ which in part comprise 
the former’s environment- are a special case of this.     
Dawkins’ particular brand of adaptationist progressiveness then is grounded in patterns 
which, according to our heuristic, appear authentic. Their generation is not accidental, the 
mechanism which produces them is sufficiently reliable, a description of the mechanism’s 
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operation ‘screens-off’ sub-mechanism processes and events, the mechanism can regulate 
which phenomena belong to any particular pattern and which do not, and the mechanism is 
able to provide a comprehensive explanation for the patterns it produces- both their 
elements and their respective relations. Additionally, Dawkins also provides a means 
through which cumulative adaptation may make ‘progress’ as well as being ‘progressive’. 
The particular evolutionary dynamics of arms-races, albeit heavily idealised, suggest that 
descendant organisms will be better-equipped to catch their ancestral prey or avoid their 
ancestral predators.   
We now turn to progresses’ second defendant: E.O.Wilson. Despite recent antipathy 
(Dawkins 2012, D.S.Wilson 2012, Johnston 2014) Wilson and Dawkins share an enduring 
belief that progress in evolution is real, and both contend that it is not merely contingent or 
incidental but a core characteristic of how evolution on earth has unfolded. Wilson’s views 
differ from Dawkins’ on a number of fronts. Firstly, the patterns that Wilson suggests 
demonstrate evolutionary progress are firmly manifest at the largest and grandest of scales 
and are a “property of the evolution of life as a whole” rather than a phenomenon relatively 
localised to natural selection operating within lineages; secondly, Wilson does not provide 
us with any obvious mechanism to account for his expansive list of ‘progressive’ biological 
phenomena; although thirdly, does provide guidance as to the effects that progressive 
evolution has had on the features that he lists as examples: body size, brain and behavioural 
complexity, precision of environmental control: ‘.... the overall averages of these traits and 
their extremes went up.....” (Wilson 1991, p175). 
Elsewhere (ibid p174) Wilson emphasises that his perspective on evolutionary progress is 
not just expansive in the taxonomical sense but expansive temporally, extending back into 
the distant past to the beginning of life itself. Perhaps surprisingly for a supporter of 
evolutionary gradualism (ibid p80) . Wilson also contends that this history of evolutionary 30
progress can be marked out by ‘four great steps’:  
 Indeed, Dawkins himself suggests that certain innovations including the eukaryotic cell may have been ‘watershed 30
events’ in the history of life (Dawkins 1996a, p1019) despite being an avowed gradualist. 
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1. Life’s inception 3.9-3.8 billion years ago 
2. The origin of eukaryotic organisms 
3. The Cambrian explosion 
4. The origin of the human mind.  
Readers familiar with the suggestion that the history of evolution can be partitioned in this 
way may be reminded of Maynard-Smith and Szathmary’s ‘Major Transitions in 
Evolution’ (Maynard-Smith & Szathmary 1995). Both patterns have much in common: they 
start from life’s inception, terminate with the advent of human social intelligence, place the 
advent of eukaryotic organisms somewhere in the middle, and organise the history of 
evolution into distinct stages characterised according to the latest ‘evolutionary 
innovation’.  Additionally, the events that Wilson contends mark-out the history of 31
progressive evolution also share the Major Transition’s increasingly-recognised difficulties 
with consistency (Calcott & Sterelny (eds.) 2011, Szathmary 2015, O’Malley & Powell 
2016), and to this we may add that both Maynard-Smith & Szathmary’s and Wilson’s 
patterns share difficulties with their authenticity.      
Consider Wilson’s series which charts the earliest and simplest forms of life to the origin of 
the human mind and the intermediate era-defining events. Clearly for life to evolve, life first 
has to start, so the origin of life is not strictly an event in evolutionary history whether we 
think the patterns that it subsequently gave rise to are authentic, progressive or otherwise. 
This observation may strike us as somewhat pedantic, but notice that by starting from this 
earliest of ‘life history’ events Wilson thereby includes an accidental occurrence as one of 
his larger pattern’s elements, something which Dawkins through his focus on the traits of 
already-existent organisms avoids. Shouldn’t patterns of evolutionary events at minimum 
commence with those brought about by evolutionary processes? There is no easy answer to 
this. For natural selection to happen there has to already be a population of variants whose 
reproductive success is influenced by their variation, and whose offspring are more similar 
 In fairness, Maynard-Smith in the paper-length precursor to the Major Transitions (Maynard-Smith 1988) explicitly 31
distances himself from idea that the stages described amount to progress of any kind, a statement which is later 
reiterated in his co-authored book-length account. There is little no doubt however that both versions of the Transitions 
consider the evolutionary patterns they describe as authentic.  
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to themselves than to the population average -  a significantly complex arrangement in 
itself, and one whose origins we are justifiably curious about. Many ‘histories of evolution’ 
like Wilson’s start with the beginnings of life rather than the beginnings of evolution so if 
this approach is a mistake it is not Wilson’s alone, but notice that if Wilson had started from 
the earliest evolution this would not only make his first stage more thematically consistent 
with his later events, it would also greatly reduce its accidental nature. As we recognised in 
chapter 2 and reiterated earlier in this chapter, evolution by natural selection may not be 
determinate but it is not accidental.   
Even granting that this correction is one that Wilson would tolerate - or is one that we are 
paying undue attention to - the second stage: ‘the origin of eukaryotic organisms’ suffers 
from a similar difficulty. Despite its undoubted  significance, the belief that the 
endosymbiotic event which created the first eukaryote represents a paradigm evolutionary 
accident is almost unanimously-held in evolutionary biology (Gould 1990, Gray et al. 1999, 
Embley & Martin 2006, Koonin 2010, O’Malley 2010, Archibald 2015). If orthodoxy is 
correct and this was a ‘freak’ event, it is difficult to see how it could be incorporated into 
anything resembling a wider authentic pattern which would require other elements which 
resemble it. Now perhaps this is unfair for couple of reasons. As mutation and - to a lesser 
extent - recombination are the ultimate source of biological novelty, surely any evolutionary 
innovation will be accidental when it first occurs. Isn’t it what these events lead to, rather 
than their origins what is important here, and what Wilson is drawing our attention to? This 
defence is, I think, only partly successful. A relevant exception is the novelty created when 
unrelated lineages combine to the extent that we consider their joint product to be a single 
entity. This is not the case in parasitism or almost all symbiosis - where the meeting of 
separate lineages involved may result in highly co-dependent but sufficiently distinct 
organisms - but has occurred in the history of evolution at least twice: in the events which 
created chloroplast organelles and the events which created eukaryotic cells. In neither of 
these cases was the resulting novelty caused by mutation or recombination, but by the 
coming together of very different organisms to make an entity quite distinct from either. So 
while it is true that eukaryotes (and chloroplasts) in common with all (non-synthetic) 
biological novelty are the results of accidents per se, their specific, idiosyncratic nature 
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might perhaps give us pause that they should not be incorporated as elements in a larger 
pattern without first taking this into account.  
But suppose we are unconvinced by this line of argument and believe that the causes of 
certain events don’t matter so much as their later consequences? Perhaps the accidental non-
biological nature of the origin of life and the accidental and somewhat esoteric nature of the 
first eukaryotic cell can can be overlooked in the light of the evolutionary developments that 
these events made possible? This may appear to be a viable approach concerning the origin 
of life which made all subsequent evolutionary events possible, and to a lesser extent for the 
advent of the eukaryotic cell which appears to be a necessary precursor to the sort of 
evolutionary phenomena which Wilson considers progressive: ‘...feeding and defensive 
techniques, brain and behavioural complexity, social organisation’ (Wilson 2001, p175). 
This ability to provide a platform for further evolutionary development is also characteristic 
of Wilson’s third stage- the Cambrian explosion, so we might be forgiven for thinking this 
might provide a unifying theme although in contrast to the origin of life and the advent of 
the eukaryotic cell there is significant doubt that the Cambrian explosion actually happened- 
at least as traditionally conceived (Runnegar 1982, Wray et al. 1996, Conway-Morris 2000, 
Fortey 2001, Butterfield 2003, Briggs & Fortey 2005, Priest 2017). If the understanding that 
something quite notable and enduring occurred to biological diversity at this time is 
approximately correct however, then including this stage alongside the origin of life and the 
arrival of the eukaryotic cell might seem to have some justification. But notice that this 
quality of promoting further evolutionary diversification is noticeably absent from the final 
stage- the origin of the human mind. It seems far from obvious that the arrival of human 
intelligence has provided a platform for further evolutionary developments (artificial 
biology notwithstanding). The arrival of Homo sapiens has diversified human beings, both 
genetically and geographically but, if anything, has reduced nett evolutionary possibility by 
its contribution to the extinction of congeneric species (Banks et al. 2008, Callaway 2016, 
Varki 2016) and more recently to biodiversity more generally (Carpenter & Bishop 2009, 
Yule et al. 2013).  
132
So far Wilson’s pattern of evolutionary progress does not hold up to scrutiny. The causes of 
the pattern’s elements are in part accidental, the reasons for including each of these stages as 
elements is unclear, and the esoteric nature of eukaryotic cell in particular certainly goes 
against the grain of our contention that the generation of a pattern should be reliable, and we 
seem to be very far from being able to provide the required mechanism for the pattern. 
Notice also the idiosyncratic nature of the origin of life and the advent of eukaryotic 
organisms not only makes them accidental, it additionally prevents us from screening-off the 
minutiae of their specific occurrences. Any satisfactory explanation for these elements 
would be forced to deal with the specifics of pre-biotic chemistry and cell biology 
respectively because it is at these levels of analysis that the events occurred, they only 
become evolutionary important by their subsequent effects and even this loose description 
does not apply to the final stage of human intelligence the effects of which are highly 
questionable.  
But perhaps most damagingly, the pattern described by Wilson does not provide any 
regulatory role. Biodiversity is clearly important to Wilson, which has been: ‘...pulled along 
by evolutionary progress, measured in four great steps’ (ibid p174), but it seems cannot be 
equated with progress directly as: ‘Biological diversity embraces a vast number of 
conditions that range from the simple to the complex, with the simple appearing first in 
evolution and the more complex later’ (ibid p175), while: ‘an undeniable trend of 
progressive evolution has been the growth of biodiversity by increasing command of the 
earth’s environment’ (idid p175, italics added). So if progress is not made by expanding the 
arena of evolutionary possibility, maybe actual biodiversity has a lot to do with it. But as we 
are not given any consistent rationale why those four elements in particular were included 
we lack the reasons for the exclusion of additional elements which Wilson misses out and 
would- at least intuitively- seem to augment Wilson’s perspective of natural history quite 
well. Consider the following seconded from Maynard-Smith & Szathmary’s Major 
Transitions (1995 p6): ‘Asexual clones to Sexual populations’. If evolutionary progress is a 
cause of (‘pulling biodiversity along’), a consequence of (‘a property of the evolution of 
life’) or simply is biodiversity then this particular evolutionary stage has equal if not 
arguably more qualification for inclusion in Wilson’s four great steps than those originally 
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chosen; consistency would seem to demand its inclusion. The advent of sexual reproduction 
not only brought with it a doubling of local diversity within those species which additionally 
developed ‘specialised’ female and male variants, the consequences of meiosis and genetic 
recombination near-guarantee that each individual organism within the species will be 
genetically unique, even from close relatives. More importantly, the reproductive barriers 
thrown up by genetic diversification in formerly-compatible sexual populations are a well-
established and effective means of entrenching incipient speciation, and by extension 
promoting the global biodiversity apparently unpinning Wilson’s entire project. If 
biodiversity has relevance to the evolution’s ‘great steps’ sexual reproduction’s exclusion 
here is genuinely puzzling. 
So even a liberal interpretation which viewed the progressive steps of evolution as having 
some relation to increasing biodiversity and/or further evolutionary development would 
appear to require substantial revision. Wilson’s first three stages fit either of these 
characterisations reasonably well, but the fourth - the advent of the human mind- has likely 
decreased biodiversity, and offers no clear suggestion as to how its arrival has opened up 
new evolutionary possibilities. Additionally, if either of these characterisations are 
approximately representative of what Wilson believes evolutionary progress consists in, 
then the pattern of progress as charted by his four steps is incomplete, there are good 
reasons to think that sexual reproduction should be included as a subsidiary step and every 
possibly that other events (cell differentiation? the establishment of eusocial colonies?) 
should be included too.  
We started this chapter by observing the general characteristics of natural patterns, and drew 
a line between patterns which were authentic and patterns which were quasi. As 
demonstrated by the sizes of the Sun and the Moon, how compellingly a pattern may strike 
us is no guarantee of the pattern’s authenticity; as demonstrated by the near-isometry 
between the Atlantic coastlines, the discovery of a mechanism for the pattern may prove 
definitive in favour of its authenticity. Authentic patterns should be: non-accidental, reliable, 
screen-off lower level events, regulate the appropriate included elements, and finally 
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account for the relations holding between the pattern’s elements. Dawkins’ pattern satisfies 
these criteria, whereas Wilson’s pattern does not.   
4.5 Higher-order mechanisms: some desiderata 
It might be tempting to think that the reasons for Wilson’s pattern lacking authenticity 
belonged to Wilson alone, and that the stages he believes are characteristic of evolution in 
the long term are either wrong, incomplete, or were never designed with the above 
philosophical scrutiny in mind. There is a strong case to be made for each of these, but in as 
much as Wilson’s stages are generally representative of evolutionary patterns at the largest 
of taxonomic and temporal scales, his difficulties are also theirs. Consider what it would 
mean for a pattern in the history of life to be considered authentic. Firstly, the generation of 
each of the pattern’s elements should be non-accidental by virtue of production through an 
underlying mechanism. This was not a problem for Dawkins as this desideratum was 
covered by natural selection, but at scales above intra- and perhaps inter- species selection 
the effects of natural selection are questionable if not outright denied (Lewontin 1970, 
Jablonski 1986, Gould 2002, Simpson 2010, Okasha 2012a, Hoehn et al. 2016). If natural 
selection cannot be relied upon as the mechanism to explain regularities at these higher 
taxonomic scales we require an alternative one that can, and these are in short supply.  
It has long been thought for example that life’s ‘complexity’ has increased over evolutionary 
time, both in the sense of increasing ‘disparity’ of differentiated anatomy in individual 
organisms and in the ‘diversification’ of species and higher taxa more broadly (Lamarck 
1809, Spencer 1891, Gould 1998, Adami et al. 2000, McShea & Brandon 2010). What 
mechanism do we think could account for this? The answer is often presented through a 
combination of the following principles: the first life was by necessity simple, there is ‘left-
wall’ of simplicity below which life processes  will not function making ‘increased 
complexity’ the only option, and that any group of homogenous entities will tend to differ 
over time as minute differences in their interactions mount up. It is admittedly difficult to 
see how these principles might not have had some influence on the patterns of increasing 
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biological complexity- in so far as these patterns actually are realised empirically- and so to 
some extent provide the required mechanism. But there is an issue here which should 
temper our enthusiasm: the ‘mechanism’ is only incidentally biological. Assuming a lower 
limit on difference we could just as easily apply these principles of change to any entities 
upon which differences accumulate, these could be billiard balls, twins, or pebbles on a 
beach arranged according to Dennett’s real pattern (Dennett 1991) - indeed one of Gould’s 
well-known criticisms that this evolutionary trend could be revelatory in anyway likened the 
effects of a ‘fixed floor’ coupled with a change in variance like this to the scoring of 
professional baseball and the meandering of a drunkard’s walk (Gould 1998). The 
distinction is a subtle one: by virtue of the ‘complexifying mechanism’, there could be 
grounds to claim that there are authentic patterns in evolutionary history- the elements are 
biologically instantiated after all- but this falls short of the stronger claim that these are 
authentic patterns of evolutionary history, when the mechanism’s non-evolutionary effects 
can be witnessed elsewhere. For this stronger claim we would need a distinctly evolutionary 
mechanism to produce the higher taxonomic phenomena in a similar way to which natural 
selection provides an explanatory mechanism for the ‘lower level’ adaptationist patterns 
suggested by Dawkins. Notice that this is not just an issue for Wilson’s increasing 
biodiversity or for the separate claims of increasing complexity, but will be a desideratum 
for any evolutionary pattern discerned in taxa from genera and above. Aside from the highly 
speculative suggestion that this ‘higher order’ mechanism could be natural selection itself a 
candidate has yet to appear. 
Suppose however that we are comfortable with an explicitly biological pattern’s authenticity 
relying on a mechanism that is only incidentally biological, and are persuaded that either the 
above ‘complexifying mechanism’ or something similar might be adequate to explain 
evolutionary patterns found at high taxonomic scales. The mechanism would have be 
reliable. The ‘complexifying mechanism’ for example seems to comfortably provide this; 
given cumulative variation and a ‘floor effect’ McShea & Brandon point out that we can 
quite reliably expect heterogeneity to increase- and, if anything, may need to find reasons 
for diversity and disparity not being higher than is currently observed (McShea & Brandon 
2010). The mechanism would also have to be regulatory, but given that the pattern is the 
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entire living world deciding which elements are fit for inclusion might be the easiest of the 
five desiderata to satisfy.    
But notice the mechanism would also need to ‘screen-off’ lower level effects, and while we 
cannot tell whether an as-yet-unidentified mechanism has the potential to do this, the 
‘complexifying mechanism’ runs into profound difficulties here. As this mechanism is not 
exclusively evolutionary or biological but physical we have no reason to stop an 
investigation into the mechanism’s operation at the evolutionary or biological patterns that 
the mechanism produces. Higher taxa will be diversifying due to the influence of this 
mechanism but not only higher taxa - so will species, organisms, and parts of organisms like 
cells and their organelles, as well as mutating genes down to the molecular level. This seems 
very unlike a mechanism to explain diversity at level of say genera or familiae, the way that 
natural selection explains the adaptation of populations or the improvement of biological 
functions and much more like the processes of coastal erosion, wearing down cliffs, stones, 
pebbles and sand. There is no preferential place in either of these compositional hierarchies 
at which these processes ‘act’, and so no principled means to decide at what level an 
analysis should be undertaken. Again, this may not bother us, but if it is ‘large scale’ 
evolutionary patterns that we are interested in, the ‘complexifying mechanism’ can tell us 
nothing more about them. The apparent rises in anatomical disparity and ecological 
diversity become just ‘one of those things’ much as a later coastline might be expected to be 
increasingly worn away given enough tide and time. At best the gradual creep of increasing 
heterogeneity might make for an important background condition which should be factored 
into the calculations of the effects of other mechanisms- as we might factor-in drift when 
calculating the strength of natural selection, or wind speed when flying a plane- but this is a 
long way from providing anything like a satisfactory explanation for the target phenomena. 
Lastly the mechanism would have to be a mechanism for both the pattern’s elements and 
their relation. For patterns found at higher taxonomic scales, how effectively a mechanism is 
able to account for this depends of course on what phenomena are grouped together to make 
an ‘element’ of the pattern. As there is no natural place where ‘screening-off’ can be carried 
out this may be done in a number of ways. We might for example find a pattern in the living 
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world at the level of genera, or we might see a pattern composed by connections holding 
between classes or familiae, in which case the pattern’s elements will be genera, classes and 
familiae respectively. But there is plenty of potential here for the elements of a pattern to be 
composed from phenomena which do not fit our established means of biological 
classification quite so neatly. Without the procedure of screening-off to provide the 
appropriate level, the identification of elements becomes something of a free for all. A 
pattern might present itself through the use of para-phyletic elements such as Reptilia or 
Pisces, or consist of elements comprised with little regard for established classification at 
all: perhaps ‘counter-shaded aquatic predators’ or ‘plants with multi-tipped leaves’. The 
mechanism responsible for the pattern’s generation should account for the relations which 
hold between such elements, and while again we cannot predict the effectiveness of a 
mechanism we do not know, the ‘complexifying mechanism’ fares poorly here. The 
‘instability of the homologous’ may account for increasing differentiation within a given 
element, but will not account for any differences in the rate, kind or extent of differentiation 
between the selected elements that together comprise a higher order pattern.  
Let us unpack this claim. The complexifying mechanism for example might explain the 
increasing disparity and diversity found in tropical regions, and we might take this grouping 
as the basis for an element in a wider pattern; the complexifying mechanism might also 
explain the increasing disparity and diversity found in the polar regions and use this as an 
element also. But what the complexifying mechanism cannot do- and what any mechanism 
that purports to explain large scale evolutionary patterns must do- is to explain how the 
elements of the large scale pattern relate to each other. In this specific example it would 
have to give reasons for why the disparity and diversity in one geographic region is different 
in kind, rate or extent from those in another. But as we saw clearly in our example of the 
Sun and the Moon’s similarity, it is often inadequate for two elements be a product of a 
given mechanism. Gravitational forces may account for their spherical shapes, just as the 
complexifying mechanism accounts for increasing differences at both geographical regions, 
but if the pattern is to be authentic the mechanism must also account for why one element is 
bigger, smaller, comparable, faster or slower etc than the others which make up the larger 
pattern. Gravity alone does not do this for the similarity of the Sun and the Moon, and the 
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complexifying mechanism does not do this for the variable rates of disparity and diversity in 
our different geographic regions.   
We should of course not preclude the possibility that a mechanism which can sufficiently 
account for large-scale evolutionary patterns could be found. The analysis undertaken in this 
section is not intended to be moratorium, but instead an indicator of the sort of properties 
that a putative evolutionary mechanism should possess in order to make the patterns it 
creates authentic. As we saw in Dawkins’ examples - and recognised in our own - natural 
selection does make some of evolutionary patterns at the population and species level 
authentic, if its dynamics can be reproduced above these higher taxonomic levels, perhaps 
any patterns that it produces there could be similarly authenticated. But whether the 
mechanism is natural selection, is partly natural selection, or is a mechanism entirely 
different to natural selection, our work in this chapter has clarified the qualities that it 
should possess, it should be: non-accidental, reliable, screen-off lower level events, regulate 
the appropriate included elements, and finally account for the relations holding between the 
pattern’s elements. Currently, there are no obvious candidates.  
4.6 Chapter recap and conclusions  
                      
In section 4.2 we looked at the general properties of patterns and identified the different 
types that our observations of nature present to us: ‘authentic-patterns’ and ‘quasi-patterns’. 
We observed the role that a mechanism plays in discriminating between these different types 
of pattern and recognised a five-part heuristic through which authentic or quasi patterns 
could be recognised. In 4.3 we addressed two real-world natural patterns to demonstrate the 
practical application of these heuristics: the close similarity of the Atlantic coastlines was 
authentic according to this heuristic, whereas the sizes of the Sun and the Moon were found 
to be quasi. In 4.4 we addressed the respective patterns suggested by Wilson and Dawkins to 
be present in the history of life. Here again the application of our heuristic proved 
discriminatory: we observed that Dawkins’ suggested pattern was authentic, while Wilson’s 
was not. Then in 4.5 we discussed the possible ramifications of finding what initially 
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appeared to be an authentic pattern in ‘large-scale’ evolution to actually be quasi-, and 
suggest the properties that a genuinely authentic pattern at taxonomic scales at genera and 
above would have to possess.   
As quasi-patterns can be as, if not more, compelling than authentic-patterns our impressions 
that a pattern is genuinely ‘out there’ and not a product of our natural inclination to find 
order and regularity in disparate phenomena may often mislead. While events in the natural 
world have causes, not all patterns in the natural world have explanations, and to ensure an 
investigation is not an attempt to join up the random dots of unrelated elements, the 
discovery of a mechanism for the perceived pattern will be of significant help. This will be 
the case whether the elements of the patterns are electronically generated numbers, 
geological structures, planetary/stellar phenomena or phenomena recognised through 
evolutionary or biological science. The patterns of gradual adaptation proposed by Dawkins 
to be present in the ‘majority’ of evolutionary lineages are perhaps not as endemic to 
evolution as Dawkins suggests, although the progressive type of natural selection we 
identified in chapter 3 proved sufficient explanation for the examples provided. We did not 
rule-out the discovery of a mechanism which could explain large-scale evolutionary patterns 
such as the one suggested by Wilson, but equally -   given the requirements brought to light 
our five part heuristic - we may be justified in being sceptical as to its discovery.  
In chapter 5 we draw on the previous chapters’ various findings in order to analyse further: 
the progressive evolution brought about by natural selection’s causality and creativity - as 
argued in chapter 2; incorporate into our analysis the improvements in biological function - 
as identified in chapter 3; and respect the criteria for natural patterns - identified earlier in 
this chapter - that sustained progressive evolution can produce. As we noted in our 
introductory chapter, perspectives regarding progressive evolution are often accompanied by 
anthropocentrism to their detriment. In chapter 5 we face this issue head on, and find that 
the link between these two positions is weaker than supposed; we may have one without the 
other, and the undoubted tendency to think of human beings as superior from an 
evolutionary perspective is not sufficient grounds for us to think it untrue. When then look 
at the evolution which occurs within lineages. All species which currently exist are the most 
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recent members of lineages of descent reaching back to the beginnings of life itself, 
although thinking of evolution in this way has similarly been treated with suspicion. Not all 
of this is unwarranted, our representation of evolution within lineages over both longer and 
shorter timescales can often mislead us as to the reality of the evolution depicted. Thus far 
our commitment to the SE conception of function has limited our scope of functional 
comparisons to traits belonging to organisms of the same species, but due to the sometimes 
radical changes which species undergo over longer spans of evolutionary time our basis for 
functional comparison needs further amendment. Progressive evolution within lineages over 
the longer term requires special handling, we observe the nature of this in the chapter ahead.        
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Chapter 5 
Progressive evolution within lineages: representation and 
reality      
5.1 Introduction.  
Although we saw in the previous chapter that the identification of an underlying mechanism 
provides sufficient warrant to take a pattern’s authenticity seriously, we have additional 
prima facie reasons to consider the regularities perceived in evolutionary lineages to be 
authentic. Evolutionary lineages are objective and not merely imposed on the phenomena by 
the prejudices of observers. Even when separated by vast spans of time and substantial 
differences in function, trait, or genotype, the properties of ancestral lineage members have 
direct casual and explanatory relevance for the properties of their descendants; inheritance 
through descent guarantees this. Resemblances between earlier and later members of an 
evolutionary lineage will not be accidental, but due to inherited similarities in genotype and 
developmental mechanism. By virtue of the objective nature of the relationships which hold 
between their component organisms, evolutionary lineages are also regulatory: it will be 
matter of fact for any given lineage whether an organism belongs to that lineage or does not, 
however difficult this might be to establish in fact. 
However as we also saw in chapter 4, having elements linked by an ancestor-descendant 
relationship is not by itself sufficient to establish a pattern’s authenticity. The evolution of 
the members of the warring lineages described by Dawkins produced authentic-patterns, but 
the four ‘great steps’ described by Wilson did not. Although we had good reasons to think 
that Wilson’s pattern was largely impressionistic, this was not because its stages could not 
be conceived as features belonging to a single evolutionary lineage; Wilson’s ‘stage 4’ - 
organisms possessing a mind- clearly did descend from some of those which evolved 
through the Cambrian explosion (‘stage 3’), these were all descendants of the first 
eukaryotic organisms (‘stage 2’), and all organisms are descended from the those present at 
life’s inception (‘stage 1’).  
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The unique natures of evolutionary lineages means they require special handling, and the 
awareness that despite the genuine relationships which hold between the organisms and 
species belonging to a single evolutionary lineage, our ways of presenting and interpreting 
the events which occur over a lineage’s evolution can mislead. As we observed in chapter 3, 
progress in evolution is both real and widespread: selection advantage and functional 
improvement often coincide and traits get better at performing their functions as a result. 
With this conception of evolutionary progress secure, this chapter will be concerned with 
procedure; specifically the procedures used to convey the nature of evolution within 
lineages and how they can both accurately and mis- represent the progressive nature of the 
evolution they describe. 
Our first lineage-specific procedure is delineation: the process of identifying out of the 
many splits and diversifications that occur to an ancestral population, the narrow path that 
leads back and links the later descendant population with that of its evolutionary 
predecessors. As we ‘pick out’ a part of the natural world when we do this the procedure 
should be uncontroversial, however as the delineation of a direct ancestral line is often 
preparatory for considering the identified line as somehow more important or ‘central’ than 
those which ‘deviate’ from it, delineation is often regarded with suspicion. But the 
identification of an evolutionary lineage and the privileging of an evolutionary lineage are 
separate procedures and we should not confuse them. We can recognise the line of descent 
stretching back from contemporary humans to their ancient ancestors in the distant past, but 
this is very different from thinking of that lineage in particular as more important, ‘central’, 
or ‘progressive’ over and above the vast number of alternatives available. All extant 
organisms posses lineages equally as ancient as ours, and many will feature characteristics 
which are just as unique and - arguably - just as unlikely and complex. Our appraisal of 
Wilson’s four steps showed that if there are reasons for thinking that our lineage does have 
specific properties which justify its separation from those which comprise the remainder of 
terrestrial life Wilson does not adequately provide them.  
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Our second lineage-specific procedure is demarcation: once a lineage has been identified, 
there must be good reasons to divide that lineage up - to segment it - into the particular 
sections and stages chosen. Wilson’s chosen lineage bookended by the ‘human mind’ and 
the ‘advent of life’ was segmented twice producing three distinct sections. As we saw, 
Wilson appeared to lack a consistent rationale for dividing the lineage up in this particular 
way: employing the first eukaryotic organisms for this purpose was dubious, while omitting 
the advent of sexual reproduction appeared remiss.  
The criteria of delineation and demarcation are recognisably distinct, and an appreciation of 
both is critical for a balanced appraisal of the evolution of lineages and the organisms and 
species which comprise them. If we do prioritise certain lineages over others good reasons 
must be provided, and if we do segment a particular lineage in a certain way, we must also 
have good reason for thinking it preferable to the many other ways in which a lineage can 
be segregated and ‘indexed’. But while the motivations behind the delineation of certain 
lineages has received considerable philosophical attention, those behind demarcation are 
frequently overlooked. Wilson and nearly all accounts of evolutionary progress approach the 
problem by attempting to justify the specific promotion of the human lineage from other 
evolutionary lineages - for finding reasons to think that human beings are special in some 
way - but even rare approaches which recognise ‘evolutionary advance’ less 
anthropocentrically can mislead when the reasons for their specific demarcation are not 
given due care and attention. Our aim in this chapter will be to consider progress in 
evolution over a longer-term perspective by looking at the delineation and demarcation of 
lineages in turn.  
This chapter will proceed as follows: In 5.2 we will identify the delineation of evolutionary 
lineages as a valid operation: lineages are objective parts of the natural world, and treating 
them as such should not generate the controversy that it often does. We do however need to 
provide good reasons to prioritise certain lineages over others, and have cause to be 
particularly weary when the lineage in question is that of humans beings- although this is 
not sufficient reason not to prioritise the human lineage if alternative justification can be 
given. In 5.3 we will discuss the second procedure: demarcation. As lineages can be 
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produced out of countless individuals and many species, the objective nature of the ‘stages’ 
through which a lineage evolves will be less straightforward. Lineages can be demarcated in 
many different ways and often the reasons for dividing a lineage will be so as to characterise 
the lineage’s evolution as a ‘progressive’ process; changing the characteristics of the 
organisms and species earlier in the lineage so that they resemble the characteristics of the 
organisms and species at the lineage’s close. In 5.4 we will use the findings of the Long 
Term Evolutionary Experiment (LTEE) to demonstrate that although evolution is not 
forward-looking, this procedure of demarcation often is. When the demarcation of a lineage 
is done so as to explain the incremental evolution of the lineage’s later stages, the 
appearance of progressive evolution ‘towards’ the lineage’s later stages will be the result. 
However, as we will appreciate through the work of Nilsson and Pelger in 5.5 reality and 
representation can coincide; a lineage can look progressive for the reasons stated in section 
5.3, but actually be progressive for different reasons as stated in chapter 3; later stages of the 
lineage may be functionally superior to those which proceed them. In 5.6 we will head-off a 
potential problem with this chapter’s findings: our equating of evolutionary progress with 
functional improvement, as this reliance on the SE conception of function might appear to 
expose a significant weakness in our approach: it would seem to prevent the comparisons of 
the functional performances of distantly-related species, and so severely limit what counts 
as evolutionary progress as a result. In response we will observe that although the SE 
conception is sufficient to tell us what the function of a trait is, it does not define what the 
abilities which are functional are- it is possible to identify these abilities in widely-different 
species independently of the SE approach. 5.7 Recaps this chapter’s findings and concludes.  
5.2 Delineation and anthropocentrism  
Over the course of evolution what began as simple and relatively uniform living forms have 
greatly multiplied in number and diversified in form. The reproduction of even the simplest 
of organisms is far from perfect and over multiple generations these differences accumulate; 
a process which is compounded in sexual species by reproductive isolation when differences 
in genotype cement speciation. Due to the successive splitting of species from a small group 
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of common ancestors, nett bio-diversity has increased over evolutionary time; although of 
course many lineages have ended and continue to end in extinction. The traditional 
representation for this spread of diversity is the ‘tree of life’; with life’s ancient ancestors 
nestling at the base of trunk with phyla, classes, orders and other taxa symbolised as boughs 
and branches, ending in the twigs and tips of contemporary species. Although widely used, 
this metaphor has fallen out of favour as those ever-alert to signs of latent progressionism in 
evolutionary thinking (O’Hara 1992, Gould 1996c, Ruse 2009) object that the positioning of 
earlier taxa at the base of the tree suggest that later taxa are ‘higher’ or superior in someway 
to those below. The placing humankind at the top of the tree- its inevitable location - being a 
particularly egregious example.  
Our purpose in this section will not be to defend the ‘tree of life’ representation. The 
concerns voiced by Gould et al. are not the tree’s only weaknesses  and in the light of the 32
availability of alternative and non-hierarchical representations  we all might agree that the 33
usefulness of the metaphor is recognisably limited. For those lineages featuring organisms 
whose genomes are too enclosed for horizontal transfer, once a lineage splits, it splits for 
good and the tree metaphor can work reasonably well in these circumstances. But 
conceiving of evolution as a series of bifurcations and diversification like this can mislead 
in other ways; it is often contrasted with a linear interpretation, as though the idea of species 
occupying the tips of the tree having a direct ancestral line leading back down to the 
branches and limbs into their ancient evolutionary past were somehow problematic.                    
This claim may seem surprising, perhaps even alarmist, but it is an impression that can be 
hard to avoid. Cognitive scientists Novick, Shade & Catley (2010, p3) for example state 
that: “people’s understanding of evolution as a process [which].... specifies that one species 
undergoes changes that lead it to turn into another species” is a “persistent misconception”; 
evolutionary biologist J.D. Archibald (2014, p19), praising Gould’s well-known criticisms 
 Those concerned with an accurate depiction of phylogeny at the smallest of scales for example object that the 32
horizontal transfer of genetic information by the ‘bacterial sections’ of the tree makes the notion of ‘branches’ 
incoherent (McInerney et al. 2008, Puigbo 2009, O’Malley, Martin & Dupré 2010);
 Circular representations of the phylogenetic diversification from a last common ancestor have becomes increasingly 33
prevalent. Here later species are depicted a radiating out from a central point, rather than evolving ‘upwards’.  
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/09/first-comprehensive-tree-life-shows-how-related-you-are-millions-species
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of linear ape-to-human illustrations of evolution, comments that “...this type of 
representation fuels profound misunderstandings” and Gould himself regarded the depiction 
of evolution as a linear process with consistent hostility: “ladders are false abstractions, 
made by running a steamroller over a labyrinthine pathway that hops from branch to branch 
through a phylogenetic bush” (Gould 2002b p97); and that “Each tip can be connected to a 
last common ancestor by a labyrinthine route, but no paths are straight and all lead back by 
sidestepping from one event of branching speciation to another, and not decent down a 
ladder of continuous change” (Gould 1996, p67).  
Yet evolutionary lineages are of course quite real, and a recognition of their reality does not 
require a commitment to the view that species ever evolve in ‘ladders’ without successive 
splitting- although debate on the coherency of this view continues (Futuyma 1987, Hallam 
1997 & 2009, Turelli et al. 2001, Emerson & Patino 2018)- only that the lineages of more 
recent species are traceable back through an unbroken line of inheritance charting their 
descent through successively more ancestral populations . Much as the ‘tree of life’ 34
representation of evolutionary history may mislead us into an implicit acceptance of Homo 
sapiens’ ‘higher’ status, Gould’s legacy of concern here appears to be that conceiving of 
evolution as producing linear series may similarly mislead us into thinking of evolution as a 
directional force - progressively driving species to ever-greater perfection. In what has 
remained one of the clearest and best-known attacks on the position that biological 
evolution could be characterised as a ‘progressive’ ladder of improvement like this, Gould 
declared progress to be: 
“....a noxious, untestable, non-operational, intractable idea that must be replaced if we wish 
to understand the patterns of history” (Gould, 1988b. p319) 
 The term ‘lineage’ will be employed in this dissertation in an general sense and refer to any ancestor-descendant 34
relationship between biological entities at the same ‘hierarchical’ level. Lineages may be comprised from ancestor-
descendant sequences of species, populations, organisms or traits; the work ahead will utilise all of these. Typically 
lineages of genes would also be included into such an expansive account but will be omitted here as our discussion 
centres on the nature of changes occurring to the members of a lineage, rather than their endurance. Unlike the members 
of the lineages of species, populations, organisms or traits, gene lineages by convention are comprised from members 
that have not changed. 
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And we are left in little doubt as to what Gould’s somewhat reactionary approach is a 
reaction to; the psychological target motivating this attack follows shortly after:     
“Our geological confinement to a moment at the very end of recorded time must engender 
suspicions that we are lucky accident, an afterthought rather than the goal of all creation. 
Progress is the doctrine that dispels this chilling thought- for if life moves inexorably 
forward, however fitfully, towards the ultimate embodiment in human consciousness, then 
the restriction of homo sapiens to a final moment poses no challenge to the general hope; for 
all that came before may now be interpreted as part of a process scheduled to yield our form 
from the start.” (Gould 1988b p319). 
When we consider the ‘great steps’ of Wilson - culminating in the ‘origin of the human 
mind’ (Wilson 2001); the stages of Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry’s ‘Major Transitions In 
Evolution’ - culminating in ‘human language and society’ (Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 
1995); and J.Huxley’s claim that progress in evolution consists in ‘greater control of and 
independence from the environment’ - and which human beings have achieved to the 
greatest extent - (J.Huxley 1942); it is difficult to deny that Gould may have a point, and 
that when evolutionary biologists do stray into more-philosophical waters, the 
exceptionalism provided to human beings and characteristically-human traits may not be 
entirely unbiased. 
As our findings in chapter 4 demonstrated, our dispositions as human observers can easily 
mislead, and from this perspective Gould’s position and ours have much in common. For us, 
the psychological bias for pattern recognition may lead us to erroneously think of entirely 
phenomenal patterns as authentic, for Gould a kind of species-wide disposition to 
‘existential angst’ biases our appraisal of evolution to regard Homo sapiens as special in 
someway whereas in fact we are no more and no less a product of capricious evolutionary 
forces than any other species. In both cases human biases threaten to distort an accurate 
understanding of empirical reality. As we saw in chapter 3 however an evaluative approach 
to the products of evolution should not be ruled out preemptively. The traits of some 
organisms perform their functions better than the traits of some of their conspecifics; 
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adhering to the ‘selected effects’ conception of biological function requires an implicit 
acceptance of this. But notice that holding that certain traits are functionally superior to 
other traits of the same type is a very long way from holding that certain species are 
superior to other species, as per Gould’s criticism. As the SE conception identifies the 
functions of traits with their selectively-beneficial historical effects it would actually seem 
to make cross-species comparisons like this highly problematic; given that different species- 
and therefore the functions of the traits of different species- will have distinct selection 
histories. If we were to carry out cross-species comparisons in the manner that Gould is 
objecting to, it seems we would need to provide alternative, or at least supplementary 
means, for their justification as the selected effects approach will not achieve this unaided. 
We tackle this problem in 5.6.    
Contra-Gould however, there are two further points to make here:  
Firstly, notice that Gould is in danger of conflating a justifiable recognition of our 
disposition to regard phenomena in a certain way with an automatic dismissal of the reality 
of the phenomena itself. It could well be the case that human beings are psychologically 
inclined to count themselves as distinct and ‘superior’ in some way to the rest of the natural 
world and for this belief to be warranted. The various reasons given by the above authors 
for humanity’s special position in their various classifications certainly seem to have some 
initial plausibility and not to be ‘spun out of whole cloth’. Huxley’s contention that 
evolutionary advance consists in an increasing control of and independence from the 
environment for example, appears to be an empirically-measurable quality - rather than 
entirely impressionistic one as Gould’s pejorative ‘non-operational’ comment might suggest 
- and one which would be selectively-beneficial over a range of environments given that the 
detrimental effects of a capricious environment could be mitigated to some degree. And 
despite Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry’s established problems with consistency (Calcott & 
Sterelny (eds.) 2011, Szathmáry 2015, O’Malley & Powell 2016), it seems clear that out of 
the three properties which they see as having increased over terrestrial evolution: the loss of 
independence of replication in the units of higher collectives; an increase in division of 
labour; and an increase in the efficiency and storage of information; all three are potentially 
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measurable, and the final two seem specifically to be characteristics which human societies 
are especially proficient at. Clearly these authors need to provide subsidiary reasons why 
these properties in particular should be used as a standard against which the whole of the 
living world may be measured as opposed to other properties where Homo sapiens may fare 
more poorly. Although we might suspect that this cannot be done impartially, it would be 
wrong to dismiss the possibility out of hand.  
Secondly, although it is common to conflate the possibility of anthropocentric bias with the 
perception of evolutionary progress as does Gould, this need not necessarily be the case. As 
Darwin himself observed: 
“To attempt to compare members of distinct types in the scale of highness seems hopeless; 
who will decide whether a cuttle-fish be higher than a bee?... In the complex struggle for 
life it is quite credible that crustaceans, not very high in their own class, might beat 
cephalopods, the highest molluscs; and such crustaceans, though not highly developed, 
would stand very high in the scale of invertebrate animals”  
(Darwin, p308, 1872 {6th edition}). 
The urge to rank different species hierarchically is quite general, and not just an enterprise 
in seeking-out features which humanity has in abundance and which makes them allegedly 
superior. The desire to rank the natural world still occurs when Homo sapiens is not one of 
the species whose advancement is being adjudicated. Just as the above authors need to 
provide empirically-justifiable reasons for placing humanity at the latter end of the 
evolutionary scale, those wishing to compare the ‘advancement’ of other non-human species 
must also provide similar reasons for their relative positions. Although as recognised by 
Darwin, the hope that this procedure could be carried out in a manner which is scientifically 
respectable seems remote.  
So the intuitions of those who feel that life has ‘advanced’ over evolutionary time should not 
be conflated with impossibility that life actually has advanced in some way; nor is the 
practice of hierarchically-ordering the different species of life necessarily motivated by a 
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desire to confirm human superiority: although this may often be the case. Additionally, 
although Wilson et al. have no solid justification for prioritising the specific lineage 
stretching back from Homo sapiens to the beginning of terrestrial life over and above the 
vast number of alternatives available, this should not blind us to the fact that this lineage can 
be identified. It is not the identification of the human lineage, or the identification of 
evolutionary lineages per se which is problematic, but the danger that focusing on certain 
lineages in particular will mislead us into conceiving of some lineages as more central to 
the history of life than others. This of course is false, and Gould is right to criticise it. But 
neither is Gould’s characterisation of evolution as a ‘labyrinthine route’ quite right either. 
There is a definitive and real direct ancestral line connecting modern species to their ancient 
predecessors and it is equally as wrong to suggest that the procedure of ‘delineating’ these 
evolutionary sequences from those of their phylogenetic neighbours should be considered 
invalid or misleading. As long as the relationships between the species and organisms under 
examination genuinely are ancestral this is sufficient qualification for the lineage connecting 
them being an objective and real part of the natural world rather than imposed and artificial 
as Gould’s criticisms seem to imply.  35
5.3 Demarcation: An A to Z of linear evolution.  
As a lineage evolves, species and traits come and go, and this successive replacement of  
traits and species permits a conception of evolution as a kind of directional process, acting 
to move from one successive form on to the next. It is clear how the gradual replacement of 
ancestral types by their descendants might be preemptively construed as ‘progressive’: as 
those later in the lineage replace those earlier, it may seem natural to think that this was 
achieved by virtue them being superior to their predecessors in some way. Along with 
anthropocentrism, this somewhat lay interpretation of evolutionary history has acted as one 
of the premier targets towards which opponents of the ‘progressive view’ of evolution have 
 How we set about the process of delineation will depend on what we intend the resultant lineage to be a lineage of; as 35
will the number of identifiable lineages produced. Clearly as species are comprised from populations, which are 
comprised from organisms, which themselves possess traits, there will be far more lineages of traits and organisms than 
there are lineages of populations, and more lineages of populations than there are lineages of species.     
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directed their attention (Ayala 1974, Jablonski 1986, Gould 1996), and one which even 
those generally more sympathetic towards an evaluative interpretation of evolutionary 
phenomena recognise as a gross oversimplification (Dawkins & Krebs 1979, Ruse 1993, 
Dennett 1995a, Dawkins 1997). Descendant organisms succeed their predecessors for any 
number of reasons: sheer chance, geographic distribution, changes in climate and in 
ecological environment and so on, and much anagenetic evolution may have no bearing at 
all on any systematic differences in fitness or phenotype between earlier and later lineage 
members. Gould and those influenced by him are again quite right here; holding that later 
members of a lineage must be ‘superior’ in some way by virtue of their succession alone is 
not only philosophically problematic, but in a large number of cases will be 
straightforwardly incorrect. But equally, in some cases, later lineage members will succeed 
their predecessors because they are better able to survive and reproduce. The replacement of 
earlier types by their descendants will not always be due to haphazard factors unrelated to 
fitness such as the effects of a capricious environment. Later lineage members may well be  
‘superior’ in some way to their ancestors by virtue of being able to perform certain functions 
that their predecessors lacked, or being able to perform certain functions to a higher 
standard. But divorcing genuine cases of ‘evolutionary advance’ like this, and cases which 
look very like evolutionary advance but are not is often far from straightforward.         
Any lineage which features significant evolutionary changes will be comprised from a vast 
amount of individual organisms, permitting numerous ways in the which the changes which 
occur as the lineage evolves may be emphasised and interpreted. Even when the stages 
‘bookending’ a particular section of an evolutionary lineage can be empirically established, 
the nature of intervening events can be highly speculative and controversial. Consider the 
‘Aquatic Ape’ thesis for example: no-one credibly disputes that the lineage culminating in 
Homo sapiens stretches back to ancestral apes, but the suggestion that this involved an 
intermediate ‘aquatic stage’ is contentious; there is currently not enough corroborative 
evidence for it (Morgan 1982, Langdon 1997, Bender at al. 2012). This can be understood 
straightforwardly as empirical underdetermination; if further evidence were to appear we 
might use it to strengthen or weaken the conjecture about what occurred over the lineage’s 
intermediate states. But there is a more interesting problem that arises when an evolutionary 
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lineage provides us with too much information for any one investigation to comprehensively 
cover. In such cases, what we can characterise as an ‘editorial decision’ must be made: what 
to omit, what to include, what to emphasise and what to de-emphasise, and this procedure 
presents separate, philosophical difficulties. Editorial decisions require editors to make them 
and what counts as an appropriate ‘edit’ of a given lineage for one project may be entirely 
inappropriate for another with different explanatory aims. There is no objective and 
perspective-free way to go about this. In contrast to an underdetermined conjecture like the 
‘Aquatic Ape’ here we proceed taking evidence out; and when we want to break down a 
large and continuous evolutionary lineage into its component stages the relevance of the 
particular stages chosen will always be project specific.           
For example: suppose that we miraculously had access to a complete fossil record spanning 
from the basal whale lineage member: Pakicetus, to the first of its whale-like descendants, a 
collection comprised from an enormous amount of individual specimens. In order to employ 
the collection for any explanatory purpose (other than showing the sheer size of the 
lineage), we would first have to edit the specimens down to a much more manageable 
number. How we would go about this procedure would depend on what sort of information 
we are hoping the chosen specimens will provide. We may feel it representative to pick 
samples separated by one million years, or perhaps by one million generations, and these 
might tell us much if our interests concerned the rate of aquatic adaptation, or the order in 
which each adaptation occurred. But for the majority of evolutionary explanations this 
approach would be inadequate. What if we were interested in specific adaptations for life in 
the oceans such as the disappearance of external ears and hind limbs, the appearance of tail 
flukes and the bulk of these developments fell between our one million markers? Any 
explanation for how the lineage adapted to an aquatic environment would be severely 
compromised without including such events so our decision to demarcate the series using a 
metric blind to them would be procedurally inappropriate. Balanced ‘curation’ is required: a 
set which is large and detailed enough so as to represent all the significant developments, 
but small enough so that the number of entries is limited to a practical and informative 
amount.  
153
It might seem natural in these cases to use the ‘key stages’ which occurred to the lineage as 
it gradually adapted to a fully aquatic lifestyle as a guide for demarcation; indeed when the 
changes undergone by an evolutionary lineage are quite radical this is typically how it is 
done (Jenner 2018). But notice how different ‘insensitive’ scales of measurement like time 
and number of generations are - which provide a fixed scale against which the lineage’s 
evolution can be objectively measured - from ‘sensitive’ ones which take into account 
qualitative features of the evolving lineage. While the former have some flexibility in that 
duration and number of generations can be ‘set’ to provide the grain of detail required, the 
resulting edit will be blind to any evolutionary changes the lineage has undergone. This is 
fertile ground for potential conflict: independence of measurement is of course something to 
be strived for in many cases - empirical science would be impossible without it - but 
employing a systematic means of measurement for unsystematic phenomena like 
evolutionary change will often result in an ‘edit’ that is inadequately representative of the 
phenomena we are trying to understand.   
We can illustrate this as follows. Let us suppose that the Pakicetus-to-Whale lineage can be 
comprehensively represented by twenty six stages; starting from specimen A at the start of 
the lineage, through the letters of alphabet to specimen Z at the lineage’s close . A 36
systematic demarcation of this lineage by fixed markers- years or generations- would result 
in the following kind of structure: 
Edit 1: A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
We place a marker (in bold) at every 5th sample to produce ‘Edit 1’: A-E-J-O-T-Y. We 
might wish to get more detail from this lineage and set our demarcation at every 4th letter, 
or feel that whatever task we are using the lineage for can be just as effectively carried out 
by selecting those at every 6th or 7th. The point to bear in mind here is that whatever the 
 We are aware of course that in actuality this A to Z representation in common with the ones we are describing can 36
only be reduced from many millions of samples according to some preference as to why those twenty six are chosen in 
the first place. I feel the illustrative benefits of this example outweigh its slightly self-referential nature.
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chosen grain of our measurement it will provide for us an objective result: evolutionary 
change in the lineage occurring in the gaps between the chosen markers.  
In contrast, an investigation into aquatic adaptation within the same lineage using the  
evolutionary developments themselves to guide its demarkation not only provides a 
different result, but provides a different kind of result. This alternative approach to the 
procedure might produce something like this: 
Edit 2: A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
A: Basal Pakicetus specimen 
H: Limbs much reduced in size 
I: Bone thickens around ear to aid hearing underwater 
P: Nasal opening has shifted upwards and backwards along top of the head 
T: Eyes of sample have moved to the sides of the head 
U: Tail is now recognisably fluked 
X: Hind legs completely disappear 
Z: Last common ancestor of all whales.  
In ‘Edit 2’ the lineage’s gradual evolution away from a terrestrial environment ‘towards’ an 
aquatic one is charted throughout each of the eight selected stages. Sample H (marking the 
reduction in limb size), and sample P (marking the relocation of the nasal opening) for 
example are evidently of major importance for this particular project, as are U and X, but 
they are also ones that would have ‘slipped through the net’ had the lineage been 
demarcated systematically as it was in Edit 1. Edit 1 is demarcated according to time or 
number of generations, whereas Edit 2 is demarcated according to the features of the 
evolving lineage itself. This contrast can be more clearly appreciated by considering that if 
the evolution of the lineage in question had been markedly different, Edit 1 would produce 
different results - the organisms and species which comprise the lineage would after all be 
different organisms and species - but the demarcation of the lineage (A-E-J-O-T-Y) would 
155
remain the same, this is because the procedure that produced Edit 1 did not take the 
evolution of the lineage into account. This would not be the case for Edit 2; the differences 
in evolutionary development would not only produce a different result as in the revised Edit 
1, they would additionally make Edit 2’s original demarcation (A-H-I-P-T-U-X-Z) defunct. 
This is because the procedure that produced Edit 2 does take the evolution of the lineage 
into account. In Edit 2 as the demarcation is carried out according to the evolving 
characteristics of the lineage, when these change so does the edit. Contingent upon how 
major the evolutionary differences in the revised lineage are some of the stages originally 
described in Edit 2 might not even exist.  
Although the ‘impartially’ of Edit 1’s demarcation may strike us as more scientifically 
respectable, there is no one ‘right’ way to go about the procedure. Edit 1 and Edit 2 produce 
different results because they are intended to measure and describe different things; for Edit 
1 this is the rate at which evolution has occurred; while for Edit 2 it is how the lineage 
transferred from a land based- to sea based- lifestyle that is of primary interest. If it is 
evolutionary rate we wish to measure, the approach of Edit 1 will be the correct one to use; 
alternatively, if it is qualitative features of the evolving lineage itself that we are interested 
in, the approach of Edit 2 will be appropriate. An edit tasked with concisely presenting a 
lineage’s evolutionary transformation is obliged to demarcate using unevenly spaced and 
grouped markers like in Edit 2 because this is how the actual evolution of the lineage is very 
likely to have occurred; in unpredictable and sporadic bursts and pauses. The evolutionary 
‘stages’ undergone by a lineage featuring significant change will almost certainly not accord 
with anything like the neatly-spaced temporal markers as described by Edit 1, we need a 
bespoke edit of samples chosen with these related changes explicitly in mind if we are to 
present this lineage’s transformation satisfactorily.  
Now, we might have concerns that by rejecting an impartial metric the representation of the 
evolution in question will be unavoidably arbitrary and subjective but this is not exactly 
right. Whether we choose to edit an evolutionary lineage so as to accord with certain 
changes that it has undergone is up to us - but once a particular explanatory project has been 
decided upon, it seems that what counts as significant within that particular project is not 
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something that we are similarly free to opt in or opt out of. For example: Our 
‘comprehensive’ lineage of x26 samples had been substantially reduced to x8 in Edit 2 
because it was those samples rather than any of the excluded eighteen that ‘fitted’ with our 
project to understand how it was that a largely land-based organism at stage ‘A’ evolved to 
become one fully adapted to an aquatic environment like that at stage ‘Z’. There may of 
course be some disagreement about the relevance of specific samples in any given 
explanatory project, but these will not simply be due to the whims of the investigator, but 
because of disagreement over how much they add to an understanding of the lineage’s 
transformation over and above that of the samples whose inclusion everyone can agree 
upon. Expanding the edit to include non-relevant samples may compromise the project by 
introducing unnecessary ‘noise’, making the evolutionary sequence of interest less apparent. 
To use another example: say the sample ‘D’ represents the first in the lineage to reach 2.5 
metres in length from nose to tail. As the A to Z lineage is an objective ordering, adding D 
into our edit of aquatic adaptation to make A-D-H-I-P-T-U-X-Z is not technically inaccurate 
as it is justified by the lineage’s phylogeny, but D does not ‘fit’ in that same position as 
comfortably when the lineage is considered thematically. A 2.5 metre body length is of 
course just one of many properties that specimen D possesses, but if none of D’s properties 
add to our understanding of aquatic adaptation over and above those of the original eight 
specimens, the act of including D in the sequence would seem gratuitous; we would be fully 
justified in asking what purpose the inclusion of D in the re-edited sequence performed.  
Equally, our demarcation of the lineage according to aquatic adaptation would also be 
compromised if we were to leave out certain specimens. Suppose that we now take Edit 2 
and remove specimen X (the disappearance of the hind legs), leaving the reduced sequence 
A-H-I-P-T-U-Z. We might still have a sequence recognisably depicting the lineage’s aquatic 
adaptation, and perhaps if we were limited to seven stages the most informative one that 
could be produced, but it is evidently not the most informative one overall because a major 
event in the sequence is missing. Looking over the shortened edit we would be entitled to 
ask why the final disappearance of the hind limbs had been left out. That A had legs so as to 
move around its terrestrial environment, and Z did not is a major component of the 
transformation that the edit was set up to show. The purpose of editing the larger collection 
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was to explain how this, along with many other land-to-sea transformations took place, and 
once this objective has been decided on, the inclusion of certain specimens like X seems to 
be near-mandatory. An edit which omitted the disappearance of hind limbs, like one that 
omitted the addition of the fluked tail or the relocation of the nasal opening, would be 
severely- and obviously-  incomplete as it would fail to accurately represent the evolutionary 
development it was explicitly set up to illustrate. Once we have locked onto an explanatory 
target we have a reasonably good understanding which out of a give range of specimens will 
be appropriate for it. If this is ‘aquatic adaption’ then this means a definite ‘yes’ for the 
inclusion of hind-limb disappearance (X), and a definite ‘no’ for the first specimen to reach 
2.5 metres (D). So any concerns that the demarcation of a lineage according to qualitative 
features of its evolutionary development will produce wholly subjective results should be 
mitigated to some degree; we cannot simply decide to omit or include any stages within an 
edit arbitrarily.   
Freedom of choice appears to be only unconstrained when it comes to the delineation of a 
given lineage and which of its ‘evolutionary themes’ we find worthy of further 
investigation, but this is not as straightforward as it may seem either. Notice what motivates 
us to embark on the project of editing down an evolutionary lineage in the first place: we 
want to understand how various evolutionary influences combined to change the 
characteristics of the species and organisms earlier in the series to produce the distinct 
characteristics of the descendant species and organisms which succeeded them. To return to 
our A-to-Z example: in common with all living things the whale has an evolutionary history, 
we want to understand how a creature of that size and with those traits and that physiology 
and so on could have evolved from a creature very unlike it in many ways by a series of 
incremental steps. It is the development of the properties possessed by the later samples of 
the series when contrasted with the properties of the earlier specimens that motivates us 
here, and it is the differences between the specimens at either ends of the sequence and how 
they were bridged that the procedure of editing-down an extended lineage is particularly 
good at illustrating. In the case of the whale, our chosen ‘theme’ of aquatic adaptation seems 
to be quite a suitable one, as it covers many of the differences between the properties of the 
modern whale when contrasted with those of Pakicetus at the start of the sequence. But this 
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is not the only interpretation for the changes that the whale lineage has undergone. ‘Size 
increase’ could provide an alternative - although less compelling - theme for the linking of 
the lineage’s two ‘extremes’ as the intervening stages show how Pakicetus grew 
incrementally over evolutionary time to the size of the whale’s last common ancestor; we 
see how the contrasting sizes of the last and first specimen are bridged by their 
intermediaries showing size increase over the span of that section of the lineage. Although 
any given lineage, and especially one as lengthy and complex as the transformation of 
Pakicetus-to-whale, will have a variety of different ‘thematic’ threads weaving through it, 
some themes will do this more more straightforwardly than others. For our A-to-Z lineage 
the clear front runner is ‘adaptation to an aquatic environment’, with perhaps size increase 
as a distant second. Other than in lineages which are very brief, or those where the changes 
between earlier and later lineage members are very limited, there will be multiple ‘thematic’ 
ways of interpreting the evolution which has occurred, and so multiple ways of editing the 
lineage so that these various themes can be highlighted and represented.                   
So a lineage is edited down to a more manageable size by its division into relevant stages, 
and the relevance of any stage with a given edit will be in accordance with the lineage’s 
overarching theme- many of which might be suitable. But notice also the side-effect that 
viewing the evolution of a lineage through a sequence of thematically-edited stages has on 
the way that we conceive of the actual evolution of the lineage itself. Because the editing is 
done so as to thematically link the characteristics of the organisms and species later in the 
series with those of their predecessors, the reasons for the inclusion of earlier samples into a 
given edit-  their ‘thematic relevance’ - is property which is only attained by those particular 
stages some time after the evolution of the stages themselves.   
As is often stressed evolution does not plan ahead, but the seldom-recognised corollary of 
this is that the significance of evolutionary events is something which can only be 
appreciated retrospectively. Our understanding of Z’s gradual evolution for example is 
informed by events which occurred temporarily before it, but we are able to know which 
events will prove to be important for this later stage as we can view the lineage’s evolution 
from a privileged position: we know that they lead to Z. But what we identify as a 
159
significant event to explain the evolved properties of Z or those of any other subsequent 
state will not have that relevance at the time of their occurrence; the events occur first, then, 
sometimes, subsequent developments may lead us to reinterpret their importance.  
As has been widely appreciated (Beatty 1995, 2008 & 2016, Cleland 2011, Powell 2012, 
Currie 2014, Hesketh 2016, Blount et al. 2018) there are clear parallels with the way in 
which we retrospectively interpret the evolution of complex and unlikely traits and 
adaptations and the way in which we reinterpret historical events through the perspective of 
their later consequences. We are now able to recognise Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon for 
example as an event of vital importance in the ending of the Roman Republic and the 
establishment of the Roman Empire but this was far from clear at the time of its occurrence. 
The first Roman emperor was finally given the ‘power to command’ by the senate at the end 
of a protracted civil war, 22 years after the fact; only then did the importance of Caesar’s 
transgression become recognised. With these parallels in mind it should be unsurprising that 
when a lineage is edited down in accordance with an overarching theme, the resulting edit 
can make the lineage’s subsequent evolution appear predestined or inevitable. When viewed 
retrospectively, the intermediate stages which describe the transformation of an evolutionary 
lineage much like the intermediate stages which build up to historical events can appear to 
be ‘progressive’ because in the sense of being future-orientated the mode of explanation 
guarantees that they genuinely are. The inclusion of earlier, antecedent stages in both this 
type of evolutionary explanation and historical explanations are done explicitly on the basis 
that they help explain how events later in the sequence came about.  
The fact that the processes underlying the evolution of lineages have no foresight, but that 
our explanations for the evolution of lineages rely on ‘future knowledge’ in this way creates 
something of an disparity between the properties which the phenomena appear to have by 
virtue of our means of explaining them and the properties of the phenomena itself. It may 
look, for example, as if the incremental evolution of the whale through the diverse forms of 
its predecessors was ‘progressive’ in that the stages preceding ‘Z’ gradually build towards 
the lineage’s final form. Our explanation operates on this basis, but as we know, evolution 
itself does not. We are able to interpret the intermediate stages P, U, X etc as ‘building’ 
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towards the lineages’ final stages because we posses the foresight that the process itself 
lacks; P, U and X did not evolve because they were stages ‘on the way’ to becoming a 
whale, although our mode of explanation for the lineage’s evolution treats them as though 
they were. 
It might to tempting here to think that the problem of progress in evolution is not one big 
problem as is commonly construed but is better-characterised as many smaller and related 
problems; most of which we have either answered or dismissed. We saw earlier that 
Wilson’s approach was ill-defined and the patterns he described lacked a higher-order 
mechanism; we saw that Dawkins’s defence of evolutionary progress aligned closely with 
our justification of normative language as both recognised that to be cumulative, adaptation 
must not only provide a selective benefit, but provide a selective benefit through functional 
improvement; we saw that Gould’s characterisation of progress as a kind of existential 
palliative was neither sufficient to say that progress does not exist, not was it necessary as 
non-anthropocentric perspectives on progress date back to Darwin if not before; and now 
we have seen that the lay conception of progress as witnessed through a lineages’ stage by 
stage progression into later forms can be artifactual, and due more to our methods of 
explanation, than to the properties of the evolutionary process itself.    
Once these observations have been taken into account we may think that there is little of the 
concept of evolutionary progress left to examine, but this would be to re-make Gould’s 
mistake. We know that the process of demarcation divides the lineage into stages that we 
retrospectively characterise as progressive in the light of their future effects, but to dismiss 
the evolution of all lineages as non-progressive because they can be characterised in this 
way mirrors closely Gould’s claim that because humans may think themselves superior to 
the rest the living world, this is enough to dismiss the idea out of hand. It could still be the 
case here - as it was there - that the evolution of a lineage can be characterised as 
progressive due to our explanatory approach and for the evolution which the lineage has 
undergone to be actually progressive in fact. The former does not rule the latter out. 
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Although the gradual adaptation of the whale lineage to an aquatic environment certainly 
seems progressive when it is demarcated into stages designed to highlight that very 
characteristic, the question here should be: do we have reasons to think that the underlying 
evolution is progressive in addition to those produced through the means of our 
explanation? Due to our findings in chapter 3 we have some guidance as to how we might 
go about finding this out. When a lineage is demarcated in order to show how its later stages 
were produced through the evolution of those earlier, do these stages also chart an 
improvement of some sort? Some lineages may feature the evolution of traits which are 
better-functioning than those which proceeded them and so feature improvement in this 
limited sense by doing so, but there are major difficulties in transposing this relatively 
‘localised’ type of functional improvement onto lineages which extend over much longer 
periods of time and whose earlier and later members are very different. As we saw earlier, 
our grounds for thinking that a comparison of the performances of traits could be carried out 
naturalistically relied heavily on the conception of functions as ‘selected effects’, but as 
ancestral traits become separated by ever greater amounts of time and shaped according to 
different selection pressures these grounds become very much reduced.  
These difficulties are particularly obvious when we attempt to compare the performances of 
the traits belonging to species as different as Pakicetus and its whale-like descendants. For 
many traits no comparison will be possible as they do not belong to both organisms -  
Pakicetus did not have have flippers and whales do not have legs - but even when traits are 
retained throughout the lineage, the effects for which they were selected as the lineage 
evolved may become distinct past the point where a comparison of their abilities would be 
possible. In contrast to the major overhaul of much of its anatomy over evolutionary time, 
many of the major organs possessed by Pakicetus: heart, lungs, liver, kidneys and so on 
persisted throughout the lineage and were inherited, albeit in modified form, by its whale-
like descendants. But the effects for which Pakicetus’ lungs provided a fitness advantage and 
the effects for which whale lungs provided a fitness advantage will almost certainly be 
significantly different. What would count as efficient or superior functioning for the lungs of 
one of these species would almost certainly not count as such for the other - it would very 
likely prove fatal. Whale lungs are certainly different lungs to those of Pakicetus, but they 
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are not better lungs. Our method of analysis developed in chapter 3 relies on the selected 
effects conception of function establishing that the functions of closely-related traits are 
comparable, it was not designed for cross-species comparisons like this, even when the 
species in question are ancestral as there are here.  
So when a lineage is as long as that of the whale and the changes through which it has 
undergone as substantial, even a comparison of the traits which do persist throughout the 
lineage’s evolution will be problematic. This should not surprise us as the impossibility of 
comparing profoundly different species in different selective environments was made clear 
by Darwin above. Although cuttle-fish did not evolve into Crustacea whereas Pakicetus did 
evolve over time into its whale-like descendants, some of the differences between these 
organisms will be just as pronounced and Darwin’s scepticism just as applicable. To know if 
a lineage’s evolution is ‘progressive’, we must first be able to validly compare earlier and 
later members, and to do that we must make sure our comparisons are comparisons between 
instances of the same type of thing. This rule is quite general: the more different items for 
comparison are, the less validly a comparison of them can be carried out; and this will be 
the case for different species whether they are direct descendants like Pakicetus and the 
whale or are not like cuttlefish and Crustacea. 
To conclude this section: while the delineation of an evolutionary lineage from its 
surrounding phylogenetic diversity is a straightforward matter of tracing later organisms and 
species back along their direct lines of ancestry to those which precede them - a procedure 
which tracks and picks out an objective part of the natural world; the demarcation of a given 
lineage into component stages is more complicated and the objective nature of the ‘edits’ 
produced less secure. Lineages can be variously demarcated according to different 
explanatory aims, but when they are designed to explain how the stages later in the lineage 
came about they present the evolution featured as progressive - progressing towards the 
lineage’s later stages. Demonstrating any ‘progress’ brought about over and above that 
automatically provided by the form of  explanation can be problematic especially when the 
differences between ancestral species and their descendants are particularly pronounced. As 
we will see in 5.6 however, these difficulties are not insurmountable in all cases. Sometimes 
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the performances of the traits of earlier and later lineage members can be validly compared, 
and when the performances of the traits improve, the evolution which the traits have 
undergone is firmly progressive.        
But first we will witness the procedures of delineation and demarcation in action, and 
advance from our idealised Pakicetus-to-whale lineage in directing our attention to the 
‘edits’ of two genuine lineages pulled from the evolutionary literature: the relatively brief 
and artificially-contained evolution of the Cit+ phenotype in the Long Term Evolutionary 
Experiment (LTEE), and the much lengthier evolution ‘in the wild’ of the vertebrate eye as 
interpreted by Nilsson & Pelger. We will see how the procedures of delineation and 
demarcation have been applied, how lineages appear to us as progressive through the form 
of their presentation, and ask whether the evolution which the lineage has undergone is 
genuinely progressive in fact. We will then, in section 5.6, return to the discussion of how 
cross-species comparisons can be validly made.  
  
5.4 The evolution of Cit+ 
The Long Term Evolutionary Experiment (LTEE) commenced in 1988 with the aim of 
investigating parallel evolution in twelve clonal lineages of E.coli bacteria (Blount, Borland 
& Lenski 2008, Quadt et al. 2014, Blount 2016). After 15 years and approximately 33,000 
generations it became apparent that one lineage ‘Ara-3’ had evolved a novel ability; it was 
able to metabolise the citrate solution used as a neutral medium in the experimental set up. 
In common with the other eleven lineages, as samples of Ara-3 were retained and frozen 
every 500 generations it was possible to retrieve a member of the lineage from before  
‘Cit+’ had evolved to see if ancestral versions of the strain would go on to develop the 
citrate-metabolising phenotype in parallel as did its decedents. It was found that out of 72 
‘replays’ ranging from Ara-3’s founding population to generation 32,500, Cit+ reappeared a 
mere 4 times, and in each case this occurred in a population taken from the narrow range 
between generations 30,500 and 32,500; very close to when the original lineage evolved the 
phenotype. Based on these results, it was hypothesised that Cit+ was only able to occur in 
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later populations due to the trait requiring multiple mutations; a earlier ‘potentiating’ 
mutation which accumulated in the population and then a subsequent ‘switching’ mutation 
which were able to act in concert to develop the Cit+ phenotype. This conjecture was 
strengthened when further inventive experimentation (this time effectively running millions 
of replays) showed that while the later the generation, the higher the likelihood that it would 
develop Cit+, the adaptation occurred in no revived samples at all taken from before 
generation 20,000; the experimenters understood this to demonstrate that the necessary 
‘potentiating’ mutation occurred sometime in 1997, after generation 20,000, and that this 
apparently unique occurrence was itself a very unlikely event. 
Fig 5.1  37
Unlike our idealised whale lineage, this real-world experiment allows us to be quite precise 
concerning the lineage’s properties. The line of inheritance tracing back from the later 
 Fig 5.1: (original to this dissertation). Markings along the bottom axis represent x500 generations; the places in the 37
original lineage where samples of the population where taken and frozen. The broken horizontal line indicates 
increasing probability of occurrence as the number of generations increases. The solid horizontal line represents actual 
occurrence in the original Ara-3 population. (Graphic by Tim Ashton, original to this dissertation). 
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samples to their direct ancestors does not have to be idealised and imagined; as the LTEE 
was explicitly set up to compare and contrast the differences in the evolution of separate 
lineages, ensuring that Ara-3 was delineated in fact was a necessary requirement of the 
experiment.    
The Ara-3 lineage also comes to us pre-demarcated: it begins with its founding clonal 
population, terminates (for our purposes at least) with the advent of Cit+ shortly after the 
sample taken at generation 33,000, and is systematically divided by the samples taken and 
frozen every 500 generations. In line with our observations concerning the need to keep the 
potentially vast amount of samples in any given lineage to a manageable amount we can 
assume that one taken every 500 generations to be a frequency balanced between 
informational pay-off and practical concerns like sampling time, storage requirements and 
so on. In theory we would be able to present these x66+ samples in the same manner as we 
did with the x26 of the A-to-Z samples of the whale’s demarcated lineage, and then further 
edit them down; either systematically like in Edit 1, or according to qualitative features of 
the lineage’s evolution as in Edit 2.    
The potentiating mutation suggested to have occurred after generation 20,000 is clearly 
what we might term a ‘key stage’ for the later evolution of the Cit+ phenotype as citrate 
metabolism does not appear evolvable without it; but notice that even if the event in 
question were somehow observed when it occurred shortly after generation 20,0000 - like 
Caesar’s crossing of the rubicon - its later significance could not have been identified at the 
time of its occurrence. Only with the advent of the Cit+ phenotype some 13,000+ 
generations (and x26 samples) later did ‘potentiating’ become an accurate description with 
the experimenters able to infer the mutation’s existence and the approximate generation of 
origin. The LTEE’s investigation into the evolution of Cit+ has to be ‘historical’ and 
retrospective like this, because the future significance of the mutations occurring in the 
Ara-3 lineage was not evident at the time of their occurrence. Notice that the inability of the 
experimenters to recognise the potentiating mutation’s importance when it originally 
occurred was not due to any epistemological or observational failure on their behalf. Even if 
the mutation had been witnessed and comprehensively analysed at the time of its 
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introduction into the Ara-3 lineage its future effects could not have been known as these 
were far from guaranteed. For Cit+ to occur the initial potentiating mutation had to be 
followed by the ‘switching’ mutation; but the arrival of this second mutation, and therefore 
the arrival of Cit+ itself, was not something that could have been known in advance. 
Consider how our observations in the previous section might apply to the evolution at the 
LTEE. We can see that both the delineation and demarcation of the lineage were carried out 
as part of the experiment’s procedure. The experiment’s original clonal population was 
delineated into twelve separate lineages, one of which was Ara-3; then as each lineage 
independently evolved in isolation they were demarcated according to x500 generational 
gaps, a systematic measurement ‘insensitive’ to any qualitative evolutionary changes that 
may occur. When it became apparent that the Ara-3 lineage in particular had evolved a 
novel trait, the experimenters set about editing down the much larger set of demarcated 
stages into a much smaller amount: those events which together explain how the Ara-3 
lineage evolved over time from an initial population which could not metabolise citrate into 
later population which could. In keeping with our former observations, notice that due to the 
retrospective nature of evolutionary explanation the experimenters start with the effect - the 
arrival of the Cit+ phenotype - then attempt to identify its antecedent causes: here the 
switching mutation, preceded by the potentiating mutation.  
The relative simplicity of the changes which the lineage required to achieve this ability 
means the most concise edit possible, that composed from Cit+’s key stages only, could be 
provided by editing the lineage down into three phases: Original population - population 
with potentiating mutation - population with switching mutation (see fig 5.1). Notice that 
the sole motivation for editing the lineage down according to these stages is due to their 
ability to interpret the various processes and interactions which occurred in the population 
over 33,000 or so generations in a concise and convenient way. These stages occurred in 
fact, so the edit is not ‘wrong’ but it is not the only possible edit and the Ara-3 lineage 
would have been divided up quite differently if the aims of the experimenters had also been 
different. The arrival of the Cit+ phenotype will not be the only evolution the Ara-3 has 
undergone during its first 33,000 generations, and had an explanation been required to 
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explain the representation of other genes in the bacterial population, alternative means 
would have had to have been employed and Cit+’s ‘key stages’ very likely omitted 
altogether. As with our interpretation of the whale’s evolution according to the overarching 
‘theme’ of aquatic adaptation, here Ara-3’s evolution is interpreted according to the ‘theme’ 
of citrate metabolism; earlier events in the lineage’s history are interpreted as progressive 
steps towards the production of this trait.  
Although considerably shorter and less convoluted than the multiple adaptations of the 
whale lineage Ara-3’s evolution certainly looks progressive when edited into the key stages  
for the Cit+ phenotype. But is the lineage’s evolution actually progressive in fact, or is this 
appearance due to the method of explanation alone? There is no straightforward answer to 
this. As the Ara-3 lineage is comparatively brief, we can be confident that its later and 
earlier populations can be correctly compared as the differences between them will be 
considerably less than those of the earlier and later members of the whale lineage which 
made their comparison problematic. The population of Ara-3 at generation 33,000 should be 
similar enough to the population of Ara-3 at the experiment’s inception for us to judge if the 
evolution connecting them can be characterised as progressive. The answer here might seem 
to be ‘yes’: the later population of Ara-3 is able to do something which the earlier 
population of Ara-3 was not, it is able to metabolise citrate and so is ‘better’ at this ability 
than its predecessors. But this would be wrong, at least in the context in which we supported 
the use of term ‘better’ to describe functional improvement as in chapter three. 
For the Ara-3 lineage to show improvement in this respect the ancestral population would 
need to metabolise citrate and the later population would need to metabolise citrate to 
higher- or ‘better’ - standard. This has not happened here - or at least has not happened yet. 
As it stands, the comparison between the non-citrate metabolising ancestral population and 
the citrate metabolising descendant population more closely resembles a comparison 
between the whale’s flippers and Pakicetus’ legs more than it does a comparison between 
the speeds of Olympic sprinters. The Ara-3 lineage features populations who differ in their 
possession of a given ability, not populations who feature differences in their performances 
of a given ability; to be progressive the evolutionary process must make later populations 
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perform the same selected effect to an improved degree. But notice that as events in 
evolution can be reappraised through the perspective of their future effects, the 
‘progressiveness’ of citrate metabolism in the Ara-3 lineage would become clearer should its 
evolution past 33,000 generations feature improvements in citrate metabolism. Then we 
would reinterpret the advent of citrate metabolism thus far in the lineage previous to 
generation 33,000 as the first stage in a progressive sequence of functional improvement, 
and according to the selective effects conception, would be quite justified in doing so. This 
is why our current attitude to the ‘progressiveness’ of the Ara-3’s evolution to date must 
remain ambivalent; we do not yet have enough information about the effects of the 
potentiating and switching mutations for us to view them as progressive, but neither do we 
have the required information for us to rule their progressiveness out: Caesar has crossed the 
rubicon- so to speak - and we are waiting to see what happens next. If the Ara-3 lineage 
were to further evolve improvements in its citrate metabolism after generation 33,0000, then 
the evolution preceding generation 33,000 will be the start of a progressive sequence; if the 
lineage does not then improve its citrate metabolism then while the mutations are important 
we would not then think of them as progressive in the same way; despite the mutations 
themselves remaining the same in either scenario.                       
5.5 Nilsson & Pelger and the evolution of the eye   
Designed to illustrate the relative speed and ease with which natural selection could develop 
a ‘fully formed’ eye despite what the authors describe as ‘pessimistic’ parameters, Nilsson & 
Pelger’s eight-stage linear depiction of eye evolution (Nilsson & Pelger 1994) has clearly 
been designed in accordance with the principles we identified above. 
As with the the Ara-3 lineage, the sequence presented by Nilsson & Pelger arrives pre-
delineated. We do not have to select a contemporary eye out from those possessed by a wide 
diversity of sighted species and follow the line of inheritance back to its distant ancestors, 
the lineage arrives to us with this procedure having been carried out. Nilsson & Pelger point 
out that the later stages of the eye are intended to be ‘vertebrate generic’ rather than an 
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anatomically accurate picture of an eye belonging to any vertebrate species in particular, so 
the picking out and tracing back of the lineage is a metaphorical rather than actual procedure 
as in the Ara-3 lineage.    
Fig 5.2  38
The lineage presented is also quite clearly pre-demarcated, although in contrast to the Ara-3 
lineage the number of stages dividing the lineage is very limited indeed: x8 in comparison 
to Ara-3’s original x66, although the duration over which the evolution has occurred and 
changes made to the lineage depicted are both significantly greater. The motivation for the 
limit in both cases however is practical. For the real-world experiment of the LTEE, we 
assumed that the samples demarcating the lineage were taken at every x500 generations as 
opposed to a lower and more frequent amount due limitations in time, space and cost; for 
Nilsson and Pelger it is the requirement of presenting their findings in a manner that 
abstracts from the technicalities of their calculations and is straightforward to understand. 
With this objective achieved, the lineage does not need to be edited down further. 
 Fig 5.2 (A simplified version of the original illustration in Nilsson & Pelger 1994 taken from Land & Nilsson 2002 38
and further reformatted - by Tim Ashton - for the purposes of this dissertation.) The linage is demarcated into eight 
stages from 1 (top left) through to 8 (top right) with each representing a distinct stage in the eye’s evolution. The figures 
between each stage are the number of generations the authors estimate each stage would take to evolve from that which 
precedes it, given what the authors believe to be realistic parameters   
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The first stage of Nilsson & Pelger’s depiction is a flat patch of light-sensitive cells, backed 
by a darker layer and covered by a transparent cellular layer. So even at this early stage we 
have three types of cell and their specific configuration. Notice that starting the project here 
was a decision of the authors and was not naturally provided by the lineage itself. The 
project could have commenced earlier, the organ at stage 1 clearly did not arrive in the 
lineage fully formed, so those sceptical that a fully-formed eye could evolve over a mere 
364,000 generations might be justified in asking for the lineage to be extended back further 
into evolutionary history so as to calculate the time taken for the development of each of 
these cell types and how they could have become layered in the manner described. Given 
that Nilsson & Pelger’s stated aim is to estimate the length of time a complex eye takes to 
evolve, starting from what is clearly a rudimentary ‘eye’ of sorts may strike us as being 
something of a short-cut.    
The final stage is a generic eye similar to those found in contemporary vertebrates. Notice 
again that this final stage, like the depiction’s first stage, is not provided naturally by 
evolutionary biology either but is again a conscious decision. The authors could have 
chosen to have halted the lineage sooner at the slightly less ‘refined’ stage 7, or in fact 
continued beyond that of stage 8 if Nilsson and Pelger were to consider the ‘degenerate’ 
organs found in formerly-sighted vertebrates living in lightless environments where 
vulnerable eyes are at a selective disadvantage. Degenerate eyes are of course just as much a 
product of evolution as are the organs depicted in stages 1 through to 8, although given their 
aim of estimating the time taken for ‘eye evolution’ if the authors had extended their 
depiction beyond this most anatomically-complex organ it would both increase the 
evolutionary time required and all for a less-compelling result.  
Notice also that as estimating the length of time or number of generations required for 
evolution to ‘bridge the gap’ spanning stages 1 and 8 is the aim of the project, these 
measures could not be the means by which the intervening stages were selected . As 39
 Nilsson & Pelger’s explicit aim is to estimate the number of generations, rather than length of time, that a vertebrate 39
eye could be produced by the evolutionary process. But as they stipulate generation time to be an average of one year 
over the length of the lineage in question, time in years or number of generations can be used interchangeably. 
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Nilsson and Pelger do not know when the ancestor of the vertebrate at stage 8 possessed the 
rudimentary ‘eye’ resembling that at stage 1 they cannot use that information to 
straightforwardly divide the lineage up by the number of stages required. Instead, their 
approach is to demarcate the eye’s transformation using what we can recognise as key 
stages in its incremental evolution from a fairly rudimentary layer of cells to the 
sophisticated organ at the lineage’s close. Notice again that although the development of the 
eye appears to be more or less monotonic, this is an artefact produced by the differential 
amount of generations used to separate out each of the different stages. The evolution from 
the flat triplicate cell-layer ‘towards’ the fully formed eye at stage 8 only appears to be even 
and consistent due to the generational gaps being increased or reduced so as to produce this 
effect. The longest generational gap (at 72,000) is in fact over twice as long at the shortest 
(at 35,000), and the specific demarcation of the sequence into the stages shown produces a 
standard deviation of 12,351. If Nilsson and Pelger’s calculations for the evolution of the 
vertebrate eye are broadly correct the process was considerably more uneven and erratic 
than their illustration suggests.   
In common with Edit 2 of our whale lineage and the Ara-3 lineage, Nilsson & Pelger’s eye 
lineage is edited with the express purpose of explaining how the stages later in the 
delineated sequence evolved from those preceding them. The whale’s fully aquatic 
physiology, the Cit+ phenotype, and the ‘fully formed’ eye are where the investigations into 
the evolutionary process responsible for these adaptations begin. In common with these 
examples, the procedure of editing the larger amount of generations spanning the length of 
the lineage down into those presented was done with this explanatory goal in mind.   
The dark, light-sensitive and transparent cell layers and their relative positions to each other 
at the ‘front’ of the eye remain constant but major changes are shown to occur between each 
of the eight stages, these include: deeper invagination and thus increase in surface area of 
the light-sensitive layer; the partial constriction of the aperture, which decreases the angle of 
light hitting the light-sensitive cells and improves resolution; and the later development of a 
lens to allow the eye the ability to focus. While the morphological changes displayed in 
each stage may initially strike us as quite a disparate group lacking a consistent property 
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that runs through the sequence from start to finish, like the disparate anatomical changes 
demarcating the whale lineage the overarching theme of the sequence can in fact be 
construed quite narrowly. For the whale lineage the various anatomical changes could be 
jointly explained by the lineage’s gradual adaptation to a fully-aquatic environment, for 
Nilsson and Pelger’s sequence it is the requirement that later stages successively-produce a 
contemporary vertebrate eye. The authors explicitly state that a guiding principle for the 
sequence depicted was its evolutionary plausibility; each stage should provide a selective 
advantage to those preceding it while remaining consistent with evidence from comparative 
anatomy. However, in contrast to the demarcation of the whale lineages above, each stage 
must increase fitness by improving a single function only (ibid. p53) which Nilsson and 
Pelger characterise as ‘spatial resolution’ or ‘visual acuity’. Later stages must not only be 
selectively advantageous to their predecessors, they must be selectively advantageous 
because they improve the organ’s ability to perform this narrowly-defined function. 
Once we appreciate the lineage’s evolution is intended to be driven according to incremental  
improvements in a single function many of Nilsson & Pelger’s choices become clearer. The 
authors begin their evolutionary sequence with the ‘short-cut’ of a triplicate layer of light 
sensitive cells as there is little guarantee that any of the organs ancestral to this stage could 
be characterised as driven by selection for ‘visual acuity’. It is highly likely that before the 
lineage arrived at this fairly well-developed stage the photoreceptive cells evolved by virtue 
of alternative abilities; the synchronisation of internal processes to coincide with the day/
night cycle being one plausible suggestion (Gregory 2008). Starting their depiction earlier in 
the lineage so as to include the possible evolution of these cells and their configuration 
would result in the sequence no longer holding together thematically; improvements in the 
function of visual acuity would no longer cover the reasons for each stage’s advantage over 
its predecessors. Notice that this further explains why extending the lineage past the 
canonical stages of 1 to 8 to the ‘degenerate’ eyes of now-sightless vertebrates would also 
be inappropriate. The evolution of these auxiliary stages would not be driven by the fitness 
advantages of their increased visual acuity either when compared to the fitness of the stages 
preceding them because the visual acuity of organs at these later additional stages would be 
considerably worse. 
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So the delineation and demarcation of the sequence is provided, and Nilsson and Pelger’s 
reasons for presenting the evolution of the eye in this way unambiguous. There is no 
requirement to further edit the lineage to a smaller number of stages as these are already 
quite brief. Again the stages 1 through to 8 certainly appear progressive; at the start of the 
depicted linage we have some fairly ‘rudimentary’ layers of cells which over time, and 
thanks to the effects of natural selection, incrementally evolve into the complex and intricate 
organ depicted at stage 8. But unlike the radically-transformative yet non-progressive 
evolution of the whale-lineage, and unlike the ambiguous but potentially-progressive nature 
of the evolution of citrate metabolism in the LTEE, the evolution depicted here is 
unambiguously progressive in fact. As the consecutive stages of the eye’s gradual evolution 
were explicitly chosen because they chart successive improvements in a narrowly-defined 
function, the organs later in the sequence will be better at that function than those preceding 
them. Later stages do not merely depict ‘better’ eyes, in the way that the later stages of the 
whale lineage could be characterised as depicting ‘better’ whales, the organs at the later 
stages in Nilsson and Pelger’s lineage are functionally superior to those which precede 
them. So although the lineage looks progressive and the lineage is progressive this is due to 
different reasons. The anatomical changes depicted in Nilsson and Pelger’s lineage look 
progressive because they incrementally move the lineage closer to the anatomy of the 
contemporary eye, but these changes are progressive because they successively produce 
increases in visual function in comparison to the organs of their predecessors. It so happens 
that in Nilsson and Pelger’s lineage, rather than in that of the whale or in Ara-3 that the two 
qualifications coincide. The artificial spacing of the stages may lead us to think that the 
progression ‘towards’ the eye was smoother and more even than the sequence depicts, but as 
long as the function of visual acuity of each stage is increasing, the progressive nature of the 
eye’s evolution remains intact.  
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5.6 Cross-species functional improvements  
As we saw in chapter 3, should we identify the function of a trait as the effect or effects for 
which it provided a historical selective advantage as per the SE conception, then what the 
function of a trait is will be a matter of fact, and traits with the same or very similar histories 
of selection will have the same function. This provided sufficient grounds - the constitutive 
norms - for a principled comparison of their functional performances to be carried out. But 
our warrant for comparison only stretches so far; the selected effects conception of 
biological function provides an effective means for the comparison of traits only, and only 
then when the effects for which the traits were selected are comparable. It does not allow us 
to compare whole organisms with other organisms or compare species with other species, 
this is no sacrifice on our part, but a limitation which accords with our - and Darwin’s - 
suspicions that attempting to compare entire organisms of very different kinds would 
inevitably produce results which were hopelessly impressionistic.    
Although we have no grounds for a straightforward comparison of ‘species with species’, 
the SE approach to function will in certain circumstances allow for a comparison of the 
functional performances of the traits of one species with the functional performances of the 
traits of another species. This will be possible if the species in question are closely related 
and the traits in question inherited from a common ancestor, as up until their divergence the 
selectively beneficial effects of the traits would be identical. This can again be shown more 
clearly using a solid example. 
Despite being the traits of different species, we might think of the claws and teeth of red 
squirrels and those of grey squirrels as performing the same functions in both species given 
their comparatively recent phylogenic divergence and the similarity of their environments 
since their separation occurred. Clearly in circumstances like these where the traits in 
question are closely related, the effects for which the traits were selected have a much 
greater chance of being the same or very similar effects and so permit their comparison; 
asking which has the ‘better’ teeth, a red or a grey squirrel would be a reasonable question if 
the tasks demanded of the teeth of red and grey squirrel teeth were the same tasks, and one 
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which could be answered if one species on average performed those tasks to higher 
standard. Conversely, the more distantly-related any two species are, the less warranted a 
comparison of their traits appears to become; at least it could seem this way if we were to 
think that the SE conception were the exclusive means by which such abilities could be 
identified. The traits of two grey squirrels - members of the same species - will have 
identical functions as the historical effects for which those traits were selected are identical; 
the effects for which the traits of more distantly-related species such as those of the red 
squirrel and those of the grey squirrel were selected may be very similar - and perhaps 
identical - but could be different to some degree due to differences in their selected effects; 
while the selected effects of traits belonging to very-distantly related species such as the 
grey squirrel and the North American beaver would seem to be too distinct for any 
comparison based on their functional performances to be carried out. The effects for which 
beaver teeth provided a selection advantage and the effects for which grey squirrel teeth 
provided a selection advantage will quite clearly be different effects. North American 
beavers will have better or worse North American Beaver teeth, and grey squirrels will have 
better or worse grey squirrel teeth (or perhaps simply ‘squirrel teeth’- should red squirrel 
teeth share the grey squirrel teeth’s functions). But beavers do not have ‘better’ teeth than 
squirrels, they do not perform the functions of squirrel teeth to a higher standard, and 
squirrels do not have ‘better’ teeth than do beavers for the same reason. When the traits of 
different species have different functions, the terms ‘better’ or ‘worse’ will not apply.   
Notice however that in claiming that natural selection is likely to divergently-adapt the traits 
of formerly-unified species past the point where a comparison of their functions can no 
longer be carried out, we seem to present one of this chapter’s central findings with a 
significant problem. While the SE approach provides sufficient theoretical grounds to 
warrant a comparison of the functional performances of traits belonging to the same or 
closely-related species, belonging to the same or closely-related species cannot be a 
necessary qualification for a valid comparison of the functions of traits to be carried out. 
This latter claim concerning the exclusivity of the SE approach is one that we must reject, 
given that our paradigm example of functional improvement - the increases in visual acuity 
as charted by Nilsson and Pelger’s eye lineage - is concerned with improvements in a single 
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function evidently spanning the evolution of traits possessed by multiple species, albeit 
those belonging to single lineage. Whichever species possessed the triplicate layer of cells at 
the start of the eye-lineage is clearly distinct and very distant to the contemporary vertebrate 
which possesses the recognisable eye at the lineage’s close, and yet we maintained that a 
functional comparison of the organs possessed by the various species throughout this 
lineage can be objectively carried out.  
So on the one hand we are stating that the cross-species lung-function of Pakicetus and 
those of the modern whale are too different to warrant a comparison in terms of ‘better’ or 
‘worse’ but consider the cross-species eye-function of the organs in Nilsson & Pelger’s 
lineage to be warranted, although the anatomical differences between the earlier and later 
lungs of the Pakicetus-to-whale lineage are arguably less than the earlier and later organs of 
the eye lineage. How do we justify this apparent double standard?  
This problem rests on a subtle conflation, while the SE conception defines what: i) the 
function of a trait is,  it does not define what: ii) the abilities which are functional are. As 
we saw in chapter 3, the SE approach tells us that out of all the effects which an organism’s 
given trait has produced, it is those effects which historically promoted the survival and 
reproduction of its ancestors which are that trait’s function or functions. For the eye lineage 
this effect is visual acuity, for the lungs of the Pakicetus it is the exchange of certain gasses 
given certain environmental conditions. As we can see, whatever i) that function is - 
whatever those selected effects are- it is not merely an effect with a reliable history of the 
promoting the fitness of the organisms possessing it, it is additionally ii) a characteristic 
type of interaction between the organism and its environment - which then provides a 
selection advantage. The property of i) and the property of ii) are conceptually distinct and 
can come apart. As we appreciated, two traits with the same selection history will by 
necessity have the same functional abilities as per the the SE conception, but to have the 
same functional abilities two traits do not need to have the same selection history, it is not 
necessary for the selection histories of traits to be the same or similar if there are 
independent means of assessing that the effects which those traits produce are the same 
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effects. In the case of the eye lineage these means are available, in the case of the whale 
pakicetus-to-whale lineage they are not.  
Let us unpack this claim. Consider the patterns on the wings of the Viceroy butterfly: these 
mimic the patterns on the wings of the Monarch butterfly, and as predators tend to avoid 
Monarchs, due to the similarity in their wings’ appearance these predators will tend to avoid 
Viceroys also. This is the effect for which the patterns on the wings of Viceroys have has 
been selected and so according to SE conception are the wing-pattern’s function. The 
Viceroy wings’ history of selectively advantageous effects tells us what i) the function of 
their pattern is: it is mimicry, but it does not define what ii) the ability of mimicry itself is: 
mimicry is the ability of one species to appear as though it were another or as though it were 
an inert feature of its environment. In the case of the Viceroy, the wings pattern’s: i) selected 
effects, and: ii) ability to resemble a member of another species coincide, but they are 
clearly not equivalent properties and are conceptually distinguishable. The selected effects 
of the wings could have had nothing to do with mimicry - their patterns attracting mates 
instead to give a plausible example - and the Viceroy’s ability to resemble another species 
could have proven to be a selectively disadvantageous effect- if it hindered the butterfly 
from attracting potential mating partners.        
So when we agree with Nilsson & Pelger’s assessment that ‘visual acuity’ is the function 
which increases over the eye lineage’s depicted span and which provides each successive 
stage with a selective benefit over those which preceded, we are in fact supporting three 
separate claims. The first claim is that a) each stage in the eye lineage is selectively 
beneficial to those which proceeded it, the second claim is that b) the eye’s ability to detect 
light and produce a sharper image- its visual acuity - increases as the lineage progresses, 
and the third claim is that c) the effect which makes each stage selectively beneficial to those 
which precede it, is the eye’s increasing ability to detect light and produce a sharper image. 
What the function of the eye is - the effects for which it was selected - and what visual 
acuity is - the ability to detect light and to produce an image - coincide in the eye lineage, 
but the relationship here is contingent. The ability to detect light and to use it to produce a 
visual image is a selected effect, but it is not merely a selected effect: it is a complex ability 
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produced through a range of physical and anatomical factors: the physical properties of light 
itself, the area of light-sensitivity, the refractive index of the medium through which light 
travels and so on. All of these conspire in the eye lineage to create an effect for which the 
eye is subsequently selected, visual acuity improves over the lineage because greater visual 
acuity is selectively beneficial, but being selectively beneficial does not tell us what visual 
acuity consists in. As long as we can identify the various abilities produced by traits - be it 
mimicry or visual acuity - independently from their histories as selected effects, there 
should be no prohibition on the comparison of the performances of the traits possessed by 
different species, as long as the abilities produced by those traits are potentially measurable 
like mimicry, and indeed, visual acuity.    
It is not differences in historical selection pressures per se which prevent cross-species 
functional comparisons being carried out, but the fact that differences in selection pressure 
will very often result in the abilities of traits diverging past the point where the ancestral and 
descendant traits will be performing the same functional ability. This does not happen in the 
eye lineage as we can recognise the same ability of visual acuity in the triplicate layer of 
cells at the start of the lineage through to the fully-formed eye at the lineage’s close- thus 
permitting their comparison. This consistency in ability almost certainly does not occur to 
the traits over the Pakicetus-to-whale lineage and thus prevents their comparison. Kidneys 
of course remove waste from the blood stream and lungs extract oxygen from the air and 
expel carbon dioxide whether they are in the bodies of pakicetus or in the bodies of whales, 
but what counts as ‘good’ or ‘efficient’ waste removal or gas exchange is highly dependant 
on the rest of the organism’s physiology in the way the visual acuity is not. 
So while the SE conception warrants the comparison of the functions of traits belonging to 
the same or closely-related species; the functional performances of the traits of species 
which are not closely-related can still be carried out if the ability is not ‘species specific’ in 
the way the lung and kidney functions of pakicetus are, but the increasing visual acuity over 
the eye lineage is not. The SE conception provides assurances that when we do compare the 
functional performances of closely-related traits that we are comparing the natural 
properties of those traits - the effects for which they were selected - and not properties that 
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are imposed on them artificially by observers like ourselves. As we saw in chapter 3, the SE 
conception provides the constitutive-norms permitting appropriate comparison. But 
whatever the functions of traits are, they are not merely effects which have been selected: 
the function of the eye (at least those in the linage of Nilsson and Pelger) is to detect and 
produce visual images; this is the function of the triplicate layer of cells at the start of the 
eye-lineage, and is also the function of the fully-formed eye at the lineage’s end, despite 
these organs belonging to very different - albeit distantly related - species. As each stage in 
the lineage is successively better able to perform this function - which is something that can 
be independently measured - and as each stage evolved because it was better able to perform 
this function, the evolution depicted in the eye lineage is progressive. Later eyes are 
improvements on those which precede them.   
5.7 Chapter recap & conclusions   
  
In section 5.2 we identified delineation as a valid operation: lineages are objective parts of 
the natural world, and treating them as such should not be controversial. We do however 
need to provide good reasons to prioritise certain lineages over others particularly when the 
lineage in question is that of humans beings - although this does not rule the prioritisation of 
the human lineage out if alternative justifications can be given. In 5.3 we discussed 
demarcation. As lineages can be produced out of countless individuals and many species, 
the objective nature of the ‘stages’ through which a lineage evolves are less straightforward. 
Lineages can be demarcated in many different ways and often the reasons for dividing a 
lineage will be so as to characterise the lineage’s evolution as a ‘progressive’ process; 
changing the characteristics of the organisms and species earlier on in the lineage so that 
they resemble the characteristics of the organisms and species at the lineage’s close. Once 
the ‘theme’ bridging an ancestral and descendant population has been decided on there will 
be broad agreement on which stages of the lineage should be emphasised and used to 
demarcate any evolution that has taken place and which should not. In 5.4 we saw that 
although evolution is not forward-looking, the procedure of demarcation is. When the 
demarcation of a lineage is done so as to explain the incremental evolution of the lineage’s 
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later stages, the appearance of progressive evolution towards the lineages later stages will be 
the result. As we realised in 5.5 however, sometimes reality and representation coincide; a 
lineage can look progressive for the reasons stated in section 5.3, but actually be progressive 
for different reasons as stated in chapter 3; later stages of the lineage may be functionally 
superior to those which proceed them. In 5.6 we were initially concerned that our equating 
of evolutionary progress with functional improvement and our reliance on the SE 
conception of function revealed a potential weakness in our approach: it would seem to 
prevent the comparisons of the functional performances of distantly-related species, and so 
severely limit what counts as evolutionary progress as a result. We observed however, that 
although the SE conception is sufficient to tell us what the function of a trait is, it does not 
define what the abilities which are functional are; it is possible to identify these in different 
species independently of the SE approach. 
We conclude this dissertation in the chapter ahead by reviewing and reappraising the 
findings of previous chapters. In our introductory chapter we posed some prima facie 
possible objections to the project of defending progress in evolution, highlighted four 
underlying themes whose influence would guide our analysis, and acknowledged three 
‘central properties’ endemic in the work of previous authors’ attempts to defend progress in 
evolution with some degree of formality. We revisit these points with the benefit of our 
newly informed perspective. 
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Chapter 6 
Evolution, progress and biological function: review and 
conclusions       
6.1 Three objections reappraised  
The valedictory tasks of this chapter are to recap, reappraise and conclude. In our 
introductory chapter we signposted four prominent themes in the work ahead: the 
explanatory scope of natural selection, the applicability of normative terms to natural 
phenomena, the relationship between representation and reality, and the methodology used 
in understanding evolutionary phenomena. We also identified three ‘central properties’ that 
previous accounts of evolutionary progress have implicitly respected: direction, drive and 
improvement. Additionally, we were alerted to distinct objections from three separate 
camps: empirical science, naturalist philosophy, and those concerned with the adverse 
‘political’ implications a defence of progress in evolution might unwittingly support. With 
the benefit of the preceding analysis we are now in a position to answer these objections, 
discuss these prominent themes, and recognise how well our perspective on evolutionary 
progress respects the ‘central properties’ of those preceding - as well as extending and 
improving on them. We will start with the objections, concurrently recapping on this 
dissertation’s main points as we do so.  
Our investigation began on the ‘back foot’; defending the casual efficacy and creative 
abilities of natural selection against a range of attacks designed to characterise it as a 
statistical abstraction or wholly eliminative influence. We remained unconvinced by these 
arguments and noticed that despite their differences they were based on a shared 
misconception: that events happening to individual organisms - whether by their proximate 
environmental interactions or by the specifics of their genetic inheritance - are the exclusive 
sites of evolutionary causality. We emphasised that natural selection’s causality cannot be 
directly witnessed at the individual-level, but that this did not make natural selection at the 
population-level derivative. Individuals are parts of populations, therefore an individual’s 
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environmental interactions are a population’s environmental interactions, not derived from 
them. We then emphasised that although the creation of novel traits are due to individuals’ 
genetic inheritance and subsequent development, it is a mistake to malign natural selection’s 
influence in this process; it plays a crucial role in explaining why individuals have the 
specific genetic inheritances that they do. Were it not for natural selection retaining unlikely 
but selectively advantageous variation in a individual’s ancestral population, complex traits 
which require the combination of many such variants would be vanishingly unlikely to ever 
evolve.  
  
As we were defending the powers of natural selection that orthodoxy already recognises it 
to posses, our thinking on this subject spoke to none of the three camps’ objections directly 
but rather provided a secure footing for our later progressive claims.  
We then reappraised the philosophical problem of providing naturalistic warrant for the use 
of normative terms. The SE conception of function proved to be an essential tool in this 
project; through it we were able to naturalise biological function, and through naturalising 
biological function we were able to provide sufficient, empirical grounds for describing the 
functioning of specified traits as ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than the functioning of others. We very 
much moved from the back foot into a proactive stance here: our progressive interpretation 
of natural selection operating through differential functional effectiveness elucidated the 
sometimes confusing, yet widespread, practice of explaining the existence of complex traits 
due to them being ‘selected’. We observed that this manner of description is frequently 
elliptical: what is fully meant is that the causal history of complex traits is often one of trait 
variants successively providing a selection advantage due to increases in their functional 
efficacy: of traits improving. 
We can see clearly here that the scientific camp’s objection that natural selection should not 
be thought to produce improvement in any way is explicitly addressed. Our use of 
improvement is not supplementary to empirical explanation or conjured by conceptual 
sleight-of-hand, but an inherent part of the explanation for how complex adaptive traits are 
produced. Saying that trait A has a selection advantage over trait B may be an adequate 
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explanation for trait A’s prevalence over trait B, but it is far from a comprehensive 
explanation: for that we need the empirical facts on the ground, and that will involve 
knowing what trait A and trait B are doing. As we noted, perhaps whatever advantage A 
provides is very different to that of B, but our numerous examples where selection 
advantage was provided by functional improvement were not hard to come by; we can 
easily recognise this dynamic to be quite general and widespread.   
Notice that warranting the use of ‘improvement’ empirically should also put the 
philosophical camp’s concerns to rest as well as those of empirical science - at least in part. 
If the concepts of ‘improvement’ and ‘betterment’ perform an important explanatory role in 
evolutionary science as we have claimed, it is surely not for naturalist philosophy to 
intervene and counter-claim that this mode of explanation is invalid and its results therefore 
wrong. As we have stressed, the application of normativity here is: i) of a very different 
stripe to that concerning the actions and intentions of moral agents and about which 
philosophy quite rightly has much to say, and: ii) accurately describes genuine causal 
interactions. Our darker butterflies in their industrial environment proliferated because they 
were better camouflaged, later eyes were selected because of improvements in their visual 
acuity; if naturalist philosophy feels that this is an inappropriate characterisation, we might 
at this point suggest that the onus is on those opposed to explain why.   
This answers the philosophical naturalist camp’s normative concerns, how does our 
perspective fare in the light of potential anti-naturalist criticism? Notice we seem to be very 
far away from the top of a ‘slippery slope’ into anti-naturalist rhetoric here. Having grounds 
for the use of ‘improvement’ gives us grounds for the use of ‘progress’; a lineage featuring 
traits selected by virtue of their functional improvement will be a ‘progressive’ one in 
respect of that specific improvement , and we could, if we wished, describe better 40
functioning traits as more ‘advanced’ or ‘superior’, perhaps even ‘better designed’ - 
 Although a lineage could of course not be progressive in respect of other traits which are not improving in 40
their functional efficacy over the same duration - or in respect of traits which are getting functionally worse. 
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although we will return to the issue of ‘design’  more fully below. What ‘improvement’ 41
does not provide is warrant for thinking that nature is teleological, purposeful, or manifests 
intent in any way. Again we must credit the SE conception of function for granting us 
immunity to this criticism. As is well established, a fundamental strength of the SE 
conception is its ability to account for the apparent purposefulness of traits naturalistically. 
Functions are not the goals of traits, they are not what traits are for, functions are past 
effects for which traits were selected, the mode of explanation make no reference to goals, 
purposes or objectives and our progressive use of the SE concept of function does not 
introduce them nor provide any grounds for this.          
Not wishing to consider our confirmation of natural selection’s progressive credentials to be 
the exclusive means by which progress in evolution could be justifiably defended, we 
outlined what qualities ‘big picture’ evidence of progress - that showing improvement 
across species, in higher taxa, or perhaps even in the history of life as whole - would need in 
order to be considered authentic and representative of genuinely progressive phenomena. 
We identified the essential ingredient for ‘big picture’ progress as a mechanism for the 
phenomena, and further suggested the properties we would expect a mechanism for the 
generation of authentic large scale evolutionary phenomena to possess. Lacking these 
properties Wilson’s pattern of ‘diversity-promoting’ stages was found to be quasi, whereas 
Dawkins’ pattern of co-evolutionary arms races was found to be authentic - and moreover 
somewhat familiar. The incremental improvements in function we identified as the basis for 
evolutionary progress are likely to be a major feature of the arms races Dawkins describes. 
After widening our perspective to cross-species and higher taxa we then narrowed our focus 
in order to examine the evolution which occurs over evolutionary lineages: the procedure 
we use to delineate a single lineage out from the ‘phylogenetic bush’ and the procedure we 
use to demarcate the characteristic stages of the evolution which the lineage has undergone. 
We noted that the recognition of an evolutionary lineage is very different from the 
 We will be keeping the term ‘design’ in inverted commas for the remainder of this chapter. Dennett prefers 41
to capitalise Design (Dennett 1995a), while Dawkins at times uses the term ‘Designoid’ (Dawkins 1997) - 
both perhaps wary of deliberate misinterpretation. To my thinking little hangs on this.    
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prioritisation of an evolutionary lineage: something which has been conflated in the claims 
of anthropocentrism often held by those sceptical that evolutionary progress amounts to 
anything over and above human aggrandisement. While the recognition of an evolutionary 
lineage is uncontentious, the manner in which its evolution is represented is open to 
considerable interpretation. We again considered some examples: the evolution of the whale 
while clearly radical, was not progressive; whereas the evolution of the vertebrate eye was 
progressive. Once more the reasons for this were familiar: the eye lineage charted a clear 
series of improvements in a narrowly defined function in the manner spelt out in chapter 3, 
and in the manner that the offensive and defensive traits of the species locked into Dawkins’ 
arms races are likely to improve. 
Here again we can observe two camps’ concerns. Although this time it is the political 
camp’s unease of differentially apprising the natural world, combined with the philosophical 
camp’s lingering worries over the reintroduction of teleology. 
As we noticed in our investigation of demarcation, these philosophical worries are not 
unfounded. Charting the steps towards the ‘end state’ of an evolutionary lineage - whether 
the Cit+ phenotype or the vertebrate eye - in order to understand how it was achieved is the 
express purpose of this type of evolutionary explanation and is inherently teleological. As 
we appreciated however, the teleology is a property of the method, not a property of the 
phenomena. We understood the evolution of the vertebrate eye as a progressive process - 
and not a teleological one - because over the span of the lineage the organs depicted were 
functional improvements of those which preceded them - not because the ‘final’ product was 
in anyway predestined. The procedure of demarcation and its usual application may be 
misleading but our approach to evolutionary progress is quite separate and distinct from 
this.           
The concern that our limited defence of evolutionary progress may provide cover for 
‘human imperialism’ can also be dismantled. Exposing the flaws in an argument which 
conflates progress with anthropocentrism does not in turn imply a defence of this position. 
As we learned, progress in a very real sense can be found in the improvement of traits 
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possessed by organisms far removed from humankind, from primates, from mammals, and 
indeed even from eukaryotes. Once more the SE conception provided a welcome break on 
unwarranted conceptual expansion: it is functions which are performed better or worse, and 
it is traits which have functions - then it is organisms which have traits. We can say that trait 
A is better than trait B in the context of performing function f  by virtue of differences in A’s 
and B’s functionality, but the most this tells is that A and B as traits are better or worse, this 
does not give us grounds to think of the organisms possessing A and B as better or worse 
organisms; the evaluations of trait performance are not transferable to organisms in this 
way. 
If we still find the question of specifically human evolutionary progress to be of interest we 
might consider the following. Firstly, it is unclear what functional improvement has 
occurred in any great degree over the human lineage, let alone is characteristic of it. What 
selected effects do we think later members of the human lineage perform to a higher 
standard than earlier members? We may, if we wish, provide our own suggestions to this 
question adding to what is already a contested and over-crowed field. However secondly, if 
human evolution was progressive, the most that this will tell us is that some of the traits of 
later members of the human lineage are functional improvements over the traits of earlier 
members; this does not remotely provide any platform for the notion of human superiority, 
nor does it provide even the thinest veneer of scientific respectability for the abuses of other 
non-human members of the natural world.    
6.2 Four central themes revisited  
As we can now appreciate, the four central themes which we identified in our opening 
chapter were strongly represented throughout our analysis; we rarely strayed far from at 
least one of them.  
Our main theme concerned the power of natural selection. This issue was addressed most 
explicitly in our defence of natural selection as both a causal and as a creative mechanism 
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but was pervasive throughout. Through doing this, we not only reaffirmed natural 
selection’s causal and creative efficacy per se but were able to appreciate the sort of 
creativity that natural selection is able to produce: composite traits requiring multiple 
individual traits for their production. We additionally recognised that the history of a trait’s 
selected effects informs us as to that trait’s function - natural selection’s role was somewhat 
different here in being diagnostic in addition to being casual. We then observed that natural 
selection was able to account for improvement: to the extent that the current effects of traits 
are of the same type as the effects for which they were historically selected, their current 
selection advantage will be due to their improved functioning. 
We can notice the scale of the phenomena for which natural selection was held responsible 
increased greatly as our work progressed. We started with mere changes in population 
structure, then moved to the creation of multi-variant traits, then in our investigation into the 
authenticity of large scale evolutionary patterns we identified natural selection as the only 
suitable mechanism, although stopped short of suggesting that such authentic patterns exist. 
The explanatory scope of natural selection overlapped to a considerable extent with our 
second thematic thread: the application of normative terms to natural phenomena. 
Unsurprisingly, as our warrant for the use of normative terms was ultimately due to the 
powers of natural selection - albeit through the intermediary of biological function.  
As we noted above: normativity’s reach into evolutionary science was strictly limited. The 
possession of a function does not impose ‘obligations’ on traits as supporters of the SE 
conception of function have variously contended, nor does the SE conception provide 
unrestricted grounds for the application of normative terms outside of the narrow remit of 
biological function. If the function of a trait endures over extended spans of time and 
anatomical change then the normative appraisal of the functioning of that trait in terms of 
better or worse and so on will be appropriate. But this is only warranted due to the 
persistence of the function, if the nature of the effect for which a trait is selected changes - 
as we might expect it is very likely to do over extended spans of time - the comparing of 
later and earlier ‘functioning’ becomes incoherent; it would be unclear what the later 
versions of the traits were better at.  
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We saw the limitation on normative reach provided by the SE conception quite clearly 
exercised in Wilson’s ‘progressive’ approach to biodiversity. Even if an underlying 
mechanism for Wilson’s pattern - or indeed any pattern discerned in the evolution of life at 
scales above the functions of traits - were discovered, this would make the pattern authentic, 
but it would not make the pattern one of improvement. We may find biodiversity, biological 
complexity or hierarchical organisation to be of particular interest, and have very good 
reasons for valuing it, but if so we can reasonably ask for the basis for these normative 
attitudes. What are these values based on? The SE conception of function provides a clear 
answer to this, increasing biodiversity and complexity in themselves do not.        
Notice that a consideration of our third theme: the interplay between representation and 
reality provides somewhat mixed results. The traditional and explicitly progressive 
Malthusian-based interpretation of species competing in the struggle for survival with 
natural selection driving the survivors to ever greater strength and sophistication proves to 
be approximately correct; the caveat being that natural selection does not necessitate 
progressive improvement as a naive interpretation of the ‘struggle for survival’ might 
assume. Organisms ‘outcompeting’ their rivals is not enough, competition must be in the 
strict sense that participants are competing at the same activity and superior functional 
performance in that activity won out. In contrast however other highly prevalent ways of 
representing evolution were shown to be potentially misleading. We have already revisited 
the shortcomings of the ‘big picture’ approach to large scale evolutionary phenomena, but in 
addition to this, the procure of demarcating an evolutionary lineage into its component 
‘evolutionary stages’ invariably presents the nature of the actual evolution from which it has 
been selected as progressive, whether that evolution actually is progressive or is not. We 
rightly object to the ‘onwards and upwards’ depiction of human evolution as a series of 
stages leading progressively from quadruped ape to spear-carrying man, but as our 
Pakicetus-to-whale lineage demonstrated, other depictions based upon explaining later 
stages through their evolutionary predecessors provide the same impressionistically-
progressive result; and as our analysis of the eye lineage’s representation demonstrated, 
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even when the evolution depicted is progressive, this approach presents it as more 
progressive than it actually is.  
Our fourth underlying theme concerned the methodology used in understanding 
evolutionary phenomena. This theme touched upon many of the others. Based upon 
methodological approach we might characterise our preceding work as composed from two 
halves. The first half - defending and reappraising the explanatory reach of natural selection 
-  utilised a ‘bottom-up’, process-centred approach, in contrast to the second half which 
employed an approach explicitly ‘top-down’ and ‘pattern-centric’. With the benefit of 
hindsight we can now recognise these approaches as complimentary. On the one hand, the 
process of natural selection need not produce any progressive phenomena - it need not 
produce anything at all - making an exclusively bottom-up approach based solely on natural 
selection insufficient. While on the other we need to see what phenomena natural selection 
is capable of producing - to witness its effects - in order to confirm that its influence is one 
of progressive improvement. As we have addressed already, a top-down approach based 
solely on the apparent ‘progressiveness’ of evolutionary phenomena is insufficient. 
Progressive-seeming evolutionary phenomena may be generated arbitrarily, or through 
causes for which the term ‘progressive’ would be inappropriate.  
We might have cause to think that despite our claims to the contrary the explanatory reach 
and casual efficacy of natural selection has been given too great a prominence in this 
dissertation, that natural selection has acted as something of deus ex machina, and that we 
are adaptationists way beyond sensible limit. This characterisation would, I think, be unfair. 
We do not intend to malign the critical role that mutation plays by creating genetic variation 
and therefore its contribution in the generation of functional improvement itself, nor do we 
contend that natural selection is the only conceivable means through which large-scale 
authentic evolutionary patterns may be generated; as our pains to set out the required 
properties for an alternative mechanism should contend. Clearly however, as our warrant for 
the normative application of ‘improvement’ is based upon the SE conception of function, 
and the SE conception of function is explicitly based upon natural selection, our claim that 
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‘improvement’ could be accounted for without natural selection might ring hollow. But 
consider the following:  
Recall fig 5.2 - Nilsson & Pelger’s depiction of the evolution the vertebrate eye. We might 
be confident that if anything looks like an example of progressive evolution it is this: a 
sequence charting both increases in anatomical complexity and sophistication of ‘design’. 
We established that this series was indeed progressive as the organs’ selected effect - visual 
acuity - could be seen to improve throughout. This would be impossible to defend if natural 
selection were not the cause, as there would be no selected effect. As we also saw however, 
what the function of a trait is, and the abilities which are functional, are conceptually 
distinct and the SE conception of function only has purchase on the first of these properties. 
The ‘eye’ at stage 1 of Nilsson & Pelger’s sequence still produces a visual image - the 
ability which is functional - as does the eye at stage 8 no matter how these organs were 
produced; it is just that without natural selection, visual acuity could not be these organ’s 
function.  
Now let us completely remove natural selection from the equation and suppose somewhat 
improbably that 160 years of biological science is mistaken, that natural selection is not a 
genuine evolutionary mechanism, and that Lamarck was correct all along; evolution is 
driven by the inheritance of somatic differences acquired over the lifetime of an organism 
and passed onto their offspring. Clearly visual acuity could not be the eye’s SE function in 
these circumstances, but would we still consider the sequence to be progressive? Although 
removing the SE conception from consideration would also mean discarding the entire 
conceptual framework we have based upon it, we might suspect the answer to this question 
would very likely be yes: the sequence of eye evolution is still charting increases in visual 
acuity . It is of course difficult to predict how we might appraise philosophically the results 42
of a mechanism which does not exist - let alone one as outré as Lamarck’s -  but the 
lengthening of the necks of the giraffes so frequently used to illustrate Lamarckian evolution 
 Although of course without the diagnostic ability of the SE conception to inform us as to the organ’s 42
function we would have to produce alternative means for justifying that the effect of visual acuity should be 
given preference over the many other effects that the eye’s ‘Lamarckian evolution’ would increase. 
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were no less progressive because they were not produced by natural selection, and we might 
guess that neither would the eye’s evolution seem any less progressive were it driven by the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics. 
Natural selection is the only mechanism for evolutionary progress which we know of, but 
our work here does not provide grounds for thinking it the only conceivable mechanism.                    
6.3 Direction, drive, improvement... and design.  
We noted that despite substantial differences in discipline and philosophical outlook, 
previous approaches to progress in evolution implicitly respected three central properties: 
direction, drive, and improvement. As we can now appreciate, the most contentious of these 
properties - improvement - is something that our perspective of progress as specifically 
functional improvement accounts for, and moreover accounts for naturalistically.  
Consider some of our examples of progressive evolution: the increases in functional 
efficacy as evidenced by the visual acuity of the vertebrate eye, by the mimicry of the 
Viceroy butterfly, and by the motility of the bacterial flagellum. Clearly the evolution of all 
three of these traits is directional. Again, using Nilsson & Pelger’s illustration eye evolution 
as a rough guide (fig 5.2), if we were to randomly arrange each of its eight stages we would 
be able place them in correct temporal order with a high degree of confidence; we could be 
reasonably certain that this would also be possible for both the changes in appearance of the 
Viceroy butterfly and the evolution of the bacterial flagellum also. Information concerning 
the traits’ various functions would not be required to achieve this; with the incremental 
appearance of new parts and the incremental disappearance or alteration of others, 
morphology alone would very likely prove sufficient to do the job for us.   
As we have explained extensively, it is equally clear that the evolution of each of these traits 
is driven and not accidental. In common with almost all post-synthesis perspectives on 
evolutionary progress, we account for the changes in the eye, and in the butterfly and 
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bacterial morphologies through the actions of natural selection. Subsequent stages in each of 
these lineages are retained because they provide a selection advantage over those which 
precede them. 
Concerning the property of improvement, this again has been explained extensively. We 
might however, emphasise that the improvement that we have defended in this dissertation 
is not only compatible with mainstream evolutionary practice and philosophical naturalism, 
but, plausibly performs an explanatory role for our understanding of how complex, ‘design-
like’ traits are produced. The progressiveness of these traits’ evolution is not something 
imposed upon them by teleologically-minded or apophenic observers, the incremental 
construction of these traits is characterised by improvements in their functionality and are 
quite real. Improvement in these traits’ functioning is not some sort of explanatory optional 
extra - it has genuine casual efficacy. Later variants in such lineages are not merely 
selectively beneficial, they are selectively beneficial because they are improvements on 
those which precede them: later eyes are advantageous because they have improved visual 
acuity, later Viceroy morphology is advantageous because it provides improved mimicry, 
later bacteria enjoy a selective advantage because of their improved motility. A 
comprehensive empirical explanation for each of these traits’ evolution would clearly 
include natural selection to account for the ‘driven’ nature of changes undergone, but would 
be severely incomplete if the explicitly progressive nature of the ‘facts on the ground’ for 
each subsequent stage being selectively beneficial were not included.  
We will sign off this dissertation with a conjecture: how our discussion on function and 
improvement might bear on the question of ‘design’ in nature - an aspect of adaptive 
phenomena which has so far remained somewhat in the the periphery of our project, 
avoiding direct engagement.   
We noted briefly at chapter 3’s close that some improvements in biological functioning will 
be more easily achieved than improvements in others. The increases in camouflage enjoyed 
by the moths in the industrialised north for example could initially be achieved relatively 
simply, perhaps by the introduction of an allele making the organisms possessing it darker 
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and more difficult to spot; in contrast, increases in the nocturnal bird’s auditory sensitivity 
will require more particular and precise modification and - ceteris paribus - therefore be 
harder for the accumulation of random variation to achieve. We might pause here and reflect 
on how differently we would apply the notion of ‘design’ or ‘design-like’ in each of these 
cases.   
To fully bring these intuitions to light, consider how the concept of ‘design’ might apply to a 
lineage undergoing progressive evolution by virtue of variation producing improvements in 
functional efficacy. For the moth population lightly coloured wings will be badly 
camouflaged against the newly-darkened trees of their polluted environment; after the 
introduction of the ‘darkening allele’, the organisms possessing it become more effectively 
camouflaged than the population average. Given enough consistency in selection advantage 
we would say that the darker wings’ colouration has the function of camouflage: for this 
would be the wing colour’s selected effect. Now consider the arrival of another allele, 
making the moths’ wings slightly darker. From our perspective we would understand this to 
be an improvement in their functioning, and so to demonstrate evolutionary progress to 
some degree. Do we also think that the colour of the darkest wings so far in this example 
shows evidence of ‘design’? This seems like quite an odd question to ask, and one for which 
there is no clear answer. In terms of environmental suitability the wings seem ‘more 
designed’ than those lighter, but the notion here seems misapplied. The alteration to the trait 
strikes us as too rudimentary to warrant the use of the term.     
Now consider a third allele introduced into the moth population, this time its phenotypic 
effect produces an even darker wing, increasing camouflage still further. Again despite this 
being progressive - a function is improving after all - we might still harbour doubts as to 
whether the language of ‘design’ would be appropriate. But if not now, then when? One 
suggestion for the partial incongruity between ‘improvement’ - which is happening here - 
and ‘design’ - which might not be - could be this: in lieu of an operational definition for the 
use of the term, ‘design’ seems to require changes to more than one aspect of the trait. If this 
is right, then the use of ‘design’ for the moths’ darkened wing-colour would be referring to a 
single aspect and therefore seem somewhat pedestrian. Consider how we might appraise the 
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arrival of a different kind of variation in the moth population, perhaps an allele which 
softens the edges of the wings, breaking up the moths’ outline and providing even better 
camouflage over those moths which lack it. Although improved, the identity of the function 
remains the same: camouflage, but now there are multiple different aspects of the moth 
conspiring to produce that function, ‘design-talk’ suddenly seems more appropriate. To 
drive this point home, consider additional variation in another phenotypic dimension of 
variation, increasing further the moths’ camouflage ability, but on this occasion making their 
wings more similar in shape to the leaves of the trees of their polluted environment. Now 
with pattern, outline and shape conspiring to increase camouflage ability, the notion that the 
moth’s wings exhibit ‘design’ seems near-unavoidable. The greater the amount of parts 
sharing what we might term ‘functional integration’ in this way, it seems the more their 
apparent ‘design’ impresses itself upon us.       
Notice that this ‘design-like’ functional integration is exactly what is happening in our 
paradigm progressive example: Nilsson and Pelger’s progressive illustration of eye 
evolution (fig 5.2). The flat triplicate layer of light-sensitive cells gradually deepens, then 
further along in the lineage, the aperture constricts, a lens is introduced then further refined. 
The dimensions along which change occurs in this sequence are many, but they are tightly 
integrated; both anatomically, and functionally in they together improve efficacy in the 
organ’s given selected effect. While complexity per se is rightly dismissed as indicative of 
evolutionary progress, the ‘design-like’ qualities of traits such as vertebrate eyes, 
camouflaged wings, and bacterial flagella confer on them complexity of a recognisably 
different stripe. The parts of these traits are not merely diverse and distinct, they are diverse 
and distinct and integrated so as to produce a single functional effect. Once more our 
identification and use of function in our analysis is baring conceptual fruit. We might further 
suggest that we not only recognise ‘design’ in evolution through the contribution of diverse 
parts to a common function, but moreover suggest that we also explain the evolution of the 
‘design-like’ properties of complex traits through the fact that, in some cases, increases in 
functional effectiveness may only be achieved through a more complex ‘design’ of the trait 
responsible for producing them.  
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This claim may be speculative, but consider that initially the increases in the moths’ 
camouflage are comparatively easy to achieve, as darker colouration produces better 
camouflage the wings need only change in colour to increase their functional effectiveness. 
But as the moths can only match themselves to the colour of their environment up to a given 
point, once this has been achieved, for camouflage to increase further it will have to be due 
to changes in a different anatomical dimension; as we suggested above, perhaps the 
contours of the wings could be softened, or the shapes of the wings themselves modified. As 
each of these modifications provides a selection advantage, we are able to explain them 
through the mechanism of natural selection - obviously; but as we can recognise through 
this dissertation’s analysis this is not natural selection simpliciter; this sequence is also 
progressive in that each subsequent modification is an improvement in the effectiveness of a 
given function- here camouflage. This might be an adequate description if functional 
effectiveness were increased due to change in a limited number of ways, such as when the 
wings become darker only. But when ‘one-dimensional’ change of this kind has reached a 
certain limit, functionality can only be increased by changes in a different phenotypic 
‘dimension’, and it is when this occurs that the design-like character of complex adaptive 
traits becomes increasingly apparent. This is an increase in complexity, but complexity of 
quite a distinctive kind: the number of different aspects of a given trait which contribute to 
the production of a narrowly-defined function.  
As is well known some, but not all, evolution is due to natural selection; a central task in 
this dissertation has been to demonstrate that that some, but not all, natural selection is due 
to functional improvement and will be progressive through doing so - a task we might feel 
that has been successfully achieved. Here it would seem that if complex design like-
properties are the means through which the effectiveness of a given function can be further 
improved, progressive evolution - characterised as improvements in functional effectiveness 
- could explain how the design-like properties of complex traits come about. Traits gain 
design-like properties, as when one dimension of improvement is unavailable or exhausted 
design-like properties are an alternative means through which a trait’s functional efficacy 
can be further increased.   
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If our thinking here is correct then in common with many alternative approaches to 
evolutionary progress this would lead us to consider the design-like qualities of traits as 
‘advanced’ and indicative of evolution’s creative and progressive potential. We could be 
understood as following in the grand tradition of J.Huxley, Simpson, Mayr and so on - but 
with an important caveat. In contrast to these other approaches which consider such traits as 
advanced on largely impressionistic grounds, or perhaps due to anatomical complexity 
simpliciter, from our perspective this claim is empirically justified. The design-like qualities 
of complex adaptive traits are ‘advanced’ as they provide explicit evidence that progressive 
evolution has taken place; such traits exist because of their functional superiority. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Writing in 1988 the philosopher and evolutionary biologist Fransisco Ayala (in Nitecki 
(eds.) 1988) argued that: ‘...the notion of progress is axiological, and therefore it cannot be a 
strictly scientific term: value judgments are not part and parcel of scientific discourse, which 
is characterised by empirically testable and objective descriptions’ (ibid p81), before adding: 
‘ ...no attempt to define progress as a purely biological concept has succeeded.’ (ibid p84).  
In the light of the preceding analysis, I hope that it will now be clear in what sense Ayala 
was mistaken. It is true that the concept of progress will involve the application of ‘values’; 
whether the progress is societal progress, technological progress or the progress which we 
intuitively feel that evolution by natural selection is capable of producing. But Ayala’s ready 
classification of the diverse species of ‘value’ used in our understanding of nature as 
belonging to the single axiological genus was an assumption - and a wrong one. We have 
not only demonstrated that ‘value judgments’ are part and parcel of scientific discourse - as 
it is hard to understand how we might explain differential functioning without them; and we 
have have also shown that the specific values involved in some evolutionary descriptions 
are empirically testable and objective - and moreover have both explanatory and causal 
power.  
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With these conceptual restrictions found to be unwarranted, the bar on appreciating progress 
in evolution as a purely biological concept has been lifted. Despite the interwoven histories 
of ‘progress’ and ‘evolution’ stretching back in antiquity, contemporary attempts to untangle 
these two concepts have been unsuccessful, and it seems, premature. Progress in evolution 
is real and moreover is a common feature throughout the tree of life.     
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